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ABSTRACT 
 
A Meta-Analysis of Information Processing Measures of Intelligence, Performance, and Group 
Score Differences 
 
by 
 
Elliott Crofts Larson 
 
Advisor: Dr. Charles A. Scherbaum 
 
Intelligence is one of the most studied constructs in industrial-organizational (I-O) and 
educational psychology. Findings from numerous studies and meta-analyses have consistently 
demonstrated the power of intelligence measures to predict performance across a wide range of 
domains. This research has been fruitful and provides strong evidence for the utility of 
intelligence measures in organizations and schools. However, while intelligence measures have 
been developed and applied for over a century, most research in I-O psychology has relied on 
operationalizations of intelligence that focus on a person’s knowledge. Meta-theories of 
intelligence propose that intelligence can simultaneously be conceptualized as a person’s ability 
to process information. From this perspective, intelligence is not just what a person knows but 
also a person’s ability to maintain, learn, and use information to reason. Approaching 
intelligence as information processing offers unique opportunities for assessing intelligence that 
may explain additional variance in workplace outcomes in conjunction with commonly used 
intelligence measures. Furthermore, theory and early data suggests information processing 
measures may reduce group score differences typically reported with other types of intelligence 
measures. For these reasons, it is important to understand the existing literature on information 
processing measures. The current study offers insight into the utility of information processing 
measures in applied settings through a meta-analytic design. Samples examining information 
processing measures were collected and examined to evaluate if they predict job performance, 
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job-oriented training performance, and academic performance. Several variables, including the 
theoretical approach used to develop the measure, the diversity of task types in the measure, and 
the language knowledge requirement needed to respond to items on the measure, were tested as 
moderators of these relationships. In addition, the group score differences between African 
Americans and Caucasians on information processing measures were analyzed. Overall, the 
findings support information processing measures as valid predictors of outcomes across several 
critical domains. Group score differences were also found to be smaller than estimates from prior 
meta-analyses examining other intelligence measures. Results from the moderator tests provided 
several interesting trends in the data that require further examination in future research. The 
current study offers insights into how information processing measures operate in applied 
settings and is a step towards expanding the use of these measures in I-O psychology.   
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Intelligence has always been considered a complex construct with a wide range of 
definitions (Sternberg & Detterman, 1987). These definitions vary in the attributes they 
emphasize, such as those that frame intelligence around high-level cognitive functions whereas 
others are more honed on intelligence as knowledge structures (e.g., Jensen, 1980; Neisser et al., 
1996; Sternberg, 2003; Sternberg & Detterman, 1987). To better map the domain of intelligence, 
Ackerman (1996) offered a meta-theory of intelligence that distinguishes between intelligence-
as-process and intelligence-as-knowledge. This model effectively recognizes that intelligence is 
not a singular construct, but rather has various factors to it. While the idea that there are multiple 
domains of intelligence is not a new one (e.g., Cattell-Horn-Carroll model) (McGrew, 1997), 
Ackerman’s meta-theory is particularly effective at demonstrating the need for different types of 
measures. Specifically, this meta-theory emphasizes that certain measures of intelligence are 
better suited to assess people’s ability to process information or to assess their existing 
knowledge structures, and the type of measure applied in a situation should be aligned with the 
testing needs.  
Ackerman’s meta-theory is a useful tool for summarizing current conceptualizations of 
intelligence, but also highlights the gaps that still exist in how intelligence is examined 
(Ackerman & Beier, 2005). While advancements in several disciplines, including psychology, 
cognitive science, and neuroscience, have promoted novel methods for measuring intelligence 
that relate directly to information processing (e.g., Jäger & Althoff, 1994; Naglieri & Das, 2005), 
measures used in some fields still rely heavily on intelligence-as-knowledge. In particular, 
industrial-organizational (I-O) psychology has undergone limited methodological developments 
related to intelligence in the past few decades and has rarely adopted measures that reflect an 
information processing approach to intelligence (e.g., Agnello, Ryan, & Yusko, 2015; Fagan & 
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Ployhart, 2015; Scherbaum et al., 2015; Scherbaum, Goldstein, Yusko, Ryan, & Hanges, 2012). 
Instead, I-O psychology researchers often rely on the tenets of Spearman’s (1927) intelligence 
theory, which suggest that the content of an intelligence measure is not as relevant as how 
strongly the measure relates to a general factor of intelligence (e.g., Dahlke & Sackett, 2017; 
Gottfredson, 2002; McDaniel & Kepes, 2014; Olea & Ree, 1994; Ree, Earles, & Teachout, 1994; 
Schmidt, 2002). These measures of general intelligence, or g, have only evolved slightly since 
their original development over a hundred years ago (Sternberg & Kaufman, 1996; Wasserman, 
2012) and are typically rooted in measurement designs that assess intelligence-as-knowledge 
(e.g., Lubinski & Dawis, 1992; Roznowski, Dickter, Hong, Sawin, & Shute, 2000; Sternberg & 
Wagner, 1993). As a result, most measures utilized in I-O psychology are often considered 
heavily knowledge-based (Hunt, 2000).  
The narrow use of intelligence-as-knowledge measures in I-O psychology is perpetuated 
by researchers emphasizing the utility of these measures (Scherbaum et al., 2012). Indeed, a 
great deal of importance has been placed on the effectiveness of knowledge-based intelligence 
tests. Validity generalization and meta-analysis studies demonstrate that intelligence measures 
effectively predict an array of life outcomes, including educational success, job performance, and 
life satisfaction (e.g., Hülsheger, Maier, & Stumpp, 2007; Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Kramer, 
2009; Kuncel & Hezlett, 2007; Salgado et al., 2003; Schmidt, 2002; Ziegler, Dietl, Danay, 
Vogel, & Bühner, 2011). While the predictive power of these tests makes them attractive to 
utilize across various settings and demonstrates their utility, it has also led to a “case closed” 
mentality to how intelligence is measured in I-O psychology (e.g., Goldstein, Zedeck, & 
Goldstein, 2002; Scherbaum et al., 2012). This mentality has led researchers to rest on the 
collective laurels of the field, which has limited attempts to improve on the test design and 
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features of current intelligence measures. While the correlation between intelligence and job 
performance is frequently cited as .51 (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998), this finding is corrected for 
range restriction and reflects one particular measure of intelligence used in a structured research 
program. More often, research on common measures of intelligence report uncorrected 
correlations with job performance in the .20s (Schmitt, 2014) or low .30s (Bobko, Roth, & 
Potosky, 1999). This suggests that while typical measures of intelligence are important predictors 
of performance, there is still additional variance that can be explained by other measures. 
Furthermore, while intelligence measures are lauded for their predictive validity, many 
researchers still express concerns about the score differences that are typically seen between 
various groups, in particular for people of different races (e.g., Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 
2001; Outtz, 2010; Roth, Bevier, Bobko, Switzer, & Tyler, 2001; Sackett, Schmitt, Ellingson, & 
Kabin, 2001; Sackett & Shen, 2009). Although some researchers argue that these score 
differences are a result of genetics or biological factors (Herrnstein & Murray, 1994; Jensen, 
1998; Rushton & Jensen, 2005), there is growing consensus that at least some of these 
differences are attributable to components of cognitive tests that are associated with race, but not 
with actual job performance. This is referred to as performance-irrelevant race-related variance 
(e.g., Cole, 1973; Darlington, 1971; Newman, Hanges, & Outtz, 2007; Outtz & Newman, 2010) 
and suggests that there is the possibility of reducing group score differences between races on 
intelligence measures without reducing their validity.  
Given the importance of utilizing well-validated predictors of workplace outcomes, 
especially due to the potentially high costs and risks associated with selection procedures 
(Yusko, Bellenger, Larson, Hanges, & Aiken, 2017), it is understandable why I-O psychologists 
favor using intelligence measures with an established utility instead of adopting intelligence 
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measures or measurement designs from other disciplines until there is sufficient evidence of their 
validity and value (Oswald & Hough, 2012). The potential impact, both positive and negative, of 
intelligence measures in organizations means there must be a strong, empirical vetting process 
prior to implementing them. However, simply choosing intelligence measures based on 
convention and not on an a priori evaluation of the target construct can be equally problematic as 
it potentially limits the domain of intelligence being assessed (Roznowski et al., 2000; 
Scherbaum et al., 2015). As a result, other tests of intelligence that could increase the coverage 
of the construct and are better aligned with the outcome of interest are not evaluated and 
advanced in the field, marking stagnation in how intelligence is measured and potentially leaving 
additional predictive power untapped.  
This is particularly problematic since an applied field like I-O psychology has much to 
gain from leveraging information processing measures to predict important work outcomes. 
Organizations continue to place a premium on employees’ ability to think analytically (Aydin, 
Leblebici, Arslan, Kilic, & Oktem, 2005), adapt to environmental changes (Fagan & Ployhart, 
2015), solve increasingly complex problems (Edmondson, 2012), and manage multiple and 
competing tasks (Bosco, Allen, & Singh, 2015; König & Waller, 2010), all of which are abilities 
associated with an information processing approach to intelligence (e.g., Gottfredson, 1997; 
Luria, 1973). Information processing is also believed to underlie the acquisition of new 
information (Ackerman, 1996), and therefore can play a critical role in how employees learn new 
skills and knowledge (Cowan, 2005). While there are examples of information processing 
measures being utilized in other applied fields, like educational psychology (e.g., Mandelman, 
Barbot, & Grigorenko, 2016; McCallum & Bracken, 2012; Sabet, Scherbaum, & Goldstein, 
2013), and even some examples in I-O psychology (e.g., Bosco et al., 2015; Higgins, Peterson, 
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Pihl, & Lee, 2007), this research is still limited compared to research on intelligence-as-
knowledge. By integrating additional research from the information processing approach into I-O 
psychology, researchers may benefit from modern and interdisciplinary theories of intelligence 
and capitalize on a growing number of new measures intended to evaluate one’s intelligence 
while reducing reliance on a person’s prior knowledge. Furthermore, this integration fits with 
recent calls by researchers to expand the measurement domain of intelligence in I-O psychology 
(Fagan & Ployhart, 2015; Reeve, Scherbaum, & Goldstein, 2015).  
Measures of information processing have shown promising early evidence of predictive 
validity (e.g., Bosco et al., 2015; Higgins et al., 2007; Mandelman et al., 2016; McCallum & 
Bracken, 2012). A prior meta-analysis demonstrated that a specific type of information 
processing measures, fluid reasoning measures, had uncorrected correlations with job 
performance (r = .14; k = 23), training performance (r = .25; k = 20), and academic performance 
(r = .22; k = .41), demonstrating evidence of their predictive validity (Postlethwaite, 2012). 
While this study provided initial evidence of the predictive power of fluid reasoning measures, it 
only covered a segment of the available information processing measures and it did not examine 
group score differences. As such, there is currently no comprehensive review of information 
processing measures and their predictive power. This could be a contributing factor to the lack of 
adoption of information processing measures by researchers in I-O psychology as they may 
prefer to stay “just behind the cutting edge of intelligence theories…to take advantage of theories 
and research findings that have already withstood a great deal of scientific and empirical 
scrutiny” (Oswald & Hough, 2012, p. 172). Therefore, I will conduct a meta-analysis of 
information processing measures to examine their ability to predict performance outcomes. 
Doing so will allow for a cumulative and empirical evaluation of the utility of information 
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processing measures for predicting performance and offer an initial test of their appropriateness 
for applied researchers. Furthermore, I will examine the score differences information processing 
measures produce between different groups, specifically between African Americans and 
Caucasians. Although other group score differences are equally important, group score 
differences between African Americans and Caucasians have been historically seen as one of the 
largest and most consistent differences on measures of intelligence and has led them to be a 
prominent point of discussion in the I-O psychology literature (Bobko, Roth, & Potosky, 1999; 
Newman, Jacobs, & Bartram, 2007; Sackett & Ellingson, 1997; Schmitt, Rogers, Chan, 
Sheppard, & Jennings, 1997). For that reason, I focus specifically on these group score 
differences on intelligence measures.    
In the remaining sections of this dissertation, I will provide an overview of the current 
literature on intelligence with an emphasis on the relationship between its conceptualization and 
its operationalization. Then, I will offer an overview of the current state of measures that assess 
knowledge and information processing. Finally, I conduct a meta-analysis of information 
processing measures, examining their predictive validity for academic and occupational 
performance outcomes and examine if group score differences between African Americans and 
Caucasians exist on these measures.  
Intelligence  
 The histories of intelligence measurement and I-O psychology have been intertwined for 
much of the last century. The revolutionary measurement design of Binet and Simon (1905) is 
heralded as the origin of modern standardized intelligence testing and has influenced many of the 
intelligence measures used today. This design spurred the development of the Army Alpha and 
Beta tests during World War I, marking the first large scale administration of intelligence tests 
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for selection purposes (Ackerman, 1996). Shortly thereafter, a wave of research utilizing 
intelligence measures in organizations established how intelligence can be applied to the 
workplace (e.g., Carson, 2014; Urbina, 2011). Since then, intelligence measures have been a 
critical part of I-O psychology, utilized by researchers to predict critical workplace outcomes and 
by practitioners to select new employees, amongst other uses. Individual studies and meta-
analyses have demonstrated that intelligence predicts various workplace outcomes, such as job 
performance across various countries, occupations, organizations, and employee tenure (e.g., 
Bertua, Anderson, & Salgado, 2005; Levine, Spector, Menon, Narayanan, & Cannon-Bowers, 
1996; Salgado et al., 2003; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998); training success (e.g., Colquitt, LePine, & 
Noe, 2000; Hülsheger et al., 2007; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998); counterproductive workplace 
behaviors (Sackett & Lievens, 2008); and prosocial behaviors (Gonzalez-Mulé, Mount, & Oh, 
2014). Today, there is even more emphasis on the role of intelligence in organizations as 
businesses rely on knowledge and sustained innovation as competitive advantages (e.g., DeNisi, 
Hitt, & Jackson, 2003; Edmondson, 2012; Powell & Snellman, 2004; Scherbaum & Goldstein, 
2015). 
While the importance of intelligence to I-O psychology is undeniable, ambiguity 
surrounds what constitutes the construct. Intelligence is a latent variable and therefore must be 
inferred through measurement rather than be directly observed. Throughout the history of 
intelligence research, several traditions have arisen that differ in their methodology for inferring 
and understanding its latent structure. As a result, there have been numerous conceptualizations 
of intelligence over the years, each highlighting distinct components of intelligence, its structure, 
its function, and its measurement. These conceptualizations vary in their divergence from one 
another, making it difficult to identify a clear consensus for defining intelligence. Jensen (1998) 
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even argued that agreement is impossible at this point because of the diversity of definitions and 
the emotionally charged nature of intelligence.  
Indeed, intelligence as a construct is marred in its history, particularly its ties with 
heredity and eugenics research (Wasserman, 2012) and therefore elicits many different reactions 
from researchers and lay people, alike. In addition, many people have implicit theories of 
intelligence that are influenced by their knowledge of intelligence measures and how these 
measures are scored and utilized (Fagan, 2000). Boring (1923) famously stated that “intelligence 
is what the test tests” (p. 35), a statement meant as a point of discussion rather than a conclusion 
about intelligence tests, though some researchers have come to accept this as a working 
definition of intelligence (Sternberg, 2003). Because many intelligence measures currently used 
rely on one’s knowledge to assess intelligence, critics argue that using measurements of 
intelligence to define the construct often equates intelligence to how much knowledge one has or 
his/her test-taking ability (e.g., Fagan, 2000; Gardner, 1993; Sternberg et al., 2000). While 
models of intelligence do include knowledge as a potential factor, today many researchers 
recognize that intelligence is not just the knowledge that one has but is rather a deeper and 
broader construct (Gottfredson, 1997). This has led to the development of various models that 
highlight both information processing and knowledge as critical components of intelligence.  
The information processing, or intelligence-as-process, approach to intelligence was 
originally derived from work in the cognitive sciences that used the computer as a basis for better 
understanding the human brain and highlights the architecture of cognitive processes (Sternberg, 
2003). This approach assumes that people analyze information from their environment using a 
set of basic cognitive mechanisms, such as perceiving, reasoning, conceptualizing, planning, 
inferring, and deducing, to learn from experience and apply logical solutions to novel problems 
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(Sternberg, 1977, 2003). From this perspective, information processing can be conceptualized as 
a person’s ability to learn, maintain, and use information to reason (Sternberg, 1997). In many 
ways, an information processing approach to intelligence is similar to Gottfredson’s (1997) well-
cited definition of intelligence as “a very general mental capacity that, among other things, 
involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, 
learn quickly, and learn from experience” (p. 13). Furthermore, Rolfhus and Ackerman (1999) 
contend that these cognitive processes are best exemplified by tasks that require abstract 
reasoning and working memory. 
This is not a new approach to conceptualizing intelligence as even Spearman (1927), one 
of the originators of contemporary intelligence research, referred to intelligence as a general 
“mental energy” rather than a specific set or sets of knowledge. Spearman (1923) further 
identified three principles of cognition that included perceiving and encoding the environment, 
inferring relationships between concepts gathered from the environment, and applying the 
principles inferred from those relationships to new situations. Contemporary models of 
information processing similarly highlight the adaptive processes involved in intelligence, 
demonstrating there are executive processes that organize information and allocate resources for 
solving problems (Lohman & Lakin, 2011; Sternberg, 1985). For example, Sternberg (1984) 
identified three major components of information processing, which he labeled metacomponents, 
performance components, and knowledge-acquisition components. Metacomponents are high-
level processes that identify a problem that needs to be solved, organizes other processes 
required to address the problem, and evaluates progress towards accomplishing the necessary 
goals for solving the problem. These types of processes, sometimes referred to as executive 
processes, prescribe what needs to be accomplished by the performance components. The 
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operations executed by the performance components typically include retaining constructs in 
memory, manipulating constructs to identify patterns, perceiving relationships between 
constructs, and applying identified relationships to new stimuli (Sternberg, 1997). The 
knowledge-acquisition components assist with learning how to solve problems, therefore 
informing the performance components. For example, people will learn how to encode 
information that is most important or to compare features of constructs that are most relevant to 
the current problem (Sternberg, Kaufman, & Grigorenko, 2008). Overall, these componential 
models exemplify the cognitive processes seen as critical for information processing, particularly 
from a cognitive science perspective.   
Based on the research and models being developed in the cognitive sciences, some 
theories have been revised to similarly suggest that intelligence involves information processing 
as a critical component. Modern psychometric theories, such as the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (CHC) 
model, depicts intelligence as a hierarchy that covers a diverse set of cognitive abilities 
(Schneider & McGrew, 2012; Schneider & Newman, 2015). Near the top of this hierarchy is the 
ability of fluid reasoning, also known as fluid intelligence or Gf, which represents a controlled 
set of mental operations that allow a person to solve novel problems through logic and thinking 
flexibly (McGrew, 2009). At the core of fluid reasoning is the idea that the type of mental 
operations being conducted are detached from memorization or known routines and, instead, 
involve inductive and deductive reasoning to draw inferences, generate and test hypotheses, and 
solve problems (McGrew, 2009; Wasserman & Wasserman, 2017). While fluid reasoning is a 
complex and multidimensional construct, all its components are seen as functional processes 
with the express purpose of “solving unfamiliar problems” (Schneider & McGrew, 2012, p. 111). 
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However, fluid reasoning often works in conjunction with acquired knowledge to solve novel 
problems that do not fit a person’s prior experiences (Goode & Beckmann, 2010).  
Other theories have incorporated research from multiple disciplines to further the concept 
of information processing and its role in intelligence. Hebb (1949) introduced a rudimentary 
theory suggesting that information processing was connected to specific regions of the brain. 
Since then, additional research in neuroscience, cognitive science, and neuropsychology have 
rooted Hebb’s assumptions in empirical data to show that several critical cognitive processes 
related to information processing occur in various regions of the brain (e.g., Das, Naglieri, & 
Kirby, 1994; Kane & Engle, 2002). This research has been used to develop several theories 
suggesting these cognitive processes are involved in guiding attentional resources and solving 
problems, making them directly related to information processing. Included in these theories are 
the executive attention theory of intelligence (e.g., Heitz, Unsworth, & Engle, 2005; Redick, 
Calvo, Gay, & Engle, 2011) and the planning, attention-arousal, simultaneous, and successive 
(PASS) theory of intelligence (Das & Varnhagen, 1986; Naglieri & Das, 2005; Naglieri, Rojahn, 
Matto, & Aquilino, 2005). However, each theory highlights a unique set of cognitive processes, 
suggesting that while the theories are similar in nature, they each examine a distinct component 
of information processing.  
It is important to highlight that these various theories of information processing do not 
eliminate knowledge from the realm of intelligence, but rather emphasize the interplay between 
the processes and knowledge of intelligence. In Ackerman’s (1996) model of intelligence-as-
process and intelligence-as-knowledge, one’s ability to process information leads to the capacity 
to acquire knowledge from one’s experiences. This perspective, also shared by Cattell (1943), 
emphasizes that one’s knowledge is a result of investing information processing abilities into 
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learning a particular subject. Applying this logic to the workplace, this suggests that job 
knowledge is a result of one’s information processing abilities interacting with job experience or 
job-related information (Schmidt & Hunter, 1993). Furthermore, as one’s knowledge grows, it 
can act as an input for future information processing, allowing a person to transfer knowledge to 
new situations and engage in deductive reasoning based on concepts already learned (Lohman & 
Lakin, 2011). Therefore, it is important to recognize that these two intelligence constructs are 
inherently intertwined yet can still be conceptualized and measured independently.  
From Ackerman’s model, knowledge can be conceptualized in many different forms, 
such as declarative and procedural knowledge, that make up one’s knowledge structure (Rolfhus 
& Ackerman, 1999). Within the CHC model of intelligence, these knowledge structures are 
made up of multiple abilities, all of which are considered forms of knowledge. Perhaps most 
well-known is crystallized intelligence, also referred to as comprehension-knowledge or Gc, 
which entails a person’s language comprehension and general knowledge, but there is also 
reading and writing (Grw), quantitative knowledge (Gq), and domain-specific knowledge (Gkn), 
with each of these having additional subordinate cognitive abilities (McGrew, 2009; Schneider & 
Newman, 2015). For example, included within domain-specific knowledge is various forms of 
job-related knowledge, such as finance knowledge or building and construction knowledge. 
However, while intelligence-as-knowledge entails domain-specific knowledge, it is most often 
conceptualized and operationalized broadly (Ackerman, 2000). Thus, while knowledge taken as 
a whole has a fairly concrete conceptualization, it is the information a person has acquired 
through experience, it is also extremely broad as it covers the facts, rules, principles, and 
procedures a person knows across various domains.  
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While intelligence-as-knowledge and intelligence-as-process are intertwined, 
distinguishing between them can have significant implications for how intelligence is studied. 
Foremost, by conceptualizing intelligence as both process and knowledge, there are more rigid 
boundaries on what is and is not intelligence, reducing some ambiguity around the construct of 
intelligence. Furthermore, the distinction between information processing and knowledge can 
facilitate the advancement of theoretical and methodological approaches to intelligence. Based 
on recent research on information processing, prior theories of intelligence have been reassessed 
and integrated with theories from other disciplines to arrive at a more nuanced understanding of 
intelligence. For example, one of the most prominent theories of intelligence continues to be the 
psychometric approach. Several psychometric theories have been revitalized to reflect a more 
hierarchical structure that reflects both intelligence-as-process and intelligence-as-knowledge 
(e.g., Carroll, 1993; McGrew, 1997, 2005). Similarly, research from neuroscience has examined 
the link between cognitive functions and the resources of the brain (e.g., Conway, Kane, & 
Engle, 2003; Kane & Engle, 2002; Naglieri, 2005). Recently, research has focused on which 
regions of the brain are associated with knowledge, information processing, or both (Colom et 
al., 2009). Overall, this type of research demonstrates how information processing and 
knowledge complement each other and allows for a more comprehensive model of intelligence. 
Conceptualizing intelligence as both a process and knowledge also offers more diverse 
ways to operationalize intelligence. However, it also emphasizes the importance of aligning both 
the conceptualization and operationalization of intelligence with the needs of a situation. This is 
particularly important for researchers and practitioners in organizations where intelligence is 
considered a critical variable for predicting outcomes. For example, an employee’s knowledge is 
important for job performance to the extent that he or she has the declarative (i.e., job 
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knowledge) and procedural knowledge (i.e., job skills) needed to perform work tasks (Kanfer & 
Ackerman, 2005). Therefore, an intelligence-as-knowledge approach is particularly useful when 
understanding and measuring an employee’s job relevant knowledge (e.g., measuring what an 
employee might need to know on day one of a new job). Extant research demonstrates that both 
measures of specific knowledges (e.g., quantitative knowledge) (Goertz, Hülsheger, & Maier, 
2014; Ziegler et al., 2011) and global measures of one’s knowledge (i.e., not job specific 
knowledge) (e.g., Hunter & Hunter, 1984) predict performance at work. To date, many of the 
studies and meta-analyses examining the link between intelligence and performance have 
examined global measures of intelligence-as-knowledge, such as the Wonderlic Test (e.g., 
Hunter, 1989; Jansen et al., 2013) the General Aptitude Test Battery (e.g., Hunter & Hunter, 
1984), and the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (e.g., Ree & Earles, 1991; Roberts et 
al., 2000).  
In contrast, information processing is critical for learning information, including new 
knowledge and skills (Kanfer & Ackerman, 2005). Therefore, information processing is likely a 
key predictor of employee success in contexts that require handling novel situations or the 
acquisition of new knowledge or skills (Cowan, 2005). As a result, while information processing 
does not represent the actual knowledge or skills an employee has, it represents at least one 
predictor of an employee’s potential to gain new knowledge and learn new competencies or 
skills. In addition, information processing is believed to be particularly useful for understanding 
job performance on complex jobs or those that require high levels of attentional resources (e.g., 
financial analysts) (Kanfer & Ackerman, 2005). For these reasons, information processing 
measures rely less on a person’s prior knowledge and more on the broad processes involved in 
reasoning, solving problems, and/or learning. However, regardless of how intelligence is 
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operationalized, it is best treated not as a singular construct, but rather a network of interrelated 
constructs that offer insight into the various manifestations of intelligence, mainly as a process 
and as content (Reeve et al., 2015).  
Both intelligence-as-knowledge and intelligence-as-process clearly have implications for 
understanding workplace behaviors and have the potential to complement each other, as 
Ackerman (1996) originally proposed. Specifically, it is important to align the needs of the 
testing context with the content of the test being employed. Measures of broad knowledge, such 
as crystallized intelligence, can be particularly useful when the criterion requires a person to 
have a large and broad knowledge base. Alternatively, in situations where one’s ability to 
process novel information efficiently and effectively is of interest, information processing 
measures may provide a better prediction of the criterion. Such an approach suggests that 
evaluating the correspondence of the criterion and the predictor are of upmost importance (Judge 
& Kammeyer-Mueller, 2012). In the case of many jobs, it is feasible that both knowledge and 
information processing are critical to effective performance (Schneider & Newman, 2015). 
However, while the majority of research in I-O psychology has examined the effect of 
knowledge on critical performance outcomes, there has yet to be an extensive review of the 
effects of information processing on performance otucomes. In the subsequent sections, I will 
provide an overview of the research and measures associated with both intelligence-as-
knowledge and intelligence-as-process to offer additional insight into the gap that currently 
exists in understanding information processing at work.  
Measuring Intelligence-as-Knowledge  
 Traditionally, intelligence measures in I-O psychology have been heavily focused on a 
person’s knowledge. Fitting with the conceptualization of intelligence-as-knowledge, the current 
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study focuses on knowledge-based measures, such as crystalized intelligence measures, that 
assess broad knowledge rather than domain-specific knowledge. Though there are intelligence-
as-knowledge measures that assess job-specific knowledge, many measures assess a person’s 
general knowledge. Hunt (2000) speculated that most measures used in applied fields focus on 
intelligence-as-knowledge, specifically crystallized knowledge. Similarly, researchers have 
evaluated the content of intelligence measures based on a Gf-Gc framework and concluded that 
most measures assessed crystallized intelligence and not fluid reasoning (Alfonso, Flanagan, & 
Radwan, 2005; McGrew, 1997). The heavy reliance on knowledge measures, particularly general 
knowledge measures, has mainly resulted from the theoretical foundations that underlie much of 
the research in I-O psychology. Specifically, the psychometric approach to intelligence has been 
the focal theory of I-O psychology for decades and has influenced how the field measures 
intelligence.  
The psychometric approach to intelligence relies on the use of measurement and 
statistical analyses to identify the underlying structure of intelligence (Embretson & McCollam, 
2000). Many of the intelligence measures used over the past century came out of the 
psychometric approach (Buros, 1977; Carroll, 1978; Scherbaum et al., 2012). Spearman (1927) 
originated the psychometric approach by relying on the use of factor analysis, a methodology he 
pioneered, to understand the latent source of individual differences on test performance. He 
found that scores on distinct intelligence tests were positively intercorrelated with one another, 
which he referred to as positive manifold. Spearman and proponents of his model used this 
evidence to suggest that there is a general factor of intelligence, known as g, which explains the 
shared variance across intelligence measures. Furthermore, based on the idea of positive 
manifold, proponents of the psychometric approach argue that any measure of intelligence that 
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correlates highly with g will be a good measure of intelligence, regardless of content 
(Gottfredson, 2002; Ree, Carretta, & Teachout, 2015; Spearman, 1927). This phenomenon is 
known as the indifference of the indicator and suggests that g can be measured across a wide 
range of methodologies and measures (Spearman, 1927). This has important implications for test 
design since a priori theory about the content of a test does not matter as much as its loading onto 
a single factor (which is known as a g-loading). Jensen (1998) contended that a test battery of 
diverse, but highly g-loaded measures should remove unwanted variance and aggregate to create 
an accurate measure of g. From this perspective, the content of an intelligence measure matters 
less than the psychometric properties of the measure (Jensen, 1992). Thus, according to 
proponents of Spearman’s psychometric approach, most intelligence measures are 
interchangeable and will serve as a measure of g. While there have been measures of information 
processing to come out of the psychometric approach (as discussed in the following sections), 
most psychometric intelligence measures are knowledge-based (McGrew, 1997).  
There are many intelligence tests grounded in Spearman’s psychometric approach that 
are composed of knowledge items and employed in organizational contexts. Some of the most 
well-known intelligence tests in the workplace, including the Wonderlic Test and the Armed 
Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, consistently correlate with crystallized intelligence, but 
not with fluid reasoning (Bell, Matthews, Lassister, & Leverett, 2002; Hicks, Harrison, & Engle, 
2015; Matthews & Lassiter, 2007; Roberts et al., 2000). These measures have been shown to 
predict performance in both work and school (Barrick, Mount, & Strauss, 1993; K. G. Brown, 
Le, & Schmidt, 2006; Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2008; Frei & McDaniel, 1998; Knapp, 
Campbell, Borman, Pulakos, & Hanson, 2001; McKelvie, 1994). Similarly, many of the 
frequently cited meta-analyses demonstrating the relationship between intelligence and job 
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performance (e.g., Hunter & Hunter, 1984; McDaniel, Schmidt, & Hunter, 1988; Schmidt & 
Hunter, 2004; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998) rely heavily on the General Aptitude Test Battery, 
which consists of assessments of one’s knowledge of vocabulary and computation (te Nijenhuis 
& van der Flier, 1997). Even measures that are intended to assess a general form of intelligence 
(i.e., not described as a measure of knowledge) are typically heavily weighted with knowledge 
subtests and dimensions (Schneider & Newman, 2015). Some argue that these knowledge-based 
measures act as proxies of a person’s ability to learn (e.g., Hunter, 1986; Hunter & Schmidt, 
1996; Schmidt, 2002), however they remain infused with items that require prior knowledge for 
test takers to answer correctly. Therefore, while these measures may assess parts of information 
processing, such as learning ability, the resulting scores are not a pure assessment of information 
processing. Regardless, these measures have been shown to consistently predict critical 
workplace and educational outcomes, engraining their use in the I-O psychology field. The high 
utility of these measures, in combination with the principle of the indifference of the indicator, 
has likely perpetuated the reliance of applied psychologists on knowledge-based measures. 
While measures of knowledge have been praised for their ability to predict workplace 
and educational outcomes, they have been critiqued on several fronts. Foremost is the concern 
that tests relying solely on knowledge-as-intelligence are too narrow in their content (Agnello et 
al., 2015; Gottfredson, 1997; Scherbaum et al., 2012). Knowledge-based measures of 
intelligence only capture a portion of the intelligence construct and therefore offer a limited 
perspective (e.g., Alfonso et al., 2005; Chen & Gardner, 2012). While these types of knowledge 
measures can and do explain a considerable portion of variance in outcome variables, their 
narrow scope restricts them from predicting additional variance. Performance dimensions are 
often multidimensional, covering a wide scope of behaviors and outcomes. Therefore, using a 
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restricted conceptualization and operationalization of intelligence will similarly restrict the 
amount of variance of complex outcome that can be predicted (Higgins et al., 2007; Scherbaum 
et al., 2012). As an example, many of the measures that have been designed from the knowledge-
as-intelligence paradigm treat problems as well-defined and therefore do not effectively measure 
a person’s ability to handle novel and abstract problems (Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003). 
Therefore, this presents a potential deficiency in the measurement of intelligence. This coincides 
with a second concern, mainly that the development and application of knowledge measures 
often rely heavily on the statistical properties of the measure and less on a theoretical foundation 
(Fagan, 2000; Lievens & Reeve, 2012; Reeve et al., 2015; Scherbaum et al., 2015). Recently 
there has been an improvement in the number of intelligence measures that have been rooted in 
theory, however, this trend has not fully carried over to I-O psychology (Scherbaum et al., 2012; 
Thorndike, 1997). To date, there has been little integration of theoretical models from other 
disciplines into the application of intelligence measures in I-O psychology, leaving an 
opportunity for additional advancements in intelligence measurement.  
A third concern facing knowledge measures is their tendency to exhibit group score 
differences, particularly between races (e.g., Aguinis & Smith, 2007; De Corte, 1999; Goldstein 
et al., 2002; Ployhart & Holtz, 2008; Sackett et al., 2001; Sternberg & Wagner, 1993). Many 
knowledge tests have been found to favor Caucasian and Asian test-takers over African 
American test-takers (Hough et al., 2001; Neisser et al., 1996; Roth et al., 2001). Researchers 
argue these differences can be attributed to socioeconomic differences in education or cultural 
differences (e.g., Cottrell, Newman, & Roisman, 2015; Fagan & Holland, 2007). When these 
intelligence measures are utilized to make hiring decisions, these group score differences can 
lead to a disparity in the selection rate of people of a certain race, also known as adverse impact 
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(e.g., Goldstein, Scherbaum, & Yusko, 2010; Hough et al., 2001; Pyburn, Ployhart, & Kravitz, 
2008; Sackett & Ellingson, 1997). Findings show that removing knowledge that varies by race 
from a test reduces group mean differences (Fagan & Holland, 2007; Freedle & Kostin, 1997; 
Malda, van de Vijver, & Temane, 2010), and the size of group mean differences often depends 
on the type of test used (Hough et al., 2001). Thus, there seems to be support for the notion that 
group score differences are due, at least in part, to the content of these measures, specifically the 
use of knowledge items, and is not solely a result of a person’s intellectual ability.  
Taken together, these critiques suggest that while knowledge measures can reflect 
important content on a job and have high face validity (Lang, Kersting, Hülsheger, & Lang, 
2010; McDaniel & Banks, 2010), they only assess one aspect of intelligence (Roznowski et al., 
2000). Therefore, despite their predictive power, researchers should question the reliance of I-O 
psychology on knowledge measures of intelligence, identifying areas where a more inclusive 
approach to the conceptualization and operationalization of intelligence can be beneficial and 
may reduce group score differences on intelligence measures (e.g., Agnello et al., 2015; Fagan & 
Ployhart, 2015; Scherbaum et al., 2015; Scherbaum et al., 2012). To date, there has been a lack 
of exploration into other methodologies for measuring intelligence by applied psychologists, 
such as the intelligence-as-process perspective.  
Measuring Intelligence-as-Process  
Researchers have proposed that intelligence measures place too much emphasis on 
knowledge since the outset of modern intelligence measurement (Cattell & Bristol, 1933). In 
recent years, researchers have noted that most test batteries do not include adequate measures of 
a person’s reasoning ability (Alfonso et al., 2005; McGrew, 1997, 2005). This is unfortunate, as 
information processing measures can address calls for additional measures to help capture a 
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broader scope of the intelligence construct (e.g., Bosco et al., 2015; Cowan, Fristoe, Elliott, 
Brunner, & Saults, 2006; Fagan & Ployhart, 2015; Roznowski et al., 2000). In fact, even within 
the intelligence-as-process framework there is a wide range of cognitive constructs that 
constitute information processing, such as fluid reasoning, working memory, and executive 
function (Krumm, Lipnevich, Schmidt-Atzert, & Bühner, 2012; Krumm et al., 2009). While 
these constructs are related, they are not considered isomorphic and, as a result, elucidate various 
cognitive processes associated with information processing (e.g., Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 
2005; Clancy Blair, 2006; Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Süß, 2005). These constructs are 
derived from different theoretical traditions and result in various measures for assessing specific 
aspects of information processing. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus on two overarching 
categories for understanding and measuring information processing: 1) the psychometric 
approach and 2) the cognitive science approach.   
The psychometric approach. Since Spearman’s traditional psychometric approach to 
intelligence, which advocated for a single factor of intelligence, significant evolutions have 
reframed intelligence as hierarchical. In one of the earliest hierarchical models of intelligence, 
Cattell and Horn (Cattell, 1963, 1971; Horn & Cattell, 1966) argued for the distinction between 
fluid reasoning and crystallized intelligence. While psychometric models have further evolved, 
fluid reasoning continues to be a critical part of the psychometric approach, including in the 
dominant contemporary model, the CHC model (Schneider & McGrew, 2012; Schneider & 
Newman, 2015). In this multidimensional approach, fluid reasoning refers to a person’s ability to 
solve novel problems through abstract reasoning and identifying patterns and subsumes other 
cognitive abilities, such as deductive reasoning, inductive reasoning, quantitative reasoning, and 
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speed of reasoning (McGrew, 2009). Within the psychometric approach, fluid reasoning is 
clearly tied to information processing.   
The CHC model also contains other factors that may be considered aspects of 
information processing. However, these factors either have their theoretical roots in the cognitive 
sciences approach or have imprecise ties to intelligence. Two examples of these factors include 
working memory and processing speed. For the past several decades, research on working 
memory has been clearly established in the cognitive science approach as researchers have 
examined the critical brain regions associated with working memory (e.g., Cohen et al., 1997; 
D'Esposito & Postle, 2015). More recently, working memory has been integrated into the 
psychometric approach through factor analysis findings (Carroll, 1993; McGrew, 2009) and by 
examining the construct’s relationship with fluid reasoning (e.g., Conway et al., 2003; Kyllonen 
& Christal, 1990). While research on working memory from the psychometric approach 
demonstrates the benefits that can come from incorporating research from other disciplines, such 
as the cognitive sciences, the theory behind the working memory factor remains rooted in the 
cognitive science approach and therefore will be addressed later in this paper.  
Another factor in the CHC model that has ties to information processing is processing 
speed. While processing speed has been examined in relation to constructs such as fluid 
reasoning (e.g., Conway et al., 2003; Fry & Hale, 1996), its overall relationship with intelligence 
is muddled. Researchers have suggested that the meaning of processing speed differs based on 
the operationalization of the construct (Carroll, 1993; Conway et al., 2003). Specifically, 
measures involving reaction times based on simple stimuli and those based on complex stimuli 
likely stimulate different cognitive processes. This means that when processing speed measures 
are taken as a whole, their relationship with intelligence is not entirely clear (Neisser et al., 
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1996). Along these lines, Carroll (1993) suggested that some measures of processing speed do 
not reflect a person’s capacity to process complex information, but rather simply how quickly 
they can respond to a stimulus. Carroll further argued from this perspective that some measures 
of processing speed are not a sign of intelligence but rather a sign of speediness in achieving an 
outcome.  
Researchers in the cognitive sciences have begun to parse out the different types of 
processing speed measures and utilize those that involve complex stimuli and reactions. In these 
instances, the measures are being associated with high-level cognitive processes, such as 
attention, usually within a battery of other measures (e.g., Bosco et al., 2015; Bühner, König, 
Pick, & Krumm, 2006; Higgins et al., 2007; Sabet et al., 2013). This subset of processing speed 
measures seems to better assess a person’s information processing ability than those that require 
reactions to simple stimuli. However, while these measures are similar or the same to those being 
used to assess processing speed, they are more clearly rooted in the theory of the cognitive 
sciences approach. For these reasons, I do not include measures of processing speed as part of 
the psychometric approach as they either do not assess information processing as conceptualized 
in this paper or, when they do measure information processing, are linked to the cognitive 
science approach.  
Therefore, while the psychometric approach has begun to implement additional measures 
of information processing into its contemporary models of intelligence, this research remains 
nascent and needs further integration to fully understand its relationship to psychometric models. 
To date, the most deeply engrained construct of information processing from the psychometric 
approach is fluid reasoning. For the purposes of this paper, I will exclusively examine measures 
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of fluid reasoning as representative of information processing measures from the psychometric 
approach.  
There have been multiple fluid reasoning measures developed over the years, though they 
mostly share the same intent of reducing the need of prior knowledge (Cattell, 1987). The 
presence of items that rely heavily on prior knowledge can reduce the construct validity of the 
measure by introducing unrelated content and provide an advantage to those familiar with that 
content, causing misleading score differences. Specifically, research has shown that knowledge 
of content unrelated to information processing may differ by people’s background, country of 
origin, race, gender, culture, economic standing, or experience, leading to observed score 
differences (Fagan, 2000; Fagan & Holland, 2002; Goldstein et al., 2010). Similarly, research 
shows that knowledge of culturally specific information (Malda et al., 2010) or exposure to 
acquired knowledge (Fagan & Holland, 2002, 2007, 2009) on an intelligence test can moderate 
the relationship between race and observed scores (Malda et al., 2010). Therefore, to avoid 
construct irrelevant variance within fluid reasoning scores and, subsequently, reduce the 
accuracy of test scores, test developers often utilize non-entrenched task designs (e.g., Bokhorst, 
1989; Tetewsky & Sternberg, 1986). Non-entrenched tasks require information processing 
strategies that are outside a person’s normal experience, meaning they do not rely on 
automatized and/or previously learned performance routines. Typically, these tasks include 
stimuli that are novel to participants and do not directly reflect how a problem and its solution 
would appear in everyday life (Sternberg, 1982). For example, by using stimuli such as 
unfamiliar images (i.e., non-verbal stimuli) or concocted words (i.e., pseduowords), the test taker 
must identify the relationship between stimuli to find a solution. Through this type of task, all 
test takers are placed on an even playing field, making it possible to assess their true information 
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processing ability. This approach helps ensure the measures assess the core competencies of fluid 
reasoning, mainly a person’s ability to reason to solve novel problems and minimize the reliance 
on a test taker’s knowledge (e.g., Fagan, 2000; Fagan & Holland, 2002, 2007, 2009; Helms-
Lorenz, Van de Vijver, & Poortinga, 2003; Malda et al., 2010; van de Vijver, 1997). Since most 
measures of fluid reasoning utilize these types of non-entrenched tasks, the main difference 
between measures is in the format of the task, specifically whether it uses a graphical strategy or 
a verbal strategy for presenting stimuli.  
Graphical tests. Perhaps the most prototypical type of fluid reasoning measures is those 
that utilize graphical stimuli, particularly geometric matrix items (Marshalek, Lohman, & Snow, 
1983; Primi, 2014). In general, these measures rely on various graphical images to present 
stimuli for the test taker to infer relationships. To exemplify the structure of these types of 
measures, I discuss the Raven’s Progressive Matrices and the Cattell Culture Fair Test, two of 
the oldest fluid reasoning measures still in use.   
Raven’s Progressive Matrices. One of the most frequently utilized measures of fluid 
reasoning is the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Urbina, 2011; van de Vijver, 1997). The 
Progressive Matrices is comprised of a series of items that contain a matrix (e.g., a 3 x 3 matrix). 
Each cell of the matrix contains a figure with a unique set of shapes and lines except one blank 
cell (Raven, Raven, & Court, 2000). The test taker must review the available figures and identify 
the pattern between them. By determining the pattern, the test taker must then apply his/her logic 
to select the figure that belongs in the empty cell from a set of alternatives. There have been 
several versions of the Progressive Matrices available, including the Standard Progressive 
Matrices, which is the original version of the test published in 1938, the Colored Progressive 
Matrices, which is designed for children between 5 and 11 years old, and the Advanced 
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Progressive Matrices, which are a more difficult version of the Standard Progressive Matrices 
and most appropriate for adults. While the test typically contains 60 items, abbreviated versions 
of the test have also been developed (Bilker et al., 2012). Several researchers have proposed that 
the Progressive Matrices are a particularly good assessment of fluid reasoning because it requires 
control processes to analyze the problem, strategize how to approach it, and apply a solution 
(e.g., Carpenter, Just, & Shell, 1990; Marshalek et al., 1983). 
Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence Test. Much like the Progressive Matrices, the Cattell 
Culture Fair Intelligence Test (Cattell & Cattell, 1973) is specifically intended to reduce the 
effect of previous or cultural knowledge through its reliance on graphical stimuli. There are four 
subtests to the Culture Fair Test, including a matrices subtest, which mirrors the items in the 
Progressive Matrices. There is also a series subtest, which is similar to the matrices, but requires 
the test taker to find the pattern across a series of matrices rather within a single matrix, and then 
select a matrix to complete the series. In addition, there is a classification subtest in which the 
test taker must identify the odd figure or figures in a set. Finally, there is the topology subtest, 
which requires test takers to select a figure based on a set of constraints described in the 
instructions (e.g., choose the figure where the dot is in the circle but outside the square). These 
subtests have been shown to correlate well with each other and likely assess a person’s inductive 
reasoning skills by requiring them to identify both similarities and differences between stimuli 
(Troche, Wagner, Schweizer, & Rammsayer, 2016).  
Verbal tests. Verbal measures of fluid reasoning offer a unique approach for assessing 
reasoning. Research has demonstrated that verbal stimuli elicit unique cognitive processes 
(Baddeley, 2012), making verbal measures of fluid reasoning a critical area of research to better 
understand how reasoning manifests in different contexts. A main strategy for balancing the need 
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to minimize prior knowledge with items that contain language is for the measure to contain 
simple words that are familiar to most test takers (Cattell, 1987). Perhaps the most prominent 
exemplar of this strategy is the Baddeley Reasoning Test.  
Baddeley Reasoning Test. The Baddeley Reasoning Test (Baddeley, 1968) was developed 
with the intention of creating a short and easily administered measure of intelligence. Baddeley 
stated that the measure utilizes variation in syntactic structure to fluctuate item difficulty while 
using language that is familiar to most test takers so that it can quickly assesses information 
processing. The measure consists of 64 items that are administered in three minutes. The test 
taker is presented with various form of statements including a rule (e.g., A precedes B) and then 
a statement (AB), to which the test taker must determine if the statement is true or false. Rules 
vary be whether they are positive or negative, active or passive, true or false, involve proceeding 
or following, and if A or B comes first. In addition, statements vary in whether they are AB or 
BA. Therefore, while the measure includes verbal stimuli, the items do not rely on extensive 
knowledge of language to be completed. Research has since used the Baddeley Reasoning Test 
to evaluate the relationship between fluid reasoning and performance, particularly in educational 
settings (Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2008; Chamorro-Premuzic, Quiroga, & Colom, 2009; 
Furnham, 2012). 
Psychometric measures and performance. Fluid reasoning measures remain the leading 
strategy for assessing information processing and have become a strategy for hiring intelligent 
employees because of their ease of administration and purported reduction in group score 
differences (e.g., Klein, Pohl, & Ndagijimana, 2007; Taylor, 2008). The exact relationships 
between fluid reasoning measures and various performance metrics at work and school have 
interested researchers for decades since these measures do not require extensive prior knowledge 
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to assess information processing. Several decades of research have shown fairly consistent 
relationships between fluid reasoning measures and job performance (e.g., Côté & Miners, 2006; 
Durso, Bleckley, & Dattel, 2006; Henderson, 1979; Lowery, Beadles Ii, & Krilowicz, 2004), job-
oriented training performance (e.g., de Bruin, de Bruin, Dercksen, & Cilliers-Hartslief, 2005; 
Moran, 1986), and academic performance (e.g., Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2008; 
Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2009; Furnham, 2012; Furnham, Zhang, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 
2006; Higgins et al., 2007). Research has even found that fluid reasoning predicts specific 
outcomes, such as annual salary (Colonia-Willner, 1998), and performance on specific tasks, 
such as multi-tasking (Bühner et al., 2006) and proofreading (Furnham, Rawles, & Iqbal, 2006). 
Taken as a whole, these measures offer strong evidence of their predictive validity for 
performance outcomes.  
Psychometric measures and group score differences. Fluid reasoning measures are 
typically constructed to minimize reliance on prior knowledge through the use of non-entrenched 
items and minimal language. This has led many fluid reasoning measures to be labeled as 
“culture fair” tests as they are intended to reduce the impact of a person’s cultural background on 
test performance (e.g., Cattell, 1971; Klein et al., 2007; Nenty & Dinero, 1981). Past research 
has shown that these types of item features lead to small group score differences (e.g., Fagan & 
Holland, 2007; Sternberg, 1986). As such, it is often expected that fluid reasoning measures, 
based on their item content, should have low score differences between groups, particularly 
between African Americans and Caucasians. Research has provided evidence to support this 
notion, showing various operationalizations of fluid reasoning to have effect sizes considered 
small to moderate (e.g., Hough et al., 2001; Kirkpatrick, Ewen, Barrett, & Katzell, 1968; Outtz & 
Newman, 2010). However, other research has also demonstrated that common fluid reasoning 
 29 
 
measures, such as the Raven’s Matrices, can have fairly large score differences similar to 
common measures of crystallized intelligence (e.g., Bosco et al., 2015) and as large as one 
standard deviation (e.g., Jensen, 1998; Rushton & Skuy, 2000). Researchers have begun to 
evaluate why these group score differences persist under certain circumstances. For example, 
researchers have found larger group score differences when the testing situation or the content of 
the test cause threatening social stereotypes to become salient (R. P. Brown & Day, 2006; Klein 
et al., 2007). Others suggest that differences in exposure to technology, games, and learning 
materials that are similar to the tasks on fluid reasoning tests can lead to group score differences 
(Greenfield, 1998). While these explanations offer some initial insight, more research is needed 
to better understand the specific features of fluid reasoning tests that lead to variation in score 
differences.  
Summary of the psychometric approach. To date, the research on fluid reasoning 
measures has demonstrated promising results regarding their ability to predict performance in 
several domains and evidence suggests that these measures may reduce group score differences, 
though not as much as once thought. It is important to note that much of the research to date has 
been conducted on the Progressive Matrices and Cattell’s Culture Fair Test, though many other 
measures exist. While these measures follow similar test designs as described above, there is 
room for further exploration of test designs and item content within fluid reasoning measures to 
evaluate how they influence predictive validity and group score differences. Furthermore, recent 
attempts have begun to examine how intelligence measures from the psychometric approach 
converge with findings from other fields, particularly those from the cognitive sciences (e.g., 
Ackerman et al., 2005; Bosco et al., 2015; Colom, Abad, Quiroga, Shih, & Flores-Mendoza, 
2008; Colom et al., 2009; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005). Researchers have begun to 
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integrate test designs from these disciplines to improve the measurement of fluid reasoning (e.g., 
Primi, 2014), though the predictive validity of these measures has yet to be tested widely. It is 
important for researchers in the psychometric approach to continue incorporating theoretical 
findings from other disciplines to optimize their measures (e.g., Reeve & Hakel, 2002; 
Scherbaum et al., 2012; Tenopyr, 2002). 
The cognitive science approach. While the psychometric approach to intelligence has a 
long and rooted history in applied psychology, acting as the dominant approach for many years, 
research in cognitive science is gaining momentum (Becker, Volk, & Ward, 2015). Whereas the 
psychometric approach emphasizes factor analysis to construe the structure of intelligence, 
approaches involving cognitive science apply interdisciplinary theories of the mind and methods 
originating from neuroscience to examine how people guide and direct cognitive resources to 
solve problems and obtain goals (Becker et al., 2015; Drasgow, 2013). Cognitive science is 
comprised of multiple branches, including cognitive psychology, which examines executive 
functions of the brain relative to intelligence (e.g., Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & 
Howerter, 2000), neuropsychology, which examines the relationship between the brain and 
behavior (e.g., Conway et al., 2003; Kane & Engle, 2002; Meier, 1974), neurocognition, which 
links cognitive resources to specific regions of the brain through neuroimaging techniques (e.g., 
Becker et al., 2015; Curtis & D'Esposito, 2003; Deary, Penke, & Johnson, 2010; Jung & Haier, 
2007; Nisbett et al., 2012), and more. The various functions within cognitive science supplement 
each other, offering deeper insights into the functioning of the brain and how it relates to the 
management of cognitive resources and the processing of information. For example, 
neuropsychology examines how people’s cognitive functions connect to behavior, which is 
validated through neuroimaging or other neuroscience techniques. As such, each branch offers a 
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theory-driven approach to understand how individual differences in intelligence are directly tied 
to functioning in the brain. To date, research in the workplace has mostly relied on cognitive 
psychology and neuropsychology, though there are future opportunities to apply additional 
branches from the cognitive sciences.   
In the following sections, I review theory and measures associated with the two main 
disciplines within the cognitive sciences being applied to workplace and academic settings, 
cognitive psychology and neuropsychology. Because the theories and measures are rapidly 
evolving, this review is not meant to be comprehensive but rather offer a representative sample 
of those that are at a state of development that can be practically applied in organizational or 
educational settings. As such, while the cognitive sciences are potentially best known for their 
use of physiological measures, such as neuroimaging and eye tracking, I do not discuss them 
here, though they offer an interesting area for future research.  
Cognitive psychology measures. Intelligence research in cognitive psychology has 
focused on understanding the cognitive processes of information processing and how they are 
organized (Sternberg, 2003). While there is no agreement in cognitive psychology about what 
mechanisms explain behavior, let alone intelligence, there are several theoretical models of 
information processing that emphasize similar processes. Typically, these models depict 
information processing as a system involving cognitive mechanisms associated with holding 
information in memory, directing attention, and controlling action (e.g., Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; 
Cowan, 1988; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway, 1999). Initially, much of the research in 
the field examined short-term memory, long-term memory, and attentional control as distinct 
constructs with their own unique contribution to cognition. Eventually these cognitive processes 
were assembled together in the theory of working memory, though they remain distinct today. 
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Through this evolution, the theory of memory and its measurement has become increasingly 
rooted in physiology (e.g., Engle et al., 1999; Kane et al., 2005). At its core, working memory 
describes how people retain diverse pieces of information in memory for short periods of time, 
maintain attention on relevant information, and integrate those pieces of information (Baddeley 
& Hitch, 1974; Prabhakaran, Narayanan, Zhao, & Gabrieli, 2000). From this perspective, 
working memory is critical to a person’s ability to reason with information as it provides the 
foundational capacity to compare different pieces of information to arrive at conclusions (Kent, 
2017). Researchers have even questioned if working memory is the neuropsychological form of 
fluid reasoning (Kyllonen & Christal, 1990), though findings show that while the constructs are 
highly related and activate similar regions of the brain, they are not isomorphic (Engle et al., 
1999; Kane et al., 2005). 
Embedded within the theory of working memory is the construct of executive attention, 
an underlying process that specifically coordinates what is attended to in working memory. 
While some researchers have questioned whether working memory and executive attention are 
the same construct (Engle, 2018), others have treated executive attention as an underlying 
process of working memory and other high-level cognitive processes (e.g., Clancy Blair, 2006; 
Conway et al., 2005; Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson, & Freer, 1996; McCabe, Roediger, 
McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010). Compounded by the fact that there is no consensus on 
the definition of working memory (McCabe et al., 2010), the boundary between working 
memory and executive attention can be difficult to delineate. While recent research has 
distinguished slight differences in how working memory and executive attention are measured, 
even the measurement strategies for these constructs overlap significantly, containing some of 
the same measures (Bosco et al., 2015). Both constructs have been used in the literature to assess 
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information processing and have demonstrated earlier evidence of their ability to predict 
performance in multiple settings (e.g., Ackerman & Beier, 2007; Bosco et al., 2015; Bühner et 
al., 2006; Perlow, Jattuso, & Moore, 1997; Roznowski et al., 2000). Because it remains unclear 
how deeply working memory and executive attention are intertwined, I discuss these constructs 
together, providing an overview of both constructs and how they relate to each other 
conceptually and operationally.  
Working memory and executive attention. In its most basic form, working memory refers 
to a limited capacity memory system in which information is held and manipulated (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2012). Expanding on this conceptualization, researchers consider there to 
be two main components of working memory: 1) a storage component and 2) an attentional and 
maintenance component. Though the storage component originated with research on short-term 
and long-term memory, it has come to be differentiated by its inclusion of information storage 
systems specific to phonological and visual based modalities. The determination of the 
information to be stored, and the manipulation of that information, is completed by the 
attentional and maintenance component, also known as executive attention. Attention control is 
an important construct in cognitive psychology, predating the theory of working memory, but 
has evolved significantly from that time. In its simplest form, executive attention is a central 
executive component that involves directing attention to ongoing cognitive processes based on a 
person’s current needs (Engle et al., 1999). This basic concept was integrated into the theory of 
working memory, which specifically pointed to executive attention as the mechanism that 
coordinates and maintains information held in storage (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). However, over 
time, executive attention has been applied to other cognitive functions (e.g., Barrett, Tugade, & 
Engle, 2004; McCabe et al., 2010).  
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Researchers have further divided working memory into three components – updating, 
maintenance, and inhibition (Redick et al., 2011) – though these components have been 
associated more specifically with the executive attention process (Bosco et al., 2015; Ren, 
Altmeyer, Reiss, & Schweizer, 2013). The updating function involves monitoring working 
memory and adding or removing information when necessary. This ensures that the information 
being stored in working memory is the most relevant to the task at hand. Maintenance is a related 
process in which information is retrieved from long-term memory or brought into working 
memory (Unsworth & Engle, 2007). The final process, inhibition, is a person’s ability to remain 
focused on the information at hand and not be distracted by potentially interfering information. 
Taken together, this suggests that working memory and executive attention encompasses the 
deliberate cognitive action to maintain attention on information relevant to one’s goals, to inhibit 
irrelevant information to one’s goals, and to ultimately direct appropriate responses to obtain 
one’s goals (Heitz et al., 2005; Redick et al., 2011).  
Working memory measures build on these basic tenets, requiring test takers to complete 
tasks that require updating, maintenance, and inhibition. While there are many types of working 
memory tasks available (e.g., n-back tasks, visual array comparison tasks) (Becker et al., 2015), 
to date, complex span tasks are the most frequently applied to predict performance. Complex 
span tasks require test takers to perform various simple cognitive tasks, including reading, 
calculations, and determining whether a matrix is symmetrical (Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 
1982; Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Turner & Engle, 1989). However, between these tasks, test 
takers must also remember distinct information to be recalled later, such as letter, digits, or 
words. For example, in an operation span task (OPSAN), the test taker is presented with an item 
that must be recalled later and then completes between two and seven simple math problems. 
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The test taker is then shown another item to be recalled later and then completes additional math 
problems (Turner & Eagle, 1989). The final score for the test involves how many items are 
recalled correctly. In this process, the test taker must maintain a list of items to be recalled and 
update the list of recall items as the process continues, all while inhibiting the distraction of the 
math problems. Therefore, requiring test takers to alternate between tasks while simultaneously 
storing information is intended to assess the key functions of working memory (McCabe et al., 
2010).  
A key aspect of working memory measures is that they assess both storage and executive 
attention processes. To assess executive attention as a distinct construct, researchers have 
recently suggested using a mix of working memory scales as well as simple attention tasks 
(Bosco et al., 2015; Hutchison, 2007). In doing so, these measures are intended to capture the 
processes that overlap between working memory and executive attention, as well as presumably 
assess the basic attention processes unique to executive attention. As an example, researchers 
have utilized the arrow flanker task in combination with complex span tasks for assessing 
executive attention. The arrow flanker task presents test takers with a series of arrows that are all 
congruent (i.e., pointing the same direction) or has the center arrow incongruent (i.e., pointing 
the opposite direction of the other arrows; Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). The test taker must quickly 
and accurately determine if the series is congruent or not. Therefore, this process tests inhibition 
to the extent the test taker can ignore distracting stimuli and does not rely on the storage 
component of working memory.  
Cognitive psychology measures and performance. To date, research from the cognitive 
psychology approach has relied heavily on the use of complex span tasks of working memory. 
Evidence from this research has demonstrated that these measures relate to performance on job 
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sample tests (Bergersen & Gustafsson, 2011), overall job performance (Henderson, 1979; 
Nelson, 2003), skill acquisition (Perlow et al., 1997), and academic performance (Rohde & 
Thompson, 2007). Furthermore, these measures have been found to correlate with performance 
on specific tasks, such as multi-tasking (Bühner et al., 2006) and a flight simulator (Van 
Benthem & Herdman, 2016). Additional research on executive attention has similarly shown 
these measures predict job performance and success on a simulation of managerial ability (Bosco 
et al., 2015). As such, there is a growing set of findings supporting the use of these cognitive 
psychology measures to predict performance.  
Cognitive psychology measures and group score differences. There is currently little data 
examining group score differences between African Americans and Caucasians for cognitive 
psychology measures in I-O psychology. In the few studies that have examined group score 
differences, results have demonstrated promising reductions in differences. Bosco and colleagues 
(2015) utilized a composite of multiple complex span measures and the arrow flanker task to 
assess executive attention. They found across four studies that Caucasians scored a half standard 
deviation higher than African Americans on the executive attention composite. This effect size is 
considered moderate in size but was significantly smaller than the one standard deviation 
difference found between the groups on the Wonderlic, a measure mainly consisting of 
crystallized intelligence. Research from an unpublished dissertation in I-O psychology showed a 
similar finding in which two working memory scales had a much lower group score difference 
than a measure of general intelligence and even a measure of fluid reasoning (Nelson, 2003). 
While the research on group score differences remains fairly lacking for cognitive psychology 
measures, the early evidence is promising.  
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Summary of cognitive psychology measures. Overall, working memory and executive 
attention measures offer a unique measurement approach, assessing multiple cognitive 
mechanisms (e.g., storage, updating, maintenance, inhibition) involved in general information 
processing. Therefore, these measures could be extremely useful in organizations that require 
memorization and visual comparisons (Becker et al., 2015) and have been found to predict 
critical workplace behaviors. While the theory of working memory originated from theoretical 
models associating cognitive processes to parallels in computer processing (Sternberg, 2003), 
recent neurological research has based these and similar processes in regions of the brain 
(D'Esposito, Ballard, Zarahn, & Aguirre, 2000; McIntosh, Grady, Haxby, Ungerrleider, & 
Horwitz, 1996). Similar research has spurred an entire area of research examining intelligence 
from a neuropsychological perspective, which ties together many critical cognitive processes to 
behavior and areas of the brain.  
Neuropsychological measures. The key to the neuropsychological approach is its basis in 
biological and psychophysiological theories, providing it with a strong set of theoretically driven 
tenets and, hence, making it a critical bridge between theories of intelligence that rely on the 
statistical approaches to categorize intelligence and those that rely on theoretical tenets to offer 
explanatory mechanisms of intelligence (Becker, et al., 2015). The neuropsychological approach 
offers deeper insight into the cognitive processes that underlie intelligence, and, as a result, 
offers new opportunities for the measurement of intelligence. It is important to recognize that 
while neuropsychology has an extensive history in clinical psychology, it remains a developing 
topic in the intelligence literature (Miller & Maricle, 2012). Therefore, it is important to consider 
how various approaches to intelligence from a neuropsychological perspective can be utilized 
together to better infer the structure of intelligence, its conceptualization, and how to best 
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operationalize it. This is a particularly important point, as a crucial critique of intelligence 
measures has been their lack of a theoretical foundation (Kaufman, 2000). Furthermore, it fits 
with the Parieto-Frontal Intelligence Theory (P-Fit), a popular neurocognitive theory of 
intelligence, which suggests that intelligence and its resulting behaviors can be arrived at through 
several different neurocognitive pathways (Haier & Jung, 2007; Jung & Haier, 2007). As such, it 
is important to consider how intelligence can manifest through various regions of the brain and 
therefore may not be limited to a single neuropsychological theory. For that reason, I review 
several neuropsychological research streams related to intelligence, mainly the planning, 
attention-arousal, simultaneous, and successive (PASS) theory of intelligence and research on 
the executive functions located in the prefrontal cortex.  
PASS. One of the most prominent examples of neuropsychological research on 
intelligence is the PASS theory, which is applied frequently in developmental and educational 
psychology (Das & Varnhagen, 1986; Naglieri & Das, 1997, 2005; Naglieri et al., 2005). Based 
on prior neuropsychological research (Luria, 1966a, 1966b, 1973), the theory’s main tenet is that 
intelligence is comprised of four separate cognitive processes that interact with one another. Of 
these cognitive processes, there is planning; which entails processes around solving problems 
through strategic thinking and self-monitoring; attention; which involves maintaining focus on 
stimuli in the face of distractors; simultaneous processing, which involves organizing stimuli 
into coherent patterns and perceiving the relationships between stimuli; and successive 
processing; which includes arranging information into a sequential order (Naglieri et al., 2005). 
Much like executive attention, which has multiple forms of attention processes, the PASS theory 
identifies several modules of the brain necessary for problem solving. Each of these modules is 
associated with a separate area of the brain, including areas beyond just the frontal lobe (Das et 
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al., 1994). Furthermore, the PASS theory emphasizes that these four processes must operate 
within a person’s knowledge base, including both temporary and long-term knowledge, and 
ultimately influence a person’s knowledge acquisition (Naglieri & Das, 1997).  
To assess the distinct cognitive processes of the PASS theory (i.e., planning, attention, 
simultaneous, and successive processing), Naglieri and Das (Naglieri, 2005; Naglieri & Das, 
1997) developed the Cognitive Assessment System (CAS). For each of the processes, there are 
multiple subtests that vary in content (Das, 2002). The measures of simultaneous and successive 
processing incorporate information-processing tasks, whereas the measures of planning and 
attention include tasks associated with higher-order control process (Fein & Day, 2004). 
The measures assessing planning in the CAS require the test taker to create and apply a 
plan of action and subsequently monitor the effectiveness of that plan during a task. As such, the 
measure plays a critical role in assessing a person’s problem-solving abilities. There are multiple 
measures of planning, including the matching numbers, planned codes, and planned connections 
tasks. As an example of one of these measures, the matching numbers task involves the test taker 
underlining any identical numbers in a series of numbers. As the task progresses, the number of 
digits in the series of numbers grows, increasing the complexity of the task. A unique aspect of 
planning measures is that they require an assessment of the actual strategies used to solve the 
task and are partially coded by an observer.  
The attention measures are intended to assess a person’s ability to detect a particular 
stimulus while inhibiting distractors. In many ways, these measures are similar to the measures 
of attention included in executive attention batteries. An example measure of an attention 
measure is the receptive attention task, which requires the test taker to underline any pairs of 
letters that are the same based on a set of rules. For one part of the test, the test taker must 
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underline all letters that are the same and the same size (e.g., AA or aa), whereas in the second 
part the test taker must underline those letters that are the same (e.g., aA or Bb). Another 
measure is the expressive attention task, which is a variation of the Stroop test. For this task, the 
test taker is shown a visual image (e.g., the word blue) but must verbalize the correct response 
(e.g., the color of the text the word is written in).  
The measures for simultaneous processing require the test taker to organize disparate 
pieces of information and arrive at valid conclusions from this organization. The 
operationalization of this system is similar to many of the operationalizations of fluid reasoning. 
For example, one measure is known as nonverbal matrices and follows the principles of the 
Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Similarly, another test known as the verbal-spatial relations task is 
similar to one of the Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence Tests and involves the test taker selecting a 
specific figure that conforms to a set of rules (e.g., select the figure with a triangle to the left of a 
circle).  
The final system of PASS, successive processing, involves comprehending meaning from 
the order in which information is presented. Often, this requires a person to complete information 
is a specific order. For example, the sentence questions task entails the test taker reading a 
nonsense sentence (e.g., the blue yellows the orange) and then must answer a question about the 
sentence (e.g., who yellowed the orange?). Other tasks associated with successive processing 
require the test taker to repeat back words in various orders. The sentence repetition task 
involves the test taker repeating back sentences that have syntax but reduced meaning.  
Taken together, these CAS tests rely on novel tasks and limit verbal and quantitative 
knowledge in order to get at a person’s high-level processes detached from prior knowledge 
(Naglieri & Bornstein, 2003). While the CAS was originally developed for children and 
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adolescents, it has been applied to older participants to predict performance on a complex 
performance task (Fein & Day, 2004). As such, the strong theoretical foundation and 
multidimensional approach of this measure could be a beneficial tool for research in the 
workplace going forward.  
Executive functions. While the PASS theory considers several specific cognitive 
functions throughout the brain, there has also been considerable work examining various 
executive functions in the dorsolateral prefrontal cognitive ability (D-PFCA), an area of the brain 
frequently connected to intelligence (e.g., Jung & Haier, 2007). Although there have been 
various models of executive functions, generally they are conceptualized as cognitive processes 
associated with goal-directed behavior and controlled cognition (Banich, 2009; Fuster, 1997). To 
date, executive functions have been considered to cover a wide range of processes, including 
shifting mental sets, monitoring progress towards a goal, updating task demands, cognitive 
flexibility, and even working memory. While historically the work on executive functions has 
been piecemeal, examining many of these processes individually or in subsets, there is growing 
work to better understand how they correspond to the D-PFCA and why they operate in the same 
region of the brain (Alvarez & Emory, 2006; C. Blair, Zelazo, & Greenberg, 2005). This has 
resulted in a debate regarding whether executive functions are one unified system or if they are a 
loosely connected set of processes (e.g., Blair et al., 2005). 
The lack of clarity in how the executive functions relate to one another can be seen in 
how they are measured as well. Numerous measures have been developed with the intention of 
assessing executive functions, but they are often developed and applied independently. However, 
more recently batteries of these prefrontal cognitive tasks have been utilized in several studies 
and found to predict performance in both work and academic settings (Higgins et al., 2007; 
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Sabet, et al., 2013). Evidence shows that these tasks are associated with various executive 
functions, such as manipulating and monitoring information, and encoding and retrieval of 
information in memory (for a review, see Higgins et al., 2007). One battery of D-PFCA 
developed by Higgins and colleagues (2007) aims to assess three categories of tasks: conditional 
associative tasks, working memory, and word fluency.  
Conditional associative tasks assess a person’s ability to learn conditional behavioral 
rules required to complete a task. There are three measures of conditional associate tasks in the 
Higgins and colleagues’ battery, including a go/no-go task. In this task, the test taker is required 
to respond to certain prompts with either a go or no-go response depending on predetermined 
criteria. In this type of task, performance is predicated on the successful learning of the criteria 
and subsequently responding correctly. Other conditional associative tasks in the battery include 
a spatial and a non-spatial conditional associative task. For the spatial conditional associative 
task, the test taker is shown a set of five squares and five circles. The test taker is told that each 
square is associated with just one circle. In each trial, one circle is highlighted, and the test taker 
must guess which square corresponds with it. The test taker can guess until he/she correctly 
identifies the corresponding square. Trials continue until the test taker gets ten consecutive trials 
correct or they complete 100 trials altogether. The non-spatial conditional associative task 
follows the same design except the test taker is shown five target words and one of five cue 
words. The test taker must then guess the one target word associated with the cue word before 
moving onto the next trial. Again, this continues until the test taker correctly identifies the cue 
word in ten consecutive trials or after completing 100 trials.  
The measures used for assessing working memory from an executive function 
perspective focus on the test taker’s ability to store, update, maintain, and inhibit information 
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throughout a task. Within Higgins and colleagues’ D-PFCA battery, there are three working 
memory measures. One measure is the self-ordered pointing task. In this task, the test taker is 
shown a set of stimuli, which can be words, images, or figures. Typically, 12 stimuli are shown 
at once and the test taker must click on one stimulus, at which point all of the stimuli will be 
randomly reordered. The test taker must then click on another stimulus without clicking on a 
previously selected stimulus. The test taker is able to click as many times as there are stimuli. 
Another measure in the battery is known as the randomization task. For this, the test taker is 
asked to randomize the order of letters in a given span. For example, the test taker might be 
asked to randomize the letters from J to M. Once the test taker correctly performs that task, 
he/she is asked to randomize a new span of letters, one letter longer than the previous span. If the 
test taker does not use all the letters, uses the wrong letters, or puts the letter in its original 
sequence (e.g. OP), the trial is considered incorrect. The test taker continues until they get two 
trials in a row wrong or complete a 14-letter span. The final working memory task is the recency 
discrimination task. For this task, the test taker is briefly shown a sequence of six or eight words. 
After the sequence is displayed, two of the words are displayed again and the test taker must 
identify which of the two words was shown most recently.  
Finally, word fluency tasks require the test taker to produce as many words he/she can in 
a set time based on a rule or set of rules. For the D-PFCA battery by Higgins and colleagues, 
there is only one task of word fluency. For this task, the test taker is asked to generate as many 
words that start with a specific letter or set of letters, such as “ST”. The test taker must generate 
as many words as he/she can within five minutes and cannot use inflections of a submitted word, 
such as plurals or past tense.   
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A critical feature of Higgins and colleagues’ measure of executive functions is the fact 
that it is a battery of multiple cognitive processes. While each of these measures assesses an 
independent cognitive process, scores are only reported for a composite D-PFCA score. 
Therefore, while the measure uses discrete tasks to evaluate the cognitive processes, its score 
reflects a broad construct of information processing. This is an important distinction since the 
measure contains a diverse array of tasks and stimuli to assess one overall construct. The diverse 
tasks found in this measure offers a representative set of possible tasks that can be used in 
research, although other tasks exist and have been used to measure executive function (e.g., 
Culbertson, Huffcutt, & Goebl, 2013; Stermac-Stein, 2014). Much like Higgins and colleagues’ 
D-PFCA battery, the tasks in these other measures seek to assess high-level cognitive processes 
that are used for controlling processes for goal attainment, and therefore share many similarities 
to the tasks used in the D-PFCA battery.  
Neuropsychology measures and performance. Most research involving 
neuropsychological measures of information processing have been used in diagnostic settings, 
intended for the use of interventions in children or clinical populations (e.g., Das, 2002; Naglieri, 
1999; Peterson, Finn, & Pihl, 1992; Peterson, Pihl, Higgins, Séguin, & Tremblay, 2003; Séguin, 
Nagin, Assaad, & Tremblay, 2004). However, a handful of studies with adults at work and in 
educational settings have provided promising findings about how these measures predict 
performance. For example, Higgins and colleagues (2007) found that the D-PFCA battery is 
related to job performance in both managerial and factory floor jobs. They also found that the 
battery was correlated with academic performance, which was replicated by Sabet and 
colleagues (2013). Research on another neuropsychological measure, the CAS, has also offered 
evidence that these measures can predict a person’s ability to acquire a complex skill (Fein & 
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Day, 2004). Taken together, the research on neuropsychological measures demonstrates the 
positive relationship between these measures and performance.  
Neuropsychology measures and group score differences. Research on group score 
differences between African Americans and Caucasians is extremely limited for 
neuropsychology measures, with only one study currently published on this topic in the I-O 
psychology literature. Sabet and colleagues (2013) found that the score differences between 
African Americans and Caucasians was a d of .15, which is considered a small difference. While 
these results offer an encouraging start, extensive research is needed to better understand group 
score differences on these measures in I-O psychology.  
Summary of neuropsychology measures. While there are other neuropsychological 
measures that are currently being applied in clinical settings or being developed today, many of 
them have yet to be used to predict performance. Still, taking together the current research, the 
neuropsychological approach offers a unique and theoretically sound approach to understanding 
and measuring intelligence. By grounding cognitive processes in regions of the brain, it is 
possible to better understand how these processes relate to each other and how information 
processing measures contribute to the overall construct space. Specifically, by using 
neuroimaging, it may be possible to understand the unique contributions of each measure in 
assessing information processing (Haier & Jung, 2007; Jung & Haier, 2007).  
Summary of the cognitive science approach. Measures from the cognitive science 
approach have been used sparingly in the I-O psychology literature, however, researchers have 
commented on its potential for use in the field (e.g., Agnello et al., 2015; Scherbaum et al., 
2012). With the handful of studies demonstrating the potential for these measures to successfully 
predict performance in several settings, it is important to continue research on these measures. 
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The strong theoretical foundation and multidimensional approach of these measures could be a 
beneficial tool for research in the workplace going forward.  
Hypotheses 
 Research on information processing measures has expanded in recent decades with 
renewed interest in the psychometric approach (e.g., Schneider & McGrew, 2012; Schneider & 
Newman, 2015) and new advancements in cognitive sciences (e.g., Ardila, 1999; Becker et al., 
2015). This has led to a strong foundation of research examining information processing 
measures and many of their key features, such as their predictive power and how people from 
different groups perform on them. However, recent calls for additional research on these 
measures (e.g., Fagan & Ployhart, 2015; Reeve et al., 2015) demonstrates that there are still 
deficits in the collective knowledge about information processing measures. As such, the goal of 
the current meta-analysis is to aggregate extant findings on these measures to spur discussion 
about their utility and encourage further research. However, the fact that research on these 
measures is still evolving, especially in the cognitive sciences, means that testing some 
conditional effects in a meta-analysis is currently impractical due to low sample sizes. For that 
reason, I hypothesize several main effects and moderators about information processing 
measures but do not propose moderation effects for all main effects. While this limits the tests 
that can be conducted, it demonstrates the importance of the current meta-analysis as a 
preliminary review of the existing findings in the field and highlights specific areas requiring 
more research going forward.  
Relationship Between Measures of Information Processing and Performance 
Based on the extant literature on information processing, there is a clear basis to expect 
information processing measures to correlate with performance in multiple domains, such as job 
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performance, job-oriented training performance, and academic performance. Foremost, 
information processing reflects a person’s ability to attend to critical information in the 
environment, reflect on and manipulate information, deduct rationale conclusions from 
information, and apply those conclusions to additional stimuli perceived in the environment. 
These core cognitive functions are critical for numerous behaviors required for success across 
numerous domains, especially those that require complex behaviors or those that require high 
attentional resources, such as those that involve processing information in large amounts or over 
an extended time (Kanfer & Ackerman, 2005). Therefore, it is expected that information 
processing predicts performance on these types of tasks. Past research supports this notion, with 
evidence demonstrating information processing predicts the ability to multi-task (e.g., Bühner et 
al., 2006), performance on a flight simulator (Sommer, Häusler, Koning, & Arendasy, 2006; Van 
Benthem & Herdman, 2016), and performance on a managerial simulation (Bosco et al., 2015).  
Furthermore, information processing is considered to represent the core set of cognitive 
processes associated with basic intelligent functioning (Fagan & Ployhart, 2015). For that reason, 
it is believed to be the fundamental process for learning skills, abilities, and knowledge 
(Ackerman, 1996). By its nature, information processing provides the basis for a person’s 
declarative and procedural knowledge, which are at the core of performance on various tasks at 
work (Kanfer & Ackerman, 2005) and in education (Kuncel, Hezlett, & Ones, 2004). As such, 
information processing also has an indirect effect on performance through one’s ability to learn 
new information (Ackerman & Kanfer, 1993). This is demonstrated in past research that shows 
information processing predicts knowledge and skill acquisition (e.g., Moran, 1986; Roznowski 
et al., 2001) and subsequent transfer to performance outcomes (e.g., Bergerson & Gustafsson, 
2011; Fein & Day, 2004). This aligns with theory that suggests knowledge acquisition is the 
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main causal factor predicting job performance across most jobs, including those with low 
complexity (Schmidt & Hunter, 1992). The combination of information processing predicting 
learning and performance on complex tasks leads to the proposition that information processing 
should also predict overall performance at both work and school, which has been supported in a 
multitude of prior studies as described in the previous sections (e.g., Henderson, 1979; Higgins et 
al., 2007; Rohde & Thompson, 2007; Sabet et al., 2013). Based on these previous findings, it is 
hypothesized that: 
 Hypothesis 1: Information processing measures will be positively correlated with (a) job 
performance, (b) job-oriented training performance, and (c) academic performance. 
Group Score Differences on Measures of Information Processing  
 Research on group score differences is a critical area for applied psychology fields, 
particularly I-O psychology. Differences on intelligence scores can ultimately lead to disparities 
in outcomes, such as admission into college and selection for a job, that can have substantial 
impact on a person’s life. For that reason, group score differences and its related concept of 
adverse impact are important legal issues, especially in the United States. Furthermore, 
organizations often seek to improve diversity in their workforce for a wide range of “business, 
social, or ethical reasons” (Ployhart & Holtz, 2008, p. 153). Most of the research in I-O 
psychology has focused on differences between African Americans and Caucasians as they have 
been systematically presented as the largest group difference (Hough et al., 2001; Neisser et al., 
1996). For that reason, I focus on group score differences between African Americans and 
Caucasians in the current study. In addition, because each country has its own social, cultural, 
and legal histories that influence how group score differences manifest and are examined (Outtz 
& Newman, 2010), I only examine group score differences within the United States.  
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Group score differences on measures of intelligence are typically represented as a 
standardized mean score difference with Cohen’s d. Though specific group score differences 
vary by measure and may even further vary by setting (Outtz & Newman, 2010; Roth et al., 
2001), several prior meta-analyses and narrative reviews have referenced a d of 1.00 (or one 
standard deviation from the mean) between African Americans and Caucasians on measures of 
intelligence (Hough et al., 2001; Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Ployhart & Holtz, 2008; Roth et al., 
2001; Sackett & Wilk, 1994; Schmitt, Rogers, Chan, Sheppard, & Jennings, 1997). This value 
has been demonstrated across a wide range of studies, samples, and measures, thus becoming a 
standard benchmark to compare group differences for any given intelligence measure against. 
Most notably, Roth and colleagues (2001) conducted a meta-analysis of intelligence measures 
across several different samples. They found that intelligence measures across various samples 
had a d value of 1.10 (k = 105) with a lower limit to its 95% confidence interval of 1.06, 
suggesting that the group score differences on these measures were most likely above a 1.00. In 
addition, they found that in an education sample, the d value was 1.12 (k = 148) with a lower 
confidence limit of 1.09, and in an industrial sample they found a d value of .99 (k = .88) with a 
lower limit of .88. Finally, they examined a specific sample of applicants that had taken the 
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, a measure believed to mainly assess crystallized 
intelligence (Roberts et al., 2000), and found a d value of 1.19 (N = 212,238). An analysis across 
three studies of the Wonderlic, another measure mainly assessing crystallized knowledge, found 
a d value of 1.09 and a lower confidence limit of .89 (Bosco et al., 2015). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that while there is variability in group score differences, they are consistently 
high with the reported d value of 1.00 an appropriate benchmark across intelligence measures. 
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The source of these group score differences remains a fiercely debated topic (Neisser et 
al., 1996). While research continues to investigate the determinants of these differences (e.g., 
Cottrell et al., 2015; Moore, 1986), researchers argue that score differences between groups can 
be a result of contamination and/or deficiencies in measures of knowledge (Fagan, 2000; Fagan 
& Holland, 2002; Goldstein et al., 2002). Knowledge-based measures, by their nature, rely on 
information that may differ based on a person’s schooling and cultural background (Fagan & 
Holland, 2002) and even differences in his/her family’s income, maternal education, and 
maternal verbal ability and knowledge (Cottrell et al., 2015; Outtz & Newman, 2010). When this 
is coupled with findings that show it is possible to reduce group mean differences by removing 
item content that involves knowledge that varies by race (Freedle & Kostin, 1997; Fagan & 
Holland, 2007; Malda, et al., 2010), there is clear support that group score differences are at least 
partially a result of items that require prior knowledge. 
 Researchers suggest that when basic cognitive functions are assessed, like those in 
information processing measures, a person’s raw intellectual capability is being measured instead 
of the outcomes of that capability (i.e., knowledge) (e.g., Fagan, 2000; Fagan & Ployhart, 2015; 
Sternberg, 1997, 2000). At their core, information processing measures are intended to assess a 
person’s ability to solve novel problems and therefore should minimize prior knowledge in the 
assessment process. Supporting this notion, Hough and colleagues (2001) found that measures 
not relying on prior knowledge generally had lower mean differences between African 
Americans and Caucasians than knowledge-based measures. Furthermore, findings from both the 
psychometric (e.g., Colom & García-López, 2002; Klein et al., 2007; Nenty & Dinero, 1981) and 
cognitive sciences approach (e.g., Bosco et al., 2015; Naglieri, 2005; Sabet et al., 2013) have 
consistently found information processing measures have smaller group difference scores than 
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traditional measures of general intelligence or intelligence-as-knowledge. For that reason, the 
following is hypothesized:  
Hypothesis 2: Information processing measures will have smaller group scores 
differences between African American and Caucasian test takers than traditionally found 
on intelligence measures (i.e., d = 1.00).  
Moderators 
 In addition to main hypotheses regarding information processing, it is feasible that there 
will be additional variance to be explained by conditional effects. While many different variables 
may influence the relationship between information processing and performance and group score 
differences on these types of tests, this meta-analysis will focus on three characteristics of the 
test as potential moderators: the theoretical approach used to develop the test, the diversity of 
task types within a test, and the level of language knowledge required for the test.  
 Theoretical approach. The psychometric and cognitive science approaches to 
information processing share many commonalities, to the point that researchers have tried to map 
them onto each other (e.g., Deary, 2005; Engle, 2018; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990; Ren, 
Schweizer, Wang, Chu, & Gong, 2017; Schneider & McGrew, 2012). Researchers have even 
begun to integrate cognitive science research into psychometric models, with the Cattell-Horn-
Carroll model including factors corresponding to working memory and controlled executive 
attention (McGrew, 2005). Similarly, recent advancements have led test developers to 
incorporate measurement strategies from both approaches, such as assessing the cognitive 
processes that underlie psychometric measures and applying advanced factor analysis methods 
on neuropsychological measures (e.g., Fiorello, Hale, Snyder, Forrest, & Teodori, 2008; 
Flanagan, Alfonso, Ortiz, & Dynda, 2010; Primi, 2002). Though it is obvious that there are 
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shared features between the functions examined in cognitive sciences and constructs such as 
fluid reasoning, the exact relationships between these constructs remain unclear (Kent, 2017). 
Furthermore, there are several critical distinctions between the theoretical approaches that make 
them unique in both their conceptualization and operationalization of information processing. 
Specifically, the two approaches mainly differ in their theoretical grounding, coverage of the 
construct space, and item designs.  
Perhaps the most critical difference between the theoretical approaches is their reliance 
on a priori theory in conceptual and operational development. Whereas the psychometric 
approach relies on results from statistical analyses to identify the structure of information 
processing, the cognitive sciences approach utilizes multiple pieces of data founded in the 
biological and neurophysiological sciences, such as neuroimaging and traumatic brain injury 
studies (Sabet et al., 2013). This means that the psychometric approach inherently begins its 
evaluation of information processing and its components at a higher level of abstraction than the 
cognitive sciences. It also indicates that the psychometric approach has less integration of 
theories from other disciplines at its foundation since factor analysis provides the initial insights 
for understanding information processing compared to the cognitive sciences, which incorporate 
constructs and methodologies from multiple disciplines throughout theory development. To be 
clear, there are examples in the psychometric approach that are founded in strong theory, with 
Hebb’s original work on different biological underpinnings of intelligence (Brown, 2016) and 
Cattell’s attempts to develop a culture-free intelligence measure to assess reasoning ability rather 
than knowledge (Cattell, 1984) at the crux of the psychometric approach to information 
processing. However, much of the theory development from the psychometric approach has 
relied on leveraging statistical analyses to better differentiate intelligence constructs, such as how 
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fluid reasoning differs from general intelligence (e.g., Gustafsson & Åberg-Bengtsson, 2010; 
Jensen, 1998), rather than integrating other theories to evolve the constructs, although this has 
begun to change in the last decade (Flanagan et al., 2010; Primi, 2014).  
The differing degree of a priori theory integration between these two approaches also 
carries over to their development of information processing measures and the range of the 
construct space they assess. While the psychometric approach is founded in theories related to 
information processing, the origins of its constructs, specifically fluid reasoning, is not originally 
based on physiological research of the brain. Alternatively, the cognitive science approach 
focuses on developing constructs and subsequent measures that are based on physiological and 
neuropsychological research. This creates a difference in the level of abstraction at which the 
measures begin. While the psychometric approach is more statistically abstract, the cognitive 
science approach is more proximal to the intended cognitive processes of the brain. This has led 
researchers to argue that measures from the cognitive sciences are able to capture a broader 
range of information processing functions compared to other approaches because they are more 
directly linked to a variety of cognitive processes (Conway et al., 2003; Higgins et al., 2007). In 
doing so, the cognitive science approach should reduce potential construct underrepresentation 
and have stronger relationships with performance outcomes (Daniel, 1997; Messick, 1995). 
Finally, measures from the cognitive science approach and psychometric approach 
typically differ in the design of their items. Specifically, measures from the psychometric 
approach often include static stimuli, such as the matrix items typically used to measure fluid 
reasoning. Although the items on these measures require reasoning ability, the test taker only 
needs to identify a right response from multiple choices, much like an achievement test, for their 
ability to be assessed. This makes it difficult to know the explicit processes underlying a test 
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taker’s response since the operation of the cognitive processes is not observable. On the other 
hand, measures from the cognitive science approach rely on dynamic behavioral based responses 
(Kyllonen, 2002; Miller & Maricle, 2012). These measures include maintaining a string of 
numbers in memory while identifying whether a series of math equations are true or false (i.e., 
working memory tasks; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005), clicking when certain stimuli 
are presented on the screen (i.e., conditional associative learning tasks) (Peterson et al., 2003), or 
developing strategies for matching the same number in a row of numbers (i.e., planning tasks) 
(Naglieri & Das, 1997). As a result, measures from the cognitive science approach offer more 
direct observations of the cognitive processes in question and have a high degree of 
correspondence between the construct of interest and the unit of measurement, an important 
factor for improving construct validity (e.g., Guion, 2002; Stone-Romero, 1994). Specifically, 
with an increased ability to assess the psychological construct directly, a test acts more as a 
direct “sample” of the target behavior rather than an indirect “sign” (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). 
This improves the accuracy of the test in assessing the underlying construct and can help 
eliminate unwanted variance in the measurement process, potentially improving the predictive 
validity of the measure.  
Taken together, the cognitive science approach should be more theoretically bound, cover 
a wider scope of the information processing construct space, and include test items that more 
closely reflect the actual operation of the target cognitive processes compared to the 
psychometric approach. These features of the cognitive science approach should subsequently 
reduce contamination and deficiencies within the testing process by capturing specific cognitive 
functions through high fidelity measures. Therefore, it is anticipated that while psychometric 
measures of information processing do predict performance, they will not be as successful as 
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measures from the cognitive sciences. Supporting these notions, research has shown that 
neuropsychological measures of information processing can predict performance above and 
beyond fluid reasoning (Higgins et al., 2007). Based on these findings, it is predicted that: 
Hypothesis 3: Cognitive science measures of information processing will have a stronger 
relationship with (a) job performance, (b) job-oriented training performance, and (c) 
academic performance than psychometric measures of information processing. 
Unfortunately, theories of adverse impact and group score differences are still only 
emerging (e.g., Cottrell et al., 2015) and there is little conclusive research on group score 
differences, particularly for measures from the psychometric and cognitive science approaches. 
However, there is research showing some measures from the psychometric approach, including 
the widely used Raven’s Progressive Matrices, still exhibit group score differences (e.g., Colom 
& Garcia-Lopez, 2002). Early research has also shown that a measure of executive attention had 
lower score differences than the Progressive Matrices, though the difference was not significant 
(Bosco et al., 2015). For that reason, it is important to quantitatively evaluate how these 
theoretical approaches may differentially influence group scores.  
The fact that the cognitive science approach is founded soundly in physiological research 
may have implications for how the two approaches manifest group score differences. Although 
the causes of groups score differences are still not completely understood, there is growing 
research that suggests genetic and biological factors do not fully explain differences in group 
scores (for reviews see Neisser et al., 1996 and Nisbett et al., 2012). Because the theory and 
measurement of the cognitive science approach originates more closely to the physiological 
domain than the psychometric approach does, it is possible that the cognitive science approach 
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can reduce measurement deficiencies and contamination that are associated with irrelevant error 
contributing to group score differences. For that reason, I hypothesize the following:  
Hypothesis 4: Cognitive science measures of information processing will have smaller 
group score differences between African American and Caucasian test takers than 
psychometric measures of information processing.   
 Diversity of task types. Attempts to optimize construct validity of information 
processing measures are ultimately aimed at increasing the alignment between the 
conceptualization and operationalization of a construct. As noted above, this could involve using 
measures that directly reflect the behaviors of information processing and, thus, sample the 
domain of interest. In the intelligence literature, researchers have also noted the importance of 
reducing the potential error caused by only sampling intelligence with a limited number of tasks, 
known as the psychometric sampling error (Jensen & Weng, 1994). From this perspective, the 
use of diverse tasks in a measure of intelligence helps to remove unwanted error by aggregating 
across multiple tasks, which ultimately helps better triangulate the focal construct (Reeve & 
Blacksmith, 2009). Similarly, others have argued that construct validity of intelligence measures 
is limited when using a narrow operationalization of intelligence (Kretzschmar, Neubert, 
Wüstenberg, & Greiff, 2016). Research has supported this notion by demonstrating that 
measures of fluid reasoning (Beauducel, Liepmann, Felfe, & Nettelnstroth, 2007) and critical 
problem solving (Kretzschmar et al., 2016) that use a diverse set of tasks to measure the focal 
construct have stronger correlations with hypothesized variables of interest than measures with a 
narrow set of tasks. By increasing the construct validity of the test through a diverse set of tasks 
should also lead to increased predictive validity since potential error is being removed from the 
measure.  
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While a diverse set of tasks has the potential to be beneficial for the construct validity of 
information processing measures, the rationale may differ slightly for measures from the 
psychometric and cognitive science approaches. Specifically, the diversity of tasks used in 
psychometric measures often differ based on the format of the item (e.g., non-verbal matrix, 
verbal spatial relations) whereas the diversity of tasks used in cognitive science measures often 
reflects multiple cognitive subsystems being measured. As an example, the Cattell Culture Fair 
Test is a psychometric measure of information processing that consists of four subtests (Cattell, 
1973). Each subtest is intended as a measure of fluid reasoning, though each is a different type of 
perceptual task in order to avoid reliance on a single ability. As such, the diversity of tasks 
associated with this test and others from the psychometric approach are specifically aimed at 
reducing the psychometric sampling error of the measure. On the other hand, a test battery of D-
PFCA from the cognitive science approach includes multiple measures to assess distinct 
cognitive processes that are all associated with the D-PFCA (Higgins et al., 2007). Therefore, 
while there are broad and diverse tasks, much like the psychometric approach, these diverse tasks 
attempt to sample a broader scope of cognitive processes included in the D-PFCA. Similarly, a 
measure of executive attention includes multiple tasks associated with assessing the various 
cognitive processes associated with both complex and simple attention tasks (e.g., Bosco et al., 
2015; Hutchinson, 2007). As such, the cognitive approach should still reduce psychometric 
sampling error but do so as a result of minimizing measurement deficiencies of the focal 
construct.  
Although the outcome of having diverse tasks in the measure is expected to improve 
construct validity and, as a result, predictive validity for both the psychometric and cognitive 
science approaches, the underlying rationale diverges. To avoid conflating the effect of diverse 
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tasks across the two theoretical approaches, I offer separate hypotheses for each approach. As 
such, I predict the following:  
Hypothesis 5: Psychometric measures of information processing with a diverse set of 
item types will have a stronger relationship with (a) job performance, (b) job-oriented 
training performance, and (c) academic performance than psychometric measures of 
information processing that do not have a diverse set of item types. 
Hypothesis 6: Cognitive science measures of information processing with a diverse set of 
item types will have a stronger relationship with (a) job performance, (b) job-oriented 
training performance, and (c) academic performance than cognitive science measures of 
information processing that do not have a diverse set of item types. 
 Language knowledge requirements. Researchers have begun to promote the use of 
information processing measures for their reduced reliance on prior knowledge (e.g., Agnello et 
al., 2015; Scherbaum et al., 2012). In particular, for testing contexts in which knowledge is not 
required, these measures can potentially reduce contamination from irrelevant testing content 
(Fagan, 2000; Fagan & Holland, 2002; Goldstein et al., 2009). However, even within 
information processing measures there is variation in the degree prior knowledge is needed to 
respond to the items. While all information processing measures are intended to assess the 
cognitive processes that underlie problem solving and reasoning, the format of the items differ 
across tests. Graphical stimuli, such as those used in the Raven’s, are commonly associated with 
information processing measures, but other measures utilize vocabulary as the stimuli. Examples 
of measures with vocabulary stimuli come from both the psychometric and cognitive science 
approaches. For instance, the Baddeley Reasoning Test is a psychometric test that requires test 
takers to determine whether a series of sentences are true or false based on a set of prespecified 
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rules as quickly as possible (Baddeley, 1968). Similarly, the word fluency test, which is a 
measure from the cognitive sciences, requires test takers to produce words that meet a set of 
specific guidelines, such as the words must start with the letters ST (Higgins et al., 2007). In both 
of these examples, the test taker must have knowledge of the language the test is being 
administered in.  
While all tests have some language requirements to the extent they include instructions, 
tests that have language infused into their items require the test taker to have at least some 
language knowledge to successful respond to individual items. Most measures of intelligence-as-
knowledge require language knowledge, which can be advantageous in some circumstances. For 
example, measures of verbal ability can be useful in hiring scenarios in which an organization is 
filling a position requiring language comprehension (e.g., Wee, Newman, & Joseph, 2014). Still, 
research has demonstrated that variation in test taker knowledge of the specific vocabulary on a 
test can lead to differences in performance on a measure of intelligence (e.g., Fagan & Holland, 
2002, 2007, 2009; Freedle & Kostin, 1997). For this reason, researchers have suggested that 
intelligence measures reduce the language demands associated with intelligence tests and instead 
use graphical stimuli (Naglieri, 2005), particularly in situations where language knowledge is not 
required for successful performance on the criterion. In cases where language knowledge is 
important for the job, it is important for test developers to ensure the level of language aligns 
with the requirements of the job. This corresponds with appeals to utilize more non-entrenched 
stimuli, such as novel or abnormal stimuli, in testing situations where language is not critical to 
ensure all test takers have similar experience with the test content (e.g., Bokhorst, 1989; 
Sternberg, 1982; Tetewsky & Sternberg, 1986). In the case of information processing measures, 
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doing so can eliminate irrelevant content from the measure and reduce potential contamination of 
the measure. Therefore, I propose the following:  
Hypothesis 7: Information processing measures that require less language knowledge will 
have a stronger relationship with (a) job performance, (b) job-oriented training 
performance, and (c) academic performance than information processing measures that 
require more language knowledge. 
While there are information processing measures from both theoretical approaches, they 
are overall limited in number. Therefore, while it is important to investigate the effect of 
language knowledge on performance, it is currently not feasible to assess its effect within the 
various theoretical approaches. Similarly, the current dearth of research makes it impractical to 
test for the effect of task diversity and language knowledge on group score differences.  
Method 
 To examine these hypotheses, I applied meta-analytic methods to aggregate the extant 
data on information processing measures. Meta-analysis offers a unique quantitative approach 
for combining and reporting findings across multiple samples, which allows for a larger sample 
size and higher statistical power (Rosenthal & DiMatteo, 2001). Specifically, the effect sizes 
from individual samples are combined and corrected based on the various errors associated with 
the individual samples, such as measurement error in the criterion, offering more accurate and 
credible conclusions than a single study can provide (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). In addition, any 
variance not explained by the sampling variance can be further evaluated by examining the 
potential effect of moderators (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). To do so, each 
effect size within a meta-analysis is coded to determine the relevant statistical data and sample 
characteristics that can be aggregated and compared to make big picture inferences about the 
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existing data. It is important to note that meta-analysis findings are not meant to be conclusive 
assessments of a research area, regardless of the scope of the meta-analysis (Aguinis, Pierce, 
Bosco, Dalton, & Dalton, 2011). Instead, they are an important stage in the evolution of a 
research area meant to summarize current knowledge, evaluate the standing of the field, and 
spark new research questions.  
For the current meta-analysis, I utilized Hunter and Schmidt’s (2004) methodology for 
estimating sampling variances, correcting for measurement error in the criterion, and weighing 
effect sizes based on their sampling variance. To test my main effect and moderation hypotheses, 
I used a multi-level analysis in order to address potential issues of non-independent effect sizes 
(Bowman, 2012; Hox, 2010). The following sections offer an overview of the steps I conducted 
for the meta-analysis, including how I operationalized the focal variables, the process for 
conducting the relevant literature search, the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the meta-
analysis, and the process for meta-analyzing the effect sizes.  
Operationalization of Key Variables  
 Information processing. Information processing measures cover a wide spectrum. As 
mentioned above, both the psychometric and cognitive science approaches to intelligence offer 
similar yet distinct methods for assessing information processing. At their core, these measures 
are focused on assessing a person’s ability to perceive, integrate, and reason with information to 
make decisions and rely on stimuli that minimize prior knowledge to reduce contamination of 
other constructs. As such, this meta-analysis will include measures that most closely reflect the 
information processing domain, as conceptualized in this paper. A scale was determined to be a 
measure of information processing based on 1) the construct validity of the measure and 2) the 
intended construct of the scale by the test developer. Table 1 offers an overview of common 
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psychometric information processing measures and Table 2 offers an overview of common 
cognitive science information processing measures, which were included in this meta-analysis. 
Furthermore, while this meta-analysis includes information processing measures that are subtests 
or dimensions of larger measures when they are reported as independent scales, it does not 
include studies that aggregate information processing measures with knowledge measures. This 
approach limits the number of effect sizes included in the meta-analysis, and potentially reduces 
the statistical power of the findings, but allows for the most accurate test of the hypotheses as it 
will only examine those measures that most closely reflect the information processing domain, as 
conceptualized in this paper.  
 Job performance. In defining job performance, researchers often highlight that it is the 
behaviors one engages in that are related to the goals of the organization (e.g., Campbell, 
McHenry, & Wise, 1990; Motowidlo, Borman, & Schmit, 1997). This definition shifts attention 
from solely the results of employees’ actions to the actions themselves, and their value to the 
organization (Motowidlo, 2003). A large range of behaviors fall under the scope of this 
definition, leaving much flexibility in how job performance is measured. Previously, job 
performance was treated mainly as a single, overall factor. However, more recently researchers 
have argued that one factor does not offer enough conceptual explanation of performance. There 
have been various models that have depicted job performance as multidimensional (e.g., 
Campbell, McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993; Viswesvaran & Ones, 2000). In the I-O psychology 
literature (Hough & Oswald, 2000; Sackett & Lievens, 2008) and intelligence research 
(Gonzalez-Mulé et al., 2014), performance is frequently separated into three major dimensions 
referred to as task performance, organizational citizenship behavior (OCB), and 
 63 
 
counterproductive workplace behavior (CWB) (e.g., Dalal, 2005; Lievens, Conway, & De Corte, 
2008; Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Rotundo & Sackett, 2002; Viswesvaran & Ones, 2000).    
Task performance is associated with those behaviors that directly impact the technical 
core of a job or organization (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993). Measures of task performance can 
be assessed using a wide array of methods, including supervisor and peer ratings of task 
performance as well as objective measures, such as measures of productivity, work samples, or 
simulations (e.g., Knapp et al., 2001). Objective measures of task performance, particularly work 
samples and simulations, are intended to reflect tasks completed on the job and can be 
administered to both employees and non-employees alike. For example, laboratory studies have 
previously shown that information processing predicts performance on management simulations 
(e.g., Bosco et al., 2015), multi-tasking simulations (Hambrick, Oswald, Darowski, Rench, & 
Brou, 2010), and flight simulators (e.g., Sommer et al., 2006), all of which were used to parallel 
task performance on the job. Therefore, studies that use task performance measures intended to 
simulate job performance were included in the meta-analysis, including those administered to 
non-employees.  
Often contrasted with task performance are OCBs and CWBs. OCBs are considered 
behaviors that contribute to the success of the organization through their impact on the social and 
psychological environment, such as spreading goodwill and endorsing the organization’s goals 
(Rotundo & Sackett, 2002). Alternatively, CWBs are those behaviors that harm the goals of the 
organization or employees, such as sabotage, aggression, and even withdrawal (Bowling & 
Gruys, 2010). While intuitively these types of behaviors appear to be related to personality traits, 
such as conscientiousness and emotional stability, there is evidence that information processing 
predicts both OCBs (e.g., Côté & Miners, 2006) and CWBs (Dilchert, Ones, Davis, & Rostow, 
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2007). One potential explanation for this link is that moral reasoning is founded on a person’s 
ability to reason and solve problems more generally (e.g., Derryberry, Wilson, Snyder, Norman, 
& Barger, 2005). Researchers hypothesize that a person’s likelihood to engage in behaviors such 
as OCBs and CWBs is influenced by the ability to consider the moral appropriateness, and 
subsequent rewards and consequences, of their actions (Dilchert et al., 2007). According to this 
perspective, the ability to anticipate the outcomes of a behavior can be indirectly affected by 
one’s information processing ability. Therefore, for the purposes of the current study, job 
performance was operationalized as overall job performance, task performance, OCBs, and 
CWBs. 
 Job-oriented training performance. At the core of job-oriented training effectiveness is 
changes in the trainee and, as a result, changes in the organization (e.g., Aguinis & Kraiger, 
2009). When considering changes in the trainee, a key metric of success is trainee learning. 
Within the Kirkpatrick Model (Kirkpatrick, 1996), learning is focused on the knowledge gained 
and the changes in the trainee’s behavior as a result of the training. Similarly, Kraiger, Ford, and 
Salas (1993) proposed a tripartite model of learning, which includes cognitive learning, skill-
based learning, and affective learning. In this model, cognitive learning references the 
acquisition of declarative knowledge whereas skill-based learning relates to procedural 
knowledge. In contrast, affective learning involves changes in opinion or attitudes, such as 
motivation or self-efficacy. While all of these categories of learning have important implications 
for the transfer of training to job-related behaviors, of interest for intelligence research are those 
training outcomes associated with the direct learning of knowledge and skills. For example, 
research has demonstrated that information processing predicts skill acquisition for apprentices 
during their first year of training (e.g., Moran, 1986) and knowledge-based learning following a 
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training session (e.g., Fein & Day, 2004). Therefore, I will focus on cognitive and skilled-based 
learning in the context of the current study.   
 Academic performance. Academic performance offers an important metric akin to job-
related behaviors. While some have questioned the practical relationship between academic 
performance and real-world tasks (e.g., Sternberg & Wagner, 1993), others have highlighted the 
importance of declarative and procedural knowledge for academic success and how that 
knowledge closely parallels the knowledge and skills required for success in other life domains, 
including work (e.g., Kuncel et al., 2004). As such, it is unsurprising that academic performance 
has been found to predict future job performance across a wide spectrum of studies (Roth, 
BeVier, Switzer, & Schippmann, 1996). Academic performance can be assessed using grades 
from a single exam or assignment, a single class, or student’s cumulative grade point average. 
Although all these measures can be effective for assessing academic performance, researchers 
typically prefer aggregated measures of academic performance as they are more reliable 
indicators (Frisby, 2001; Robbins et al., 2004). Specifically, aggregated measures typically 
reflect performance over time, domains, and/or raters allowing for more consistency in the 
measurement and have been used in prior academic research (Higgins et al., 2007; Noftle & 
Robins, 2007). For the current study, most measures of academic performance reflected students’ 
aggregated grades over time within a class (e.g., overall course grade, end-of-year exams) or 
across classes (e.g., GPA), while measures of academic performance based on single exams or 
assignments were excluded. To date, numerous studies have demonstrated the relationship 
between information processing and academic performance, including final grade in a course 
(e.g., Krumm et al., 2012), overall GPA (e.g., Wüstenberg, Greiff, & Funke, 2012), and end-of-
year exam scores (e.g., Furnham, Zhang, et al., 2006). 
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Literature Search 
 To identify studies relevant for the meta-analysis, a comprehensive search of available 
research databases was conducted. The process included a search of academic databases, 
including EBSCOhost, Google Scholar, JSTOR, PsycARTICLES, and PsycINFO. Various 
combinations of keywords were used as search terms, including the following: intelligence, 
cognitive ability, information processing, neuropsychology, fluid reasoning, executive attention, 
executive function, working memory, PASS, performance, academic performance, GPA, job 
performance, task performance, CWB, OCB, job-oriented training performance, race, group 
score differences, and adverse impact. Specific measures from the psychometric and cognitive 
science literatures (e.g., Cattell’s Culture Fair Test, CAS, Raven’s Progressive Matrices) were 
also used as keywords. Furthermore, articles of several key journals in the field (e.g., Journal of 
Applied Psychology, Educational and Psychological Measurement, Intelligence, Personnel 
Psychology, Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, Cognition, Journal of Clinical 
Psychology) along with any relevant review articles, chapters, and books were reviewed to 
identify additional studies. Reverse searches were conducted from the reference section of prior 
meta-analytic studies of intelligence (e.g., Bertua et al., 2005; Gonzalez-Mulé et al., 2014; 
Hough et al., 2001; Hülsheger et al., 2007; Kuncel et al., 2004; Postlethwaite, 2012; Salgado et 
al., 2003; Ziegler et al., 2011) to isolate information processing measures used in those studies. 
Using this initial set of articles, chapters, and manuals, a reverse search of their reference 
sections was conducted to identify additional studies. 
In addition to collecting published data, attempts were made to overcome the “file drawer 
problem,” which reflects the tendency for significant results to be published more often than 
non-significant results (Dickersin, 2005; Rosenthal, 1995). To do so, searches were also 
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conducted on ProQuest Dissertations and Theses with the same search terms as described above. 
Manual reviews of conference programs for key associations in the field (e.g., Academy of 
Management, American Psychological Association, Society of Industrial-Organizational 
Psychology) were conducted for presentations or posters on topics related to information 
processing measures. Technical reports and manuals were reviewed for measures or data (e.g., 
Aamodt, 2004). I also contacted major test publishers of cognitive ability tests and prominent 
researchers working on information processing measures to inquire about any unpublished 
samples they may have. These search strategies cumulated in the database of possible studies to 
be used in the meta-analysis. 
Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria  
 After identifying studies from the literature search that could be potentially included in 
the meta-analysis, the studies were evaluated against a series of a priori criteria to determine if 
they would be retained for data analysis (see Figure 1 for inclusion and exclusion criteria). For a 
study to be retained, it had to include an information processing measure, as operationalized 
above. In addition, the study had to present data about the measure and 1) its relationship with 
job performance, job-oriented training performance, or academic performance, as 
operationalized above, and/or 2) provide data on group scores for African Americans and 
Caucasians. Next, the data presented in the study needed to include statistics that could be 
transformed into a common effect size. For studies examining the relationship between 
information processing and performance, the focal effect size was Pearson correlation 
coefficients because most intelligence research reports correlations. Therefore, a study had to 
include the correlation between the measures or other statistics that could be transformed into a 
correlation (e.g., t-values, F-ratios) to be included. When reporting on group scores for a 
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measure, there needed to be an effect size of mean differences between groups (e.g., Cohen’s d) 
or statistics to calculate such effect sizes (e.g., sample sizes, means, standard deviations, 
correlations, F-ratios, t-values). Furthermore, meta-analysis calculations require a study’s sample 
size to calculate sampling variance and provide weights to each effect size, therefore for a study 
to be included it needed to report the relevant sample sizes.  
Experimental studies offer a unique opportunity to better understand intelligence scores 
by manipulating features of the situation to potentially influence test taker scores. While this data 
offers interesting insight into information processing measures, manipulations can strengthen or 
weaken observed relationships through the overt strength of situational manipulations or by 
creating dichotomies that do not exist naturally (Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009). For these 
reasons, scores from experimental studies were only included from conditions where no 
manipulation existed (i.e., control conditions) to avoid contamination from manipulated factors.  
Several key criteria about the sample for a study were also used to determine if the study 
was included in the meta-analysis. To ensure that the sample reflects the general working 
population, only studies that included an employee sample or a sample of college students were 
included. Studies that solely recruited participants with psychological or cognitive disorders were 
not included. Since examinations of group score differences were limited to the United States, 
only samples reporting group score differences between African Americans and Caucasians in 
the United States were retained. For samples reporting on performance outcomes, the data was 
retained even when the data was collected outside of the United States. However, only articles 
written in English were included.  
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Coding 
For each study that met the inclusion/exclusion criteria, it was coded on a set of criteria 
related to basic features of the study (see Appendix A for full coding sheet). Each study was 
coded by two independent coders. I was a coder on all studies and a research assistant acted as 
the second coder. All research assistants underwent a two-part training process in which they 
were first introduced to the theory underlying the project and then trained on best practices for 
coding as well as the specific coding categories for this project. Research assistants then 
completed a practice coding, after which they received feedback. Once coding was complete, any 
disagreements were resolved through consensus between coders. Since there were multiple 
research assistants, the configuration of coders was not the same across all effect sizes, which 
influenced how interrater reliability was calculated for each variable type. For categorical 
variables, Fleiss’ kappa was calculated and for continuous variables, intraclass coefficient was 
calculated. These statistics are reported below for all variables included in analyses.  
Sample characteristics. Every sample was coded for key features of the study, such as 
author(s), publication year, publication status (e.g., journal paper, presentation, dissertation, 
technical manual), sample type (e.g., employees, students), demographics of the sample (e.g., 
sex, race, age), and country of data collection. Furthermore, features of the information 
processing measures at the sample level were coded, such as the name of the measure, the 
version of the measure, number of items in the measure, whether the measure was adapted, the 
administration method (i.e., computer-based or paper-and-pencil), whether the test was timed or 
not, and the reliability of the measure in that sample.  
Effect sizes and sample sizes. Next, all relevant statistics regarding the target variables 
(i.e., information processing, performance, group score differences) were collected. This 
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included means, standard deviations, sample sizes, and effect size(s) or statistics to calculate an 
effect size. For the validity effect sizes (i.e., correlation coefficients), group score difference 
effect sizes (i.e., d scores), and sample sizes, there was high agreement between coders (ICC = 
1.00).  
Moderators. In addition to general sample characteristics, each effect size was coded 
based on the three variables hypothesized to be moderators. These variables include whether the 
measure was from the psychometric or cognitive science approach, the number of item types in 
the measure, and the degree to which language knowledge is required for the measure. When 
possible, these variables were coded based on information provided by the study that the effect 
size was coded from. However, in some cases the information was not directly available in the 
primary source materials. In those cases, the relevant information was coded from a 
supplementary source and imported into the dataset at a later time. In some cases, the measures 
were not publicly available, making it difficult to determine the specific features of the measure. 
In these cases, I reached out to the author or test distributor of the measure to gather additional 
information (e.g., request the specific information needed or a test manual for the measure).  
Theoretical approach. Past research (e.g., Ackerman et al., 2005; McGrew, 1997) has 
provided comprehensive breakdowns of information processing measures into different 
categories. These categories include fluid reasoning, executive attention, and working memory, 
as just some examples, which correspond directly to the current conceptualizations of the 
psychometric and cognitive science approaches. Furthermore, many test designers explicitly link 
their measures to specific theoretical paradigms, such as the CAS to the PASS theory, which is 
directly derived from the cognitive science approach (Naglieri & Das, 1997). Tables 1 and 2 map 
the categories of the most well-known information processing measures and their associated 
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theoretical approach based on past literature. Coders were given these tables to use when coding 
a measure as rooted in the psychometric or cognitive science approach. As new measures were 
encountered, they were added to this master list. The Fleiss’ kappa for theoretical approach was 
high at .98.  
Diversity of task types. The diversity of task types has been recognized as an important 
feature of intelligence measures (e.g., Jensen & Weng, 1994), though to my knowledge no prior 
study has operationalized this feature yet. For the purposes of this meta-analysis, item type was 
operationalized as discrete strategies for assessing information processing. This means there 
must be a fundamental difference in the construct being assessed or the method for assessing the 
same construct to be considered a different task. As an example, complex span measures involve 
the same strategy for assessing working memory, even though each span task differs in its focal 
action (e.g., an operation span task requires simple math skills whereas a reading span task 
requires simple reading skills). In this case, the tasks are the same in that they require the test 
taker to maintain a certain piece of information in memory. As such, these would not be 
considered different task types. Alternatively, the self-ordered pointing task and the recency 
discrimination task both assess working memory but do so in fundamentally different ways. 
Therefore, they would be considered different task types. The number of task types was coded as 
a count of these discrete strategies for assessing information processing. The ICC for the number 
of task types on a test was .99.   
Language knowledge requirements. While all measures require some degree of language 
knowledge to understand the measure’s instructions, measures differ in the degree that language 
comprehension is needed to respond to each item. Language knowledge requirements can be 
considered from many different perspectives, such as the syntactic complexity or readability of a 
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sentence. However, because most information processing measures purposefully avoid the use of 
language to complete items, there is a low threshold for what is considered a language 
requirement for information processing measures. For the purposes of this meta-analysis, there 
were two coding variables related to language knowledge requirements. First, all effect sizes 
were coded as either requiring language knowledge or not requiring language knowledge. If a 
measure did require language knowledge, then the percentage of items on the measure that 
involved language was also coded. Since not all measures report the exact number of items that 
contain language and/or the total number of items in a measure, each coder reported an estimated 
percentage. For the categorical coding of whether a measure required language knowledge or 
not, the Fleiss’ kappa was high at .93. The ICC for estimated percentage of language on a test 
was .99. 
Analyses 
 Correction procedures. For the current meta-analysis, Hunter and Schmidt’s (2004) 
psychometric procedures for correcting effect sizes were employed. This approach offers a wide 
range of strategies for correcting statistical artifacts that result from the various forms of error 
accompanying any given effect size. There are several potential statistical artifacts that can be 
corrected for in a meta-analysis, most often including sampling variance and error of 
measurement. Sampling variance reflects how an observed correlation will randomly vary from 
the true value of the population due to sampling error (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). In order to 
correct for this artifact, sampling variance is estimated for each effect size. The inverse of the 
sampling variance is then used as a weight for each effect size to correct for this artifact.  
Error of measurement corresponds to the random error associated with a particular 
measure when its utilized. Since most measures contain some level of random error, it is 
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considered important to reduce this artifact to systematically improve the validity estimates 
included in the meta-analysis. Error can exist in both the criterion and predictor variables, though 
correcting for them has different implications for the resulting estimates and these implications 
differ based on the type of effect size being examined. When examining validity coefficients, 
corrections are typically only done for the measurement error in the criterion. This is often 
considered the most accurate estimate of the “operational validity” of the predictor variable. That 
is, removing the random error in the criterion is believed to provide the most accurate assessment 
of how well the predictor correlates with an estimate of “true” performance. While measurement 
error in the predictor can also be corrected for, it is often seen as an inaccurate estimate of how 
the predictor measure operates in actual decision-making contexts (Kuncel et al., 2004). For 
example, when making a hiring decision, decision makers rely on the observed score from a 
selection tool instead of an estimate of the “true” score for that measure. Since the main interest 
of the current study is to estimate how information processing measures predict performance in 
real world situations and is not aimed at the theoretical relationship between these constructs, 
estimates correcting only for measurement error in the criterion are most appropriate, which is in 
line with prior intelligence meta-analyses (e.g., Hülsheger et al., 2007; Salgado et al., 2003). 
Therefore, when estimating validity coefficients, I present correlation coefficients corrected for 
measurement error in the criterion.  
In contrast to validity coefficients where the predictor is used to make decisions, in group 
difference analyses, it is often the criterion that is the focal variable for decision making. As 
such, correcting for measurement error in the criterion leads to estimates that do not reflect the 
operational nature of these measures. To understand how score differences lead to differential 
outcomes for groups in real world situations, it is best to evaluate estimates without correcting 
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for the criterion. Since the predictor in group difference analyses is group membership (e.g., a 
person’s race), there is often no need to correct for measurement error in the predictor because 
these measures contain little error. For the current study, when analyzing group differences, I 
only report the uncorrected group differences.  
Selecting the reliability coefficients to correct for measurement error is an important step 
since the use of inaccurate reliability estimates can lead to imprecise estimates and improper 
conclusions. However, there is no consensus in the field about what is the most appropriate 
estimation of reliability when correcting for measurement error (e.g., Murphy & DeShon, 2000; 
Richardson & Norgate, 2015; Schmidt, Viswesvaran, & Ones, 2000). In many ways, most 
reliability coefficients have some flaw and will lead to under- or overestimations of the validity. 
To best fit the methods of past meta-analyses and allow my findings to be comparable to the 
results from other meta-analyses, I corrected for measurement error in the criterion by extracting 
reliability estimates from prior meta-analyses. To most accurately reflect the criterion variables 
in my meta-analysis, I identified the most specific criterion types in prior meta-analyses to match 
with my dataset. In total, I identified 11 reliability coefficients from prior meta-analyses that fit 
with the performance outcomes in my study. I imputed these values for each relevant effect size. 
The criterion categories, associated reliability coefficients, and sources of these coefficients are 
presented in Table 3. 
There are several other types of artifacts that can be corrected for when the relevant 
information is available. A common artifact corrected for in prior intelligence meta-analyses is 
restriction of range. Restriction of range refers to situations in which the sample being used to 
examine a relationship between variables is not random because the sample has been previously 
screened on some variable. As such, the sample is not representative of the population. While 
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restriction of range has been corrected for in prior research, only recently formulas have been 
derived that more accurately address indirect restriction of range, which is the most common 
restriction of range that impacts intelligence measures (Hunter, Schmidt, & Le, 2006). Indirect 
restriction of range refers to situations in which a person is screened on a variable that is not 
being examined in a correlation. For example, if job applicants were selected into a job based on 
an interview but a study was examining the relationship between an intelligence measure and job 
performance, this would constitute indirect restriction of range. Unfortunately, while studies in 
the social sciences have begun to report more information about sample characteristics, it is still 
extremely difficult to obtain all of the relevant information to correct for indirect range 
restriction (Aguinis et al., 2011; Aytug, Rothstein, Zhou, & Kern, 2012). Others have noted that 
the relevant data for range restriction for fluid reasoning measures is rarely found in primary 
studies (Postlethwaite, 2011). In line with this finding, the majority of samples in the current meta-
analysis did not provide enough information to investigate the effect of range restriction, and 
therefore this correction was not applied. It should be noted that not correcting for range restriction 
means the findings in the current study should be seen as conservative estimates, particularly 
compared to other meta-analyses.  
Analytic strategy. Many of the studies included in the meta-analysis contain multiple 
measures of information processing, including both psychometric and cognitive science 
measures. For that reason, effect sizes of these measures are non-independent. There are several 
strategies for handling non-independent samples, including computing average effect sizes 
within a sample or selecting a single effect size from a study (Bowman, 2012). These strategies 
reduce the number of effect sizes available for a meta-analysis and, in the case of the current 
study, would potentially create confounds when trying to parse out the effects of the different 
theoretical approaches. To avoid losing data associated with each sample, it is advisable to use 
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multi-level analyses (Bowman, 2012; Cheung, 2014; Hox, 2010). In this approach, variance 
components are modeled at three different levels: the sampling variance of the effect sizes (level 
1), the variance between effect sizes within a sample (level 2), and the variance between samples 
(level 3) (Assink & Wibbelink, 2016). Multi-level analyses are effective at accounting for the 
interdependency of effect sizes within a sample, addressing the issues of non-independent 
effects. For the current study, I used the restricted maximum likelihood estimation method to 
estimate the relevant parameters. Estimates were computed for a random-effect model, which 
means there is no assumption that there is one underlying population effect for each study. This 
allows for a more accurate estimate of the confidence intervals for the target effects and is more 
capable than fixed effect approaches in identifying moderating effects in the data (Hunter & 
Schmidt, 2000).  
To test the hypotheses, I computed the meta-analytic estimates relevant for each 
hypothesis along with a 95% confidence interval using the metafor package in R, which allows 
for multilevel and moderator tests (Viechtbauer, 2010). Supplemental syntax provided by Assink 
and Wibbelink (2016) was also employed for conducting the multilevel analyses. Confidence 
intervals offer an estimate of the variability in the meta-analytic estimate due to sampling errors. 
This provides the range of values that the true score falls within with a 5% chance of error. 
Therefore, when testing hypotheses regarding the main effect of information processing on 
performance, it should be expected that the confidence interval does not include zero and is 
positive. Similarly, for hypotheses suggesting that information processing measures have smaller 
group score differences than measures of general intelligence, it would be expected that the 
upper bound of the confidence interval is lower than 1.00 since the typical d value of intelligence 
measures is 1.00.  
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Prior to testing the moderation effects, I examined if there was a significant amount of 
residual heterogeneity in the data to be explained. There are several tests of residual 
heterogeneity that can be assessed. For the current study, I first used the Q-test to assess the 
overall heterogeneity of the main effect models and then assessed the amount of variance 
associated with the sampling variance to test for explainable heterogeneity. The Q-test provides a 
general assessment of heterogeneity across all three levels of variance in the model (Cochran, 
1954). When the Q-test is significant, it indicates that there is a significant amount of 
heterogeneity not explained by the model. However, it does not specify at what level of the 
model the heterogeneity is located. To better understand if the variance is due to the sampling 
variance or due to within-sample or between-sample variance, it is useful to compute the amount 
of variance associated with the sampling variance (Kepes, McDaniel, Brannick, & Banks, 2013). 
When the variance due to the sampling variance is below 75%, meta-analysis guidelines suggest 
it is reasonable to test for moderators (Hunter & Schmidt, 2004). Based on the outcomes of these 
analyses, I determined if it was appropriate to test my moderation hypotheses.  
Moderation is tested by examining the amount of overlap between the confidence 
intervals of the various levels of the moderator. When there is no overlap, there is strong 
evidence of moderation. When the confidence intervals do overlap, it is important to assess the 
degree of overlap to better understand if there is any evidence of moderation. It should be noted 
that because of the nascent state of the information processing literature, particularly of the 
cognitive sciences approach, my moderator analyses are based on small sample sizes. Therefore, 
tests of moderation are conservative since small sample sizes often cause confidence intervals to 
be very wide due to their large standard error. Nonetheless, these analyses should provide an 
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overview of the trends in the data and offer insight into areas where additional research is needed 
to improve our current knowledge of these moderators.  
Results 
Data collection resulted in two separate datasets: one for the correlation coefficients (i.e., 
validity data) and one for the d values (i.e., the group differences data). While there was some 
overlap between the samples in the two datasets, most samples were unique. The final validity 
dataset consisted of 100 sources of data, including articles, technical reports, and conference 
presentations. These sources resulted in a total of 121 samples, which had a cumulative sample 
size of 20,055 and 234 effect sizes. There was a large range in the observed correlations between 
information processing measures and performance measures reported in the literature, spanning 
from -.31 to .76. The group differences dataset included 20 data sources and 23 samples. The 
total sample size was 19,190 with 32 effect sizes. The d values also had a large range from -.14 
to 1.09. 
Hypothesis Testing: Main Effects 
When testing my hypotheses concerning the validity of information processing measures, 
I began by examining the aggregated effect size across all performance outcomes (i.e., job 
performance, job-oriented training performance, and academic performance). While each 
outcome type provides unique information regarding performance, aggregating across them 
offers a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between information processing 
measures and performance. Furthermore, when breaking performance outcomes down into 
specific types, the number of samples and effect sizes decreased dramatically, making it difficult 
to arrive at generalizable conclusions. Guidelines for meta-analyses recommend that analyses 
should not be conducted when there are less than five data points within a group since the 
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estimates may be unstable (e.g., Arthur, Bennett, & Huffcutt, 2001). While I present analyses for 
job performance, job-oriented training performance, and academic performance, some of the 
analyses should be interpreted cautiously as the results are based on a small number of sources, 
samples, and/or effect sizes. 
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis proposed that informing processing measures will 
correlate with performance outcomes. The results for this hypothesis are located in Table 4. After 
weighting the mean observed correlation by the sampling variance (henceforth referred to as the 
mean weighted correlation), the relationship between information processing measures and 
performance outcomes is .19. Correcting for the measurement error in the criterion increased the 
correlation to .23. The confidence interval for the mean corrected coefficient excludes zero (95% 
CI: .18, .28), implying these findings are not simply a result of sampling error. Therefore, this 
positive effect can be considered generalizable.  
When examining the effects for each of the performance outcomes, a similar pattern of 
findings was found. For job performance, the mean weighted correlation is .19 and the criterion 
mean corrected correlation is .25 (95% CI: .16, .33). Fitting with prior conceptualizations of job 
performance (e.g., Dalal, 2005; Lievens et al., 2008; Ones, Dilchert, & Viswesvaran, 2012; 
Robinson & Bennett, 1995; Rotundo & Sackett, 2002; Viswesvaran & Ones, 2000), this group of 
outcomes was comprised of a wide range of measures, including supervisor ratings, work 
samples, objective productivity indicators, and simulations. While these various types of 
measures allow for a broader assessment of the job performance domain, they also approach the 
criterion in fundamentally different ways. While measures such as work samples and simulations 
typically operationalize job performance as the final results on a task, ratings capture a range of 
behaviors related to job duties and requirements that are inherently more subjective in nature. 
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Because of this difference, I also ran separate analyses on 1) subjective measures of job 
performance (e.g., supervisor and peer ratings) and 2) objective measures of job performance 
(e.g., simulation, work sample, and objective productivity measures).  
The results from splitting job performance into subjective and objective measures 
demonstrated a fairly large difference between the correlations. For subjective job performance 
ratings, the mean weighted correlation is .14 and the mean corrected correlation is .19 (95% CI: 
.10, .28). Alternatively, for objective measures of job performance, the mean weighted 
correlation is .30 and the mean corrected correlation is .33 (95% CI: .18, .49). While the 
confidence intervals for these correlations overlap, signifying they are not categorically different 
from each other, the resulting trend suggests a slightly stronger relationship between information 
processing measures and objective measures of job performance than subjective measures of job 
performance. This fits with prior meta-analytic findings suggesting that objective and subjective 
measures of job performance are not interchangeable and therefore may have distinct 
relationships with other variables (Bommer, Johnson, Rich, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 1995). 
Subjective measures are more susceptible to contamination from rater bias and insufficient 
observational opportunities for the rater, potentially capping how accurate they reflect the 
criterion (e.g., Landy & Farr, 1980). However, objective measures can also be limited as they 
often represent a narrow set of behaviors and outcomes and capture an employee’s maximal 
performance more than their typical performance (Ones et al., 2012). As such, while the current 
findings show a gap between the subjective and objective job performance correlations, the 
correlations should be considered in conjunction to understand the overall effectiveness of 
information processing measures in predicting job performance as a general construct.  
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For job-oriented training performance, the mean weighted correlation is .22 and the 
correlated correlation is .25 (95% CI: .11, .38). Again, the confidence interval did not include 
zero, demonstrating a positive relationship between information processing and job-oriented 
training. However, it should be noted that for both objective measures of job performance and 
job-oriented training performance, the confidence interval around the correlation was fairly wide. 
This is a result of a large standard error for both variables, which is partially due to the smaller 
number of samples and effect sizes for these outcomes. While this does not invalidate the 
findings of the current study, it does emphasize the need to interpret these findings cautiously 
until a larger number of samples and effect sizes are available in the literature.  
Finally, academic performance also showed a positive mean weighted correlation at .19 
and a mean corrected correlation of .21 (95% CI: .17, .24). Taken together, these findings 
demonstrate consistent evidence that information processing measures correlate with 
performance outcomes, though there may be some variation across the outcome types. Thus, 
there was support for Hypothesis 1.  
Hypothesis 2. The second hypothesis proposed that information processing measures, as 
a whole, would have smaller group differences than has been traditionally found on intelligence 
measures, which has been estimated at a d of 1.00 (e.g., Hough et al., 2001; Roth et al., 2003). 
Table 5 provides the results for this hypothesis. Overall, the mean weighted d value is .41, less 
than half the size of the value typically associated with general intelligence measures. The 
confidence interval for this value ranged from .17 to .65, showing a wide range but not including 
1.00. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
Hypothesis Testing: Moderators 
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 The subsequent hypotheses all offered potential moderators of the relationship between 
information processing measures and performance outcomes or of the group score differences on 
information processing measures. Prior to testing these moderation effects, I first tested the 
heterogeneity of the effect sizes in each dataset to ensure moderation tests were appropriate.  
Across all performance outcomes in the validity dataset, results from the Q-test showed 
that there is significant unexplained heterogeneity in the model (Q (233) = 866.63, p < .001). 
Furthermore, breaking the variance down into its components showed that only 22.35% of the 
variance is attributed to the sampling variance while the remaining 77.65% of variance was 
explained by the within-sample and between-sample levels of the model. Based on Hunter and 
Schmidt’s (2004) guidelines, it was determined that there is substantial variance that could still 
be explained by examining potential moderators. 
Next, I tested the group score differences dataset to see if there was sufficient 
heterogeneity to be explained by potential moderators. Results from the Q-test showed that there 
was significant unexplained heterogeneity in the model (Q (35) = 333.16, p < .001). Examining 
the variance by the different levels of the multi-level model, it was possible to see that only 
4.76% of the variance was attributed to the sampling variance, meaning 95.24% of the variance 
was explainable by the within-sample and between-sample levels of the model. Based on this 
classification of the variance, it was appropriate to test moderators of the group differences.  
Hypothesis 3. In the third hypothesis, I proposed that the theoretical approach used to 
develop an information processing measure would moderate the relationship between the 
measure and performance outcomes. Specifically, I expected to see stronger correlations when 
examining measures from the cognitive science approach than the psychometric approach. 
Findings for this hypothesis are presented in Table 6. It is important to first note that overall the 
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cognitive science measures had fewer samples and effect sizes than the psychometric approach. 
This is not surprising given the long history of research associated with the psychometric 
approach, but has implications for the standard errors and, consequently, the confidence intervals 
associated with the cognitive science approach. The confidence intervals for the cognitive 
science approach are generally wider than the psychometric approach, making it more difficult to 
find instances in which the confidence intervals do not overlap. While it is important to still 
interpret the confidence intervals as presented, it should be noted that the tests of this and 
subsequent hypotheses should be considered a conservative approach due to the smaller sample 
sizes. In accordance with this approach, I also offer some insights based on the general trends of 
the differences between the correlations but emphasize that more research is needed prior to 
making any conclusions regarding these trends. 
 The mean weighted correlation between the psychometric approach and all performance 
outcomes is .18 and the mean corrected correlation is .22 (95% CI: .16, .27). For the cognitive 
science approach, the mean weighted correlation is .23 and the mean corrected correlation is .28 
(95% CI: .19, .38). While the confidence intervals of the two theoretical approaches overlap, it 
should be noted that the upper limit of the psychometric approach’s confidence interval does not 
contain the mean corrected correlation of the cognitive science approach. Thus, while there are 
no statistically significant differences between the correlations, there is some support that the 
cognitive science approach is trending towards a stronger relationship with performance 
outcomes than the psychometric approach.  
 Splitting the performance outcomes into their distinct types shows that the cognitive 
science approach generally still has a stronger correlation than the psychometric approach, 
though the confidence intervals consistently overlap. For job performance, the psychometric 
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approach has a mean weighted correlation of .16 and a mean corrected correlation of .21 (95% 
CI: .12, .30), whereas the cognitive science approach has a mean weighted correlation of .22 and 
a mean corrected correlation of .29 (95% CI: .15, .43). The correlations between the information 
processing measures with objective job performance outcomes parallel the overall job 
performance finding. Specifically, the psychometric approach has a mean weighted correlation 
of .23 and a mean corrected correlation of .25 (95% CI: .09, .41) and the cognitive science 
approach has a mean weighted correlation of .34 and a mean corrected correlation of .38 (95% 
CI: .18, .57). While the confidence intervals for both overall job performance outcomes and 
objective job performance outcomes do not overlap completely, there is a large amount of 
commonality. Interestingly, when examining only the subjective job performance outcomes, 
there is a reverse in correlations such that the mean weighted correlation and mean corrected 
correlation for the psychometric approach are .15 and .20 (95% CI: .10, .29), respectively, and 
.12 and .17 (95% CI: -.03, .37) for the cognitive science approach. While the confidence interval 
of the psychometric approach fits entirely within the confidence interval for the cognitive science 
approach, it is important to note the confidence interval for the cognitive science approach 
includes zero, meaning the positive mean correlation is possibly due to sampling variance and 
may not be representative of the population effect.  
There was only one study in the current dataset that examined job-oriented training 
performance from a cognitive science approach. While there were two effect sizes in this study, 
the sample size is so low that it makes it difficult to make any generalizable conclusions at this 
time. The findings do show a similar trend to the findings for overall performance. Specifically, 
while the psychometric approach shows a large mean weighted correlation of .22 and mean 
corrected correlation of .24 (95% CI: .10, .38), the cognitive science approach has a higher mean 
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weighted correlation of .32 and mean corrected correlation of .39 (95% CI: .01, .77). Due to the 
extremely large standard error for the cognitive approach mean correlation, the confidence 
interval for the psychometric approach is enclosed within the confidence interval for the 
cognitive sciences approach.  
Academic performance has a mean weighted correlation of .18 and mean corrected 
correlation of .20 (95% CI: .16, .24) for the psychometric approach and a mean weighted 
correlation of .23 and mean corrected correlation of .25 (95% CI: .15, .35) for the cognitive 
science approach. While the lower bounds of the confidence intervals were the same, the 
confidence interval for the psychometric approach did not include the mean corrected correlation 
of the cognitive science approach. This suggests that while there is a large amount of overlap in 
the confidence intervals, the cognitive science approach is trending as a stronger effect than the 
psychometric approach.  
 The findings across all performance outcomes do not fully support Hypothesis 3, 
although they do demonstrate a general trend that the cognitive science approach’s effect size is 
slightly stronger than the effect size for the psychometric approach. These results should be 
interpreted carefully as the lack of support for the hypothesis partially stems from the large 
standard errors for the mean correlations. As more data is collected in this area, these findings 
should be reevaluated.    
Hypothesis 4. Next, I tested whether measures from the cognitive science approach have 
smaller group differences than measures from the psychometric approach (see Table 7 for 
results). The cognitive science approach did have a smaller d value (.40) than the psychometric 
approach (.46), though the confidence interval for the psychometric approach (95% CI: .27, .64) 
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fit entirely within the confidence interval for the cognitive science approach (95% CI: .11, .69). 
Overall, Hypothesis 4 was not supported but does have some promising early evidence.  
Hypothesis 5. The next two moderator hypotheses examined whether an increase in the 
diversity of tasks within a measure strengthened the relationship between information processing 
measures and performance outcomes. Separate hypotheses were proposed for the psychometric 
approach (Hypothesis 5) and the cognitive science approach (Hypothesis 6) since diversity of 
tasks has different implications for each theoretical approach. Both theoretical approaches 
displayed a similar tendency for measures to mostly use only one type of task. For the 
psychometric approach, 116 (71.2%) effect sizes were based on a measure with only one task 
type. Of the other effect sizes, 16 had two task types (9.8%), nine had three task types (5.5%), 
and 22 had four task types (13.5%). A similar pattern surfaced for the cognitive science approach 
as 44 effect sizes had only one task type (44%), 10 with two task types (14.1%), 10 with three 
task types (14.1%), five with six task types (7%), and two with eight task types (2.8%). Since 
nearly half of the effect sizes only contained one task type, this created a highly skewed 
distribution for both theoretical approaches and limited the number of effect sizes representing 
measures with more than one task type. Because of these uneven distributions of tasks, I 
collapsed effect sizes into two categories: 1) measures with no diversity in task types and 2) 
measures with diversity in task types. Therefore, my analyses for both Hypothesis 5 and 6 are 
conducted with diversity of task types as a dichotomous moderator.  
 In testing Hypothesis 5, I examined the effect of task diversity on performance outcomes 
for the psychometric approach only (see Table 8 for results). Across all performance outcomes, I 
found that measures with no diversity had a mean weighted correlation of .21 and a mean 
corrected correlation of .24 (95% CI: .17, .31). Counter to my hypothesis, these correlations were 
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higher than the mean weighted correlation of .13 and mean corrected correlation of .16 (95% CI: 
.08, .24) for measures with diverse task types. While the confidence intervals overlap for both 
groups, only half of the confidence interval for measures with no task diversity corresponds with 
the confidence interval for measures with task diversity. Therefore, there is some evidence that 
measures with no diverse task types have a slightly higher correlation than measures with diverse 
task types.  
 A different pattern of findings appears when examining the various job performance 
outcomes. For all job performance outcomes, there is little difference between measures with no 
task diversity and those with task diversity. Specifically, for measures with no task type 
diversity, the mean weighted correlation is .16 and the mean corrected correlation is .21 (95% 
CI: .11, .32), which is identical to the mean weighted correlation of .16 and mean corrected 
correlation of .21 (95% CI: .05, .36) for measures with diverse task types. The findings for only 
the subjective job performance measures shows a different pattern in which the mean weighted 
correlation of .14 and mean corrected correlation of .17 (95% CI: .05, .29) for measures with no 
task diversity are slightly lower than the mean weighted correlation of .16 and the mean 
corrected correlation of .22 (95% CI: .09, .35) for measures with task diversity. It should be 
noted that the confidence interval for measures with no task diversity is contained entirely within 
the confidence interval for measures with task diversity. For objective measures of job 
performance, there was only one sample and effect size for measures with diverse task types. As 
such, the findings presented here should not be taken to reflect the true population effect until 
more data is collected. The weighted and mean corrected correlations for measures with no task 
diversity are .23 and .25 (95% CI: .03, .48), respectively, which are larger than the weighted and 
mean corrected correlations for the single effect size of measures with diverse task types, at .20 
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and .22 (95% CI: -.43, .88). Taken together, there seems to be little difference in the job 
performance validity for measures with and without diverse task types, though there may be a 
slight benefit to measures with diverse task types when examining subjective job performance 
outcomes.  
 For job-oriented training performance, measures with no task diversity have a mean 
weighted correlation of .25 and mean corrected correlation of .27 (95% CI: .13, .42). This is 
much higher than the mean weighted correlation of .06 and mean corrected correlation of .08 
(95% CI: -.12, .27) for measures with diverse task types. Despite the .19 difference between 
these mean correlations, the confidence intervals still overlap, though the confidence interval for 
measures without diverse task types does not include the mean correlation for measures with 
diverse task types. However, it should be noted that 12 of the 13 effect sizes for measures with 
diverse task types came from only two samples, both of which were from the same paper. 
Additional research should further investigate these types of measures prior to making any 
conclusions regarding their validity.  
 Academic performance also showed a relatively large difference between the mean 
correlations. For measures with no diversity in tasks, the mean weighted correlation is .20 and 
the mean corrected correlation is .22 (95% CI: .17, .27). This is compared to the lower mean 
weighted correlation of .12 and mean corrected correlation of .13 (95% CI: .04, .21) for measures 
with task diversity. Again, while the confidence intervals for both groups overlap, there is a clear 
trend suggesting the measures with no task diversity have a stronger correlation with academic 
performance.  
 Overall, the evidence does not support Hypothesis 5. First, the confidence intervals for 
measures with and without task diversity overlapped across outcome types, though to varying 
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degrees. However, even when there was some evidence of a general trend, it was measures with 
no task diversity that had a stronger relationship with performance outcomes, counter to my 
original hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 6. The sixth hypothesis proposed that measures with task diversity would 
lead to a stronger relationship between cognitive science measures of information processing 
than measures without task diversity. As with Hypothesis 5, I tested this hypothesis by splitting 
measures into those with and without task diversity for the moderator. The results from these 
analyses are presented in Table 9. Examining the effect across all performance outcomes, 
measures with no task diversity have a mean weighted correlation of .20 and mean corrected 
correlation of .26 (95% CI: .13, .40), whereas measures with task diversity have a mean weighted 
correlation of .28 and a mean corrected correlation of .32 (95% CI: .18, .46). These confidence 
intervals overlap considerably as the confidence interval for measures with no task diversity is 
subsumed within the confidence interval for measures with task diversity. Therefore, while 
measures with diverse task types have a slighter higher mean correlation with performance 
outcomes than measures without diverse task types, this difference should not be generalized to 
the population effect size.  
 Across all job performance measures, measures with no task diversity have a mean 
weighted correlation of .20 and a mean corrected correlation of .27 (95% CI: .08, .45). In 
contrast, measures with task diversity have a mean weighted correlation of .28 and a mean 
corrected correlation of .33 (95% CI: .12, .53). Similarly, for subjective measures of job 
performance, measures with no task diversity have a mean weighted correlation of .11 and a 
mean corrected correlation of .15 (95% CI: -.12, .42), whereas measures with diverse task types 
have a mean weighted correlation of .23 and a mean corrected correlation of .32 (95% CI: .07, 
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.57). In both cases, there is a significant amount of overlap between the confidence intervals, 
though some evidence pointing to measures with diverse task types having slight stronger 
relationships with job performance outcomes. However, the relationship between task diversity 
and objective job performance outcomes appears to trend in the opposite direction. For measures 
with no task diversity, the mean weighted correlation is .38 and the mean corrected correlation is 
.43 (95% CI: .29, .57). Alternatively, measures with task diversity have a mean weighted 
correlation of .29 and a mean corrected correlation .33 (95% CI: .18, .47). The confidence 
interval of measures with task diversity is entirely within the confidence interval of measures 
without task diversity, showing little evidence that there is a difference between the groups 
despite the .10 difference in mean correlations. The sample size for all job performance 
outcomes was low across types, therefore it is important to interpret these findings cautiously.  
 Unfortunately, there were no samples including a measure with no task diversity for job-
oriented training performance, making it impossible to compare across groups. For academic 
performance, there was a small sample size, with only four samples at each level of the 
moderator. For measures with no task diversity, the mean weighted correlation is .22 and the 
mean corrected correlation is .24 (95% CI: .13, .35). For measures with task diversity, the mean 
weighted correlation is .24 and mean corrected correlation is .27 (95% CI: .15, .38). Again, while 
there was a slight trend favoring measures with task diversity, the confidence intervals 
overlapped extensively. As a whole, the small sample sizes for the cognitive science measures 
makes it difficult to arrive at any concrete conclusion regarding the effect of task diversity on the 
relationship with performance outcomes.  
 Hypothesis 7. The final validity hypothesis examined if information processing measures 
that require no language knowledge will have a stronger relationship with performance outcomes 
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than measures that require language knowledge. The majority of effect sizes (78.2%; k = 183) 
included an information processing measure that did not require any language knowledge. This 
fits with the basic nature of information processing measures as they deemphasize the need for 
any prior knowledge. For those measures that did require some level of language knowledge, it 
was often difficult to identify how much of the test required language knowledge. In several 
cases, it was possible to identify the number of subtests that required language knowledge, but 
this did not provide a specific percentage of the test that required language knowledge. 
Therefore, only general estimates could be provided. Due to the low number of scales that 
required language knowledge and the difficulty in establishing a clear percentage of the test that 
required language knowledge, I decided to collapse the moderator into two groups, tests that 
required language and tests that did not require language. Table 10 presents the results for 
Hypothesis 7.  
 When all performance outcomes are considered, measures with no language knowledge 
requirement have a mean weighted correlation of .19 and a mean corrected correlation of .22 
(95% CI: .17, .28). The correlations for measures with language knowledge requirements are 
slightly higher at .23 for the mean weighted correlation and .28 (95% CI: .18, .38) for the mean 
corrected correlation. The confidence intervals overlap considerably, with the confidence interval 
for each level of the moderator enclosing the mean correlation of the other level, suggesting little 
evidence of moderation. However, there is a slight trend favoring measures with a language 
knowledge requirement, contradicting my hypothesis.   
 Across job performance outcomes, measures with a language knowledge requirement 
again show a slight advantage over measures with no language knowledge requirement, though 
the confidence intervals still overlap. For measures with no language knowledge requirement, the 
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mean weighted correlation is .17 and the mean corrected correlation is .22 (95% CI: .14, .30), 
whereas for measures with a language knowledge requirement the mean weighted correlation is 
.24 and the mean corrected correlation is .31 (95% CI: .13, .48). Interestingly, when examining 
only subjective job performance outcomes, this trend reverses such that the mean weighted 
correlation (.14) and mean corrected correlation (.19; 95% CI: .11, .28) for measures with no 
language knowledge requirement are slightly stronger than the mean weighted correlation (.12) 
and mean corrected correlation (.17; 95% CI: -.14, .47) for measures with a language knowledge 
requirement. The sample size for measures with a language knowledge requirement is noticeably 
small (ksamples = 6, keffects = 11), causing a large confidence interval that includes zero. As such, 
this finding should not be generalized without additional research. For objective job performance 
outcomes, the pattern of results showed measures requiring some language knowledge had a 
slightly stronger correlation than measures with no language knowledge requirement. 
Specifically, measures with no language knowledge requirement have a mean weighted 
correlation of .25 and a mean corrected correlation of .28 (95% CI: .13, .43), whereas measures 
with a language knowledge requirement have a mean weighted correlation of .36 and a mean 
corrected correlation of .40 (95% CI: .18, .62). The confidence intervals do overlap, suggesting 
the difference in means is not generalizable.  
 The sample size for job-oriented training was extremely small for measures with a 
language knowledge requirement, with only one sample and two effect sizes. The trend does 
support what was found with objective job performance outcomes, that measures with a language 
knowledge requirement have a stronger correlation (weighted = .32; corrected = .39; 95% CI: 
.01, .77) than measures with no language knowledge requirement (weighted = .22; corrected = 
.24; 95% CI: .10, .38), but the confidence intervals for both groups are very wide and overlap 
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significantly. For academic performance, there was a slight advantage to measures with no 
language knowledge requirement, but again the confidence intervals overlapped. For measures 
with no language knowledge requirements, the mean weighted correlation is .18 and the mean 
corrected correlation is .20 (95% CI: .16, .25), whereas the mean weighted correlation is .20 and 
the mean corrected correlation is .22 (95% CI: .14, .30) for measures with a language knowledge 
requirement.  
Hypothesis 7 was overall not supported. Across all performance outcomes, there was no 
definitive evidence to support differences between measures that require language knowledge 
and those that do not. A general trend appeared suggesting that measures with language 
knowledge requirements might actually be marginally better at predicting outcomes, except for 
subjective job performance, opposing the original hypothesis. However, the confidence intervals 
between the two groups consistently overlapped to a high degree, suggesting there is no 
generalizable effect based on the current data.  
Discussion 
 Information processing measures have been in use for over a century, though there is 
little comprehensive knowledge about their overall utility. While the intelligence literature has 
mostly focused on other types of measures, such as those assessing crystallized intelligence, 
recent research has begun to highlight the role of information processing measures. Updated 
models of intelligence promoting fluid reasoning and cognitive science researchers advocating 
for novel methodologies for measurement have contributed to this development, though I-O 
psychology has only engaged in a limited amount of relevant research examining the value of 
these measures to organizations. The objective of the current paper was to illuminate this 
bourgeoning area of research through a meta-analytic examination of information processing 
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measures, specifically focusing on their validity evidence and how African American and 
Caucasians perform on them.   
Overview of Findings 
 Taken as a whole, the current findings offer a promising initial assessment of information 
processing measures and their functionality. In the following sections, I provide a summary of 
the findings for each hypothesis as well as an interpretation of them compared to prior findings 
in the literature. Table 11 provides an overview of the theoretical rationale, summary of findings, 
and key takeaways for each hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis predicted that information processing measures are 
related to a variety of performance outcomes, including job performance, job-oriented training 
performance, and academic performance. There was overall support for this hypothesis across all 
performance types. Measures of information processing had a consistent and positive 
relationship with performance outcomes. Furthermore, the evidence supports that these results 
were not simply due to sampling variance. These findings fit with prior theory suggesting that 
information processing is predictive of performance on complex tasks requiring substantial 
attentional resources, such as adapting to changing situations, thinking analytically, or multi-
tasking (e.g., Aydin et al., 2005; Fagan & Ployhart, 2015; Kanfer & Ackerman, 2005). The fact 
that these measures relate to performance is an important finding but does not address their 
relative utility compared to other measures. While it is important for these measures to be 
predictive, it is also valuable to know how well they function compared to other predictors, 
particularly other intelligence measures.  
Prior review articles have shown that the validities for intelligence measures vary widely, 
depending on context, occupations, and other factors (e.g., Ones et al., 2012; Schmitt & Fandre, 
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2008). Schmitt (2014) noted that validities between intelligence measures and job performance 
are typically in the .20s when uncorrected.1 This generally fits with other reviews of meta-
analytic findings that suggest uncorrected validities range from .22 (k = 140) to .43 (k = 24), but 
generally average around .30 (Bobko et al., 1999). Specific meta-analyses have found an 
uncorrected correlation between crystallized intelligence measures and job performance to be .23 
(k = 199) (Postlethwaite, 2011) and between general cognitive ability and job performance to be 
.22 (k = 12) (Bertua et al., 2005), .23 (k = 86) (Postlethwaite, 2011), and .26 (k = 7) (Kuncel et 
al., 2004). The uncorrected mean correlation in the current study is lower than these estimates at 
.19, but the confidence interval extends up to .26, making it reasonably in range of many of these 
estimates.  
It is important to note that many of the prior meta-analyses based their estimates on 
subjective ratings of job performance rather than objective measures. When comparing across 
uncorrected correlations for subjective job performance outcomes, it is clear that the estimate of 
.14 in the current study falls below these prior estimates. The confidence interval for the 
uncorrected correlation goes up to .20, bringing it well within range of these prior estimates, but 
still relatively weaker than expected. Subjective job performance ratings are frequently 
recognized as imperfect measures of performance as they can be influenced by systematic biases 
(Richardson & Norgate, 2015) and do not correlate well with objective measures of performance 
(Roth et al., 2005). In addition, there is often little agreement about what constitutes good 
performance for a particular job, making it difficult to accurately and fairly measure it 
                                                 
1 For the purposes of comparing estimates across meta-analyses, I refer to uncorrected correlation estimates and their 
corresponding confidence intervals. This is to ensure that all estimates are approximately equivalent since most 
meta-analyses use slight variations in their correction methods and/or estimates. Prior review articles have similarly 
made comparisons across uncorrected correlations when evaluating meta-analytic estimates (e.g., Bobko et al., 
1999; Schmitt et al., 1997; Schmitt & Fandre, 2008). 
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(Gottfredson, 1991). Nonetheless, subjective job performance ratings are some of the most 
commonly used measures, making this low correlation notable. On the other hand, the 
relationship between information processing measures and objective job performance outcomes 
was found to be strong at .30. This aligns with Roth and colleagues’ (Roth, Bobko, & 
McFarland, 2005) meta-analysis that found general cognitive ability had a .30 uncorrected 
correlation with work samples. It may be that information processing measures are better at 
predicting objective measures of job performance than subjective measures.  
Estimates of job-oriented training have also varied in past meta-analyses, with one review 
paper reporting estimates ranging from .23 (k = 58) for verbal ability measures to .29 (k = 223) 
for general mental ability measures (Schmitt & Fandre, 2008) while others have reported a 
correlation of .38 (k = 114) for crystallized intelligence measures (Postlethwaite, 2011). Colquitt 
and colleagues found that measures of general cognitive ability had an uncorrected correlation of 
.32 with both skill acquisition (k = 17) and transfer of training (k = 3). In the current study, the 
uncorrected estimate for the correlation between information processing measures and job-
oriented training outcomes was .22. Much like job performance outcomes, this estimate is on the 
lower side of prior estimates though remains in the same general range. Furthermore, the 
confidence interval for information processing measures has an upper limit of .34, which 
contains many of the prior meta-analytic estimates.  
For the final performance outcome, academic performance, prior meta-analyses have 
mostly examined the relationship between standardized admission tests and GPA. These tests, 
which include the SAT, GRE, and GMAT, are often considered measures of crystallized 
intelligence. An overview paper reported meta-analytic estimates for such standardized tests used 
in graduate school admissions ranging from .27 (k = 1,231) for the GRE to .45 (k = 22) for the 
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Pharmacy College Admission Test (Kuncel & Hezlett, 2007). Similarly, the Miller Analogies 
Test, a measure of general cognitive ability relying on a person’s vocabulary knowledge, has 
been found to have a .27 (k = 70) uncorrected correlation with overall graduate school GPA 
(Kuncel et al., 2004). The SAT has been found to have an uncorrected correlation with 
cumulative undergraduate GPA at .33 (k = 41) (Berry & Sackett, 2009). A meta-analysis of a 
wider range of intelligence measures found crystallized intelligence measures, including but not 
limited to admissions tests, had an uncorrected correlation of .36 (k = 139) while measures of 
general cognitive ability had a correlation of .42 (k = 78) (Postlethwaite, 2011). In the current 
study, the uncorrected relationship with information processing measures was .19 with an upper 
limit of .22, making it the furthest from past validities out of the three performance outcomes.  
By their nature, measures of academic achievement, such as GPA, reflect a person’s 
crystallized knowledge as these outcomes are most often assessed by tests of declarative 
knowledge. A student’s prior knowledge would then reasonably act as an initial baseline for 
future growth in knowledge. This makes the stronger relationship between crystallized 
intelligence measures and measures of general cognitive ability, which typically also contain 
knowledge components, with academic achievement reasonable. However, it does not preclude 
the importance of information processing measures. Across all three performance outcomes, the 
findings show that while information processing measures typically have lower uncorrected 
correlations compared to previous meta-analytic estimates for intelligence measures, the validity 
coefficients associated with information processing measures also demonstrate valuable validity 
evidence. These estimates are higher than estimates associated with other individual difference 
measures such as personality measures, which typically do not exceed .20 (Schmitt, 2014). 
Moreover, information processing is considered a broader construct than crystallized knowledge 
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as it is the root of learning new skills and knowledge (Ackerman, 1996) and therefore may still 
provide explanatory power above and beyond commonly used intelligence measures.  
Hypothesis 2. In conjunction with validity evidence, it is important to also assess data 
related to group score differences. Hypothesis 2 predicted that information processing measures 
would produce lower score differences between African Americans and Caucasians than the d 
value of 1.00 typically reported for intelligence measures. The evidence showed group 
differences on information processing measures were well below this target with a d value of .41 
and an upper confidence limit of .65. While 1.00 is the most frequently reported value of group 
differences across review articles (e.g., Hough & Oswald, 2000; Ployhart & Holtz, 2008; Sackett 
& Wilk, 1994), there is variation in what has been reported. Narrative review articles have 
presented values that range between .80 and 1.00 across all intelligence measures (Murphy, 
Cronin, & Tam, 2003), .60 and 1.00 for specific abilities (Hough et al., 2001), and .72 for 
moderately complex jobs and .86 for low complexity jobs (Bobko & Roth, 2013). A meta-
analysis found that the GATB, a measure of general intelligence, had a d value of 1.14 (k = 127) 
with a lower confidence limit of 1.11 for a sample of employees (Berry, Cullen, & Meyer, 2014). 
The same study also found a d value of .88 (k = 7) and lower limit of .82 for the SAT. In another 
meta-analysis of group score differences, a d of 1.10 (k = 105) was found for general cognitive 
abilities across sample types (e.g., military, education, industrial) with a lower limit of 1.06 
(Roth et al., 2001). This same article showed that industrial samples had a d of .99 (k = 34) with 
a lower limit of .88 and that the Wonderlic, a common measure of crystallized intelligence, had a 
d of 1.00 (k = 3) with a lower limit of .82. Researchers caution these d values may be inflated 
when looking across all jobs and that more appropriate estimates should be calculated at the level 
of a job family or across jobs with similar complexity (Bobko & Roth, 2013). Nonetheless, the 
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current findings show that the d value for information processing measures is consistently lower 
than estimates of d for measures of intelligence across studies and review articles.  
 Hypotheses 3 and 4. The remaining hypotheses entailed moderation. In general, while 
the evidence showed some trends within the data, the confidence intervals for the various levels 
of each moderator overlapped to varying degrees. Therefore, there was often no evidence of full 
moderation. It should be noted that for all of these hypotheses, the sample sizes fluctuated across 
performance outcomes to a large degree, with some sample sizes being extremely small. In 
addition, the current dataset came from a wide variety of populations, industries, testing stakes, 
and so forth. This makes the dataset fairly heterogeneous, increasing the overall variance. As 
such, my discussion speaks more to the trends in the data that should be investigated by future 
primary research to help explain the potential effects.  
 The first two moderation hypotheses predicted that the theoretical approach used to 
develop an information processing measure would influence the validity coefficients (Hypothesis 
3) and group score differences (Hypothesis 4). Regarding validity coefficients, a general trend 
showed that measures developed from the cognitive science approach had a slightly stronger 
correlation with performance outcomes than those developed from the psychometric approach. 
The largest difference came from measures of objective job performance, which had an .11 
difference between validity coefficients favoring cognitive science measures. This aligns with 
the general content and methodologies of measures from the psychometric and cognitive science 
approaches. Information processing measures from the psychometric approach typically involve 
static stimuli whereas measures from the cognitive science approach involve behavioral based 
tasks in which the test taker dynamically interacts with the task (e.g., adapting to new rules being 
presented, learning conditional associations through trial and error). These types of measures are 
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akin to “samples” of the actual behaviors than “signs” of the behavior (Cronbach & Meehl, 
1955) and may better reflect the content of an objective job performance measure. This may also 
explain why measueres from the cognitive science approach displayed slightly lower group score 
differences between African Americans and Caucasians compared to the psychometric approach. 
The fact that these measures are mostly behavioral based suggests they may be less impacted by 
contamination in the measurement device. However, it should be noted that the reduction in 
group score differences for both theoretical approaches is an improvement over many other 
intelligence measures that demonstrate larger score differences. While the group score 
differences for information processing measures would still be considered moderate effect sizes 
(Cohen, 2016), it is important to recognize that there are other factors that can play into score 
differences beyond the content of the measure. For example, a person’s familiarity with item 
content (e.g., Arvey, 1972) and stereotype threat (e.g., Mayer & Hanges, 2003; McKay, 
Doverspike, Bowen-Hilton, & McKay, 2003) could cause differences in scores. Research has 
begun to examine the roots of group score differences dating back to a person’s childhood (e.g., 
Cottrell et al., 2015), including their exposure to the types of tasks presented on information 
processing measures (Greenfield, 1998). It is important to continue this line of research to 
evaluate the sources of group score differences in intelligence measures, including information 
processing measures. 
 Hypotheses 5 and 6. The next two hypotheses examined the impact of task diversity on 
validity coefficients for the psychometric approach and cognitive science approach, respectively. 
Interestingly there was a reverse in the pattern of results for the two theoretical approaches, with 
the psychometric approach having higher validities for measures with no task diversity than with 
task diversity and the cognitive science approach demonstrating the opposite effect. This might 
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be a result of the difference in meaning of task diversity across the two theoretical approaches. 
For the cognitive science approach, task diversity reflects different measurement approachs 
typically assessing different types of cognitive functions. As a result, diversity of tasks may 
imply a broader assessment of the construct and therefore improve validity. Alternatively, 
diversity of task type for the psychometric approach indicates differences in task content that is 
not inherently related to specific cognitive functions but attempts to diversify the method for 
assessing fluid reasoning. While this methodology fits with calls to reduce error related to a 
single task type, it may also introduce additional variance based on how the tasks vary in content, 
ultimatley reducing validity coefficents rather than strenghtening them. Nonetheless, past 
research has found that measures of fluid reasoning can benefit from diversity in tasks (e.g., 
Beauducel et al., 2007; Kretzschmar et al., 2016), highlighting the importance of investigating 
additional moderators that may explain how variation in task content benefits information 
processing measures from the psychometric approach in some situations but not others.  
One important caveat to the findings for Hypothesis 6 is that objective job performance 
outcomes were predicted better by measures with no task diversity than with task diversity 
within the cognitive science approach. This is particularly interesting given the strong 
relationship between information processing measures and objective measures of job 
performance as a whole. While not originally hypothesized, this effect may reveal that tasks 
assessing a specific cognitive function that closely relate to the content of the objective 
performance measure may be better suited to predict performance than measures assessing a 
wider set of cognitive functions. This aligns with the ability-performance compatibility principle 
in I-O psychology (Judge & Kammeyer-Mueller, 2012; Schneider & Newman, 2015) and the 
bandwidth-fidelity dilemma in personality research (e.g., Hogan & Roberts, 1996; Schneider, 
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Hough, & Dunnette, 1996), which suggests that there should be an alignment between the level 
of specificity for both the predictors and the criteria. For example, simulation tasks that require 
high levels of attention (e.g., an air traffic simulator) may be better predicted by just a measure of 
attention than by a test battery that assesses attention and conditional association. While the 
sample size in the current dataset does not lend itself to such tests, this could be a valuable 
avenue for future research and may speak to the importance of aligning the content of the 
predictor measure with the criterion of interest.  
Hypothesis 7. The final hypothesis examined the role of language knowledge 
requirement in predicting job performance outcomes. Generally, it was found that measures 
requiring language knowledge had stronger validities than measures without language 
knowledge requirements, which contradicted the original hypothesis. It is important to consider 
that the language knowledge requirement for all these measures is relatively low compared to 
other predictors of performance, including most intelligence measures. Therefore, these 
measures do not rely heavily on one’s crystallized knowledge, even when including language. 
Still, the use of language in information processing measures may increase alignment between 
the content of the predictor and criterion. The role of language is evident in many of the 
performance outcomes in the current study, such as academic performance where performance is 
typically a reflection of scores on written tests or objective job performance where simulations 
and work samples often take the form of written scenarios. The use of language has been found 
to activate different neurological pathways compared to spatial stimuli (Langdon & Warrington, 
2000), meaning that measures using language may be processed differently than measures only 
using visual stimuli. In line with the ability-performance compatibility principle, it may be that 
the correspondence between the predictor and criterion could strengthen the relationship when 
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the predictor contains verbal stimuli. Future research should investigate if there are differences in 
predictive validity for information processing measures based on the content of the measure and 
criterion. It may be that while the use of visual stimuli helps reduce the role of prior knowledge 
in information processing measures, the misalignment with the criterion in some situations limits 
their validity.  
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 There are two major takeaways from the current research that apply to both researchers 
and practitioners. First, the current study provides clear evidence that information processing 
measures are valid predictors of performance that simultaneously reduce group score differences 
compared to the typical d value of 1.00 seen in prior meta-analyses. As such, I-O psychologists 
should continue to evaluate the application of information processing measures for the purposes 
of research and practice. Second, there is a plethora of research questions that still need to be 
investigated to better understand the role of information processing in the intelligence literature 
and how that impacts the construct’s operationalization. This includes evaluating how theoretical 
approaches impact information processing measures and how variations in the content of these 
measures can improve their predictive validity.  
 Overall, the current validity and group score differences evidence for information 
processing measures strongly supports that they should be considered when developing and 
administering an assessment or assessment battery for the purpose of predicting job or academic 
performance. As with all measures, information processing measures are not perfect predictors of 
performance, but can provide useful information when the desired criterion is related to a 
person’s information processing abilities. It is important to recognize that the utility of 
information processing measures does not imply the exclusion of other intelligence measures. 
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Instead, information processing measures should be considered another resource available to 
applied psychologists, organizations, and academic institutions for predicting outcomes. In 
particular, information processing measures can be combined with other intelligence measures to 
create comprehensive batteries. Woodcock (1990) made a similar argument when describing the 
need for creating a collection of measures to assess fluid reasoning and crystallized intelligence. 
Specifically, Woodcock suggested that researchers should map intelligence measures onto 
existing models of intelligence to better understand how to capture an appropriate breadth of the 
intelligence domain and to identify potential gaps in the measurement space.  
 This suggestion aligns with the more recent cross-battery approach (XBA) (Flanagan & 
McGrew, 1997; Flanagan, Ortiz, & Alfonso, 2007), which suggests utilizing multiple 
intelligence measures in a given testing scenario in order to create a theory-driven and 
comprehensive test battery. A key emphasis in this approach is linking the needs of the situation 
to the measures that are utilized, something that is often not well articulated in I-O psychology 
(Agnello et al., 2015; Scherbaum et al., 2015). In the case of information processing measures, 
researchers and practitioners should evaluate if the context calls for information processing. For 
example, as organizations place more value on the ability for employees to multitask and solve 
novel problems, information processing measures can offer a critical resource for measuring 
applicant’s abilities during the hiring process. Some researchers have even suggested integrating 
cognitive functions into job analysis models to better understand how specific features of 
information processing underlie certain knowledge, skills and abilities and, consequently, relate 
to performance (Becker et al., 2015). In doing so, it will be easier for organization to determine 
the most appropriate information processing measures to utilize for any given job. When used in 
conjunction with other measures, including personality and crystallized intelligence measures, 
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information processing measures can be a vital resource to assess a broader array of individual 
differences important for performance.  
Researchers not only suggest assessing a wide range of knowledge, skills, and abilities to 
cover more of the relevant job domain but also to minimize dependency on a limited number of 
predictors that may demonstrate group score differences (e.g., Ployhart & Holtz, 2008; Sackett & 
Ellingson, 1997; Sackett & Roth, 1996). Balancing the predictive validity of measures while 
simultaneously maintaining diversity in hiring and promotion contexts is a pressing matter facing 
many organizations (Pyburn et al., 2008). Information processing measures can offer a valuable 
opportunity to introduce valid measures of intelligence that limit group score differences. Past 
research has shown that when measures of cognitive abilities with lower group score differences 
are included in an assessment battery, they can improve the amount of diversity during hiring 
without negatively impacting the quality of hires (Wee et al., 2014).  
 The use of information processing measures can provide an attractive opportunity for 
organizations, particularly as they have the potential to create fairer hiring processes. In fact, 
some organizations have begun to adopt neuropsychological methodologies for assessment 
purposes (e.g., Gee, 2017). However, despite calls for more research on intelligence theories and 
measures, including information processing (e.g., Scherbaum et al., 2012), there is still a general 
lack of studies examining how characteristics of information processing measures influence 
outcomes. It is critical for I-O psychologists to remain on the frontier of emerging issues like 
these to ensure they can leverage their expertise and empirical rigor to guide organizations in 
making the best business decisions (Rotolo et al., 2018). From the current study, there are several 
discernable research areas that should be investigated further.  
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Foremost, a deeper understanding of the differences between the psychometric and 
cognitive science approaches and their measures is needed. Although there are distinct 
differences in the theoretical approaches, there is still ambiguity regarding how much they 
overlap (Nisbitt et al., 2012). Some researchers have argued that fluid reasoning and working 
memory are closely related due to a shared underlying process in the central executive function 
(Conway, Cowan, Bunting, Therriault, & Minkoff, 2002; Engle et al., 1999; Kyllonen, 1996; 
Kyllonen & Christal, 1990), while others suggest that the constructs are correlated but not 
isomorphic (Ackerman et al., 2005). Continued research on the differences and similarities in 
how the two theoretical approaches conceptualize information processing can offer new insights 
into the distinct operationalizations of their respective measures. Through refining and 
developing the theoretical side of information processing, it will be possible to better evaluate 
the construct validity of these measures and understand if they are assessing distinct attributes of 
information processing or simply supplying unique methodologies to assess the same construct. 
However, there are some clear methodological features of information processing measures that 
may be potential sources of improvement for measures across both theoretical approaches. For 
example, the cognitive science approach has promoted several modern methodologies, 
particularly computer-based assessments, that could have appealing applications for assessing 
fluid reasoning. In particular, more dynamic stimuli could broaden the types of stimuli used in 
fluid reasoning measures. Similarly, most research still relies on older fluid reasoning measures, 
such as the Raven’s Matrices and Cattell Culture Fair Test. An evaluation of the benefits of 
contemporary fluid reasoning measures and methodologies from the cognitive science approach 
may help progress fluid reasoning measures. This type of cross-fertilization within and between 
theoretical approaches can evolve intelligence measures beyond just information processing 
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measures and could be a unique opportunity as organizations look for more advanced methods of 
assessing applicants and employees.  
Beyond the theoretical approach taken to develop the assessment, there are specific 
characteristics of information processing measures that should be evaluated to determine their 
impact on validity and group score differences, including, but not limited to, task diversity and 
language knowledge requirement. As the current findings suggest, test content can influence the 
validity of information processing measures and should be evaluated, particularly in relation to 
improving construct validity. Lievens and Sackett (2017) described several features of predictor 
measures that could be examined in relation to information processing measures. For example, 
they suggest that stimuli can be presented as textual, pictorial, auditory, dynamic audiovisual, 
and face-to-face interactive. This offers a large number of stimuli types that can be combined to 
address concerns about error associated with a single format. While currently most measures use 
text or figures, there are some measures in the cognitive sciences that use auditory stimuli (Konig 
et al., 2005). Lievens and Sackett also note that the level of contextualization can be 
manipulated. At the core of information processing measures is the use of novel or unfamiliar 
stimuli, however, recent research has examined using stimuli that all test takers are trained on 
prior to the test (e.g., Fagan & Holland, 2002, 2007, 2009). In this type of assessment, a person’s 
ability to learn novel information through a training session allows for more contextualized 
questions while maintaining a generally novel task. The key point is that information processing 
measures should continue to evolve, which requires deeper investigations of test content and 
item characteristics. The current meta-analysis suggests that the content of a test matters, making 
it an important area for deeper consideration. In particular, researchers should begin evaluating 
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how to better tailor information processing measures to specific jobs, tasks, and conditions in the 
workplace (Becker et al., 2015).  
Although the current study demonstrated several positive attributes of information 
processing measures, it is also imperative to recognize their limitations, both practical and 
conceptual, in order to appropriately evaluate their utility in any given situation. Perhaps most 
notably is that some information processing measures, particularly from the cognitive science 
approach, require a significant amount of resources and time to administer and score. Many of 
these measures were developed for administration in lab or clinical settings, which allows them 
to be more dynamic but also requires computer testing that may involve specific hardware 
requirements. They also typically require proctoring to ensure test security and avoid errors made 
by the test taker. This is in contrast to many other intelligence measures that can be administered 
via paper and pencil in large group settings. Similarly, when developing any type of assessment 
that contains multiple tests, it can potentially increase the cost and time of administration 
(Ployhart & Holtz, 2008). Researchers and practitioners need to be cognizant of the balance 
between assessing a range of abilities while accounting for practical limitations. There should 
also be some consideration of how test takers may react to information processing measures. Past 
research has shown that test takers often rate measures using abstract item types as less face valid 
than measures of vocabulary and math (Smither, Reilly, Millsap, & Pearlman, 1993). The way 
that test takers perceive a measure can have important implications for test-taking motivation, 
job acceptance intentions, and even performance on the measure (Ryan & Ployhart, 2000). These 
potential limitations should not prevent researchers and practitioners from evaluating the 
practicality of administering information processing measures but should rather factor into their 
overall assessment of the measures’ utility.  
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Limitations  
 Despite best efforts, there are still limitations to the current meta-analysis that should be 
noted. Foremost, the sample size for the overall study was fairly low. Even when using 
multilevel analyses to capture multiple effect sizes within a sample, there was still a limited 
number of samples available for analysis. This was particularly noticeable when examining 
moderators, as several groups (e.g., measures from the cognitive science approach, psychometric 
measures with diverse tasks) were not well represented in the literature. Similarly, there was a 
lack of research examining the population norms for most of these measures. Even when some 
normative data exists, it is frequently based on populations that do not generalize to most I-O 
psychology research, such as children and clinical populations, making it impractical to correct 
for range restriction in the current study. While correcting observed correlations is a debated 
practice in general (e.g., Richardson & Norgate, 2015), several prior meta-analyses have reported 
corrected correlations for both measurement error and restriction of range. As such, direct 
comparisons between the estimates from the current study and past meta-analyses on the 
corrected values must be done carefully.  
 Another potential limitation is the process for identifying information processing 
measures and categorizing them based on the relevant moderators. First, it was necessary to 
decide how to operationalize information processing measures. In reality, many measures of 
intelligence include an information processing component, however, they are not strictly 
information processing measures. For the purposes of the current study, a blunt delineation was 
made around information processing measures. However, there may be measures that are on the 
edge of this distinction that could be useful for understanding the interplay between information 
processing and crystallized knowledge. This makes the current study a conservative assessment 
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but could be reevaluated with a broader scope of information processing measures in the future. 
Furthermore, the classification of moderators was restricted into dichotomous variables even 
though continuous variables would be better suited for the study. For both diversity of tasks and 
language knowledge requirements, there was a restriction in variation that made it impractical to 
examine more nuanced analyses with the moderators.  
 Finally, it is important to note some caveats regarding meta-analysis findings in general. 
Meta-analyses are limited by the available data in primary studies. As many studies do not report 
information about all relevant methodological features and statistics, it can be difficult to 
appropriately aggregate and correct the data (Richardson & Norgate, 2015; Schmitt, Arnold, & 
Nieminen, 2010). For example, most studies do not report local reliabilities, meaning corrections 
for measurement error must be imputed based on external data, usually other meta-analyses. This 
can limit the appropriateness of a correction being made. Similarly, without information about a 
study’s sample or test administration, it can be difficult to know the degree of heterogeneity 
within a dataset. In addition, while attempts are made to overcome the file-drawer problem, it is 
impossible to know if all data has been included in a meta-analysis. This means there is still a 
potential bias in the dataset for published studies. These caveats do not mean meta-analyses and 
their findings are unusable but should be seen as a step in evaluating the current research on a 
topic and promoting more research in that area. It is important to follow up meta-analyses with 
comprehensive studies that have greater control over the factors of interest to reduce error 
variations across factors (e.g., Bobko & Roth, 2003; Bobko & Stone-Romero, 1998).  
Future Research 
 There are many avenues for future research on information processing measures. In 
addition to the research areas discussed above, several key areas should be addressed to better 
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evaluate the utility of information processing measures. One primary line of research is 
examining how contextual factors influence the validity and group score differences for 
information processing measures. The current meta-analysis focused on measure level factors, 
but many past meta-analyses have examined how intelligence measures perform differently 
based on the content of the job (e.g., low vs. high complexity jobs) (Gonzalez-Mulé et al., 2014; 
Hülsheger et al., 2007; Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Salgado et al., 2003; Ziegler et al., 2011) or the 
stakes associated with the test (e.g., low vs. high testing stakes) (Postlethwaite, 2011). These 
types of moderators can elucidate the contexts in which information processing measures operate 
most effectively.  
 Another fruitful avenue of research is examining the explanatory power of information 
processing measures in comparison to other intelligence measures. For the current study, 
estimates of the validity for information processing measures were examined in isolation and 
then compared to existing meta-analytic estimates of other intelligence measures. To better 
understand the contribution of information processing measures to the validity of outcomes, they 
should be evaluated in studies that administer and evaluate multiple intelligence measures at 
once. This fits with recent intelligence theories that suggest when multiple measures of specific 
cognitive abilities are administered simultaneously, they can be equally or more predictive than 
general intelligence measures (e.g., Lang & Bliese, 2012; Lang et al., 2010; Van Der Maas et al., 
2006). Through the use of relative weights analysis (Johnson & LeBreton, 2004), it is possible to 
assess the contribution of each intelligence measure for predicting an outcome. Such analyses 
can offer insight into the unique variance explained by information processing measures 
compared to other intelligence measures. It should be noted that even when measures do not 
explain much variance beyond other measures in a battery, they still may be useful as 
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independent measures when situational constraints limit the number of measures that can be 
administered.  
 A final area of research that will be critical going forward is examinations of mean score 
differences for groups besides African Americans and Caucasians. The information processing 
literature and I-O psychology can benefit from deeper examinations of several possible group 
score differences, such as those based on a person’s sex and age. Though some meta-analytic 
work has shown that men have a slight advantage on the Raven’s Matrices (d = .33) (Irwing & 
Lynn, 2005), more research is needed to determine if this difference generalizes to other 
measures. In addition, age differences are perhaps the most well-known group difference related 
to information processing measures. Evidence suggests that as people grow older, there is a 
general slowing of the frontal lobe in executing cognitive functions and more difficulty retaining 
information in temporary storage (Bugg, Zook, DeLosh, Davalos, & Davis, 2006). This fits with 
early research by Horn and Cattell (1966) that showed fluid reasoning was negatively related to 
age. Beyond sex and age differences, more research is needed on differences between races not 
examined in the current study (e.g., Hispanic, Asian) as well as other demographics. 
Furthermore, a principal feature of information processing measures is their reduced language 
requirements, making them appealing in international settings. Research is needed to better 
understand how these tests operate with a global population and examine potential sources of 
group score differences. For example, past research has found multilingual speakers may 
outperform monolingual speakers on measures of executive function (Bialystok, Craik, Klein, & 
Viswanathan, 2004). I-O psychologists should pay careful attention to these types of possible 
group differences as they relate directly to adverse impact and could have important implications 
for differential validity of information processing measures.  
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Conclusion 
 The importance of intelligence measures in I-O and educational psychology is undeniable 
as they are strong predictors of performance across a wide spectrum of contexts. As a result of 
their value to both researchers and practitioners, it is critical to continually improve upon the 
intelligence literature by clarifying intelligence as a construct and refining its measurement. 
Although information processing and its measurement have been a topic of discussion since the 
beginning of contemporary intelligence research, it has not been abundantly investigated to 
properly understand its full potential in predicting critical outcomes and reducing group score 
differences. The findings from the current study offer an initial evaluation of their utility, which 
hopefully contributes to the current revival of research on the topic. The utility of these measures 
in various contexts still needs to be explored in greater depth, but there is significant potential 
within these measures. Paired together with past research on intelligence and leveraging 
methodologies and findings from other disciplines, I-O and educational psychology have the 
opportunity to significantly advance knowledge about intelligence and how to best predict its 
outcomes.  
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Appendix A:  
Coding Form 
 
 
 
Coder Author(s) Year Article Title
Journal/ 
Thesis/ 
Dissertation/ 
Conference
Summary of 
Article (1-2 
sentences)
Does Study 
Include 
Measure of 
Information 
Processing?
Does Study 
Examine 
Information 
Processing 
Measure and 1) 
Relationship 
with 
Performance 
Outcomes, 2) 
Group Score 
Differences, or 
3) Both? 
Is Sample 
Non-Clinical 
and Over 18 
Years Old?
Does Study 
Include 
Manipulations?
PUBLICATION INFO INCLUSION/EXCLUSION CRITERIA
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If Study 
Includes 
Manipulation
s, Does it 
Have a 
Control 
Group? 
Does Study 
Include 
Correlations 
and/or 
Cohen’s d?
If Study 
Does Not 
Include 
Correlation 
or Cohen's 
d, Does it 
Include 
Statistics to 
Calculate 
Correlation 
and/or 
Cohen’s d?
Does Study 
Meet 
Inclusion 
Criteria? 
Number of 
Relevant 
Studies in 
Paper (Use 
Separate Row 
for Each Study)
Is Intelligence 
a Focal 
Variable, 
Secondary 
Variable, or 
Control 
Variable?
Does Study 
Include 
Manipulations?
If Study Has 
Manipulation, 
What Is the 
Manipulation? 
Only Include 
Data for 
Control 
Conditions.
N (Sample 
Size) Per 
Study 
Sample Type (Job 
Applicants; Job 
Incumbents; 
Undergraduate 
Students; Graduate 
Students)
STUDY DETAILSINCLUSION/EXCLUSION CRITERIA (CONTINUED) SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
For Employees, 
What Industry/ 
Industries are 
Participants 
From? List All
For Students, 
Where Were They 
Recruited From 
(Participant Pool; 
Psychology 
Class)?
Were 
Participants 
Screened Prior 
to Participating? 
If So, What 
Were They 
Screened On?
Number of 
Female 
Participants
Number of 
Male 
Participants
Number of 
African 
American/ 
Black 
Participants
Number of 
Asian 
Participants
Number of 
Caucasian/ 
White 
Participants
Number of 
Hispanic 
Participants
Number of 
Participants 
Listed as 
Another 
Race (List 
Race and 
Number if 
Reported)
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS (CONTINUED)
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Number of 
Participants 
Where 
English is 
Their 
Primary 
Language
Number of 
Participants 
Where 
English is 
Not Their 
Primary 
Language Age Range
Field Study, 
Lab Study, 
or Online 
Study
List Each 
Country 
Data was 
Collected 
From
List 
Countries 
Participants 
Were Born 
In and 
Number of 
Participants 
Born There
List Each 
Country 
Data was 
Collected 
From
List All Control 
Variables
Is Socio-
Economic Status 
Included in Study? 
If So, Was It 
Controlled For? 
List All 
Intelligence 
Measures 
that are Not 
Information 
Processing 
Measures 
List All DVs 
Not Tested 
with 
Information 
Processing 
Measures
VARIABLESSAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS (CONTINUED)
Name of 
Information 
Processing 
Measure 
(Use 
Separate 
Row for 
Each 
Measure)
Citation for 
Measure
Theoretical 
Approach for 
Measure 
(Psychometric 
or Cognitive 
Science)
Version of the 
Measure 
and/or Year it 
Was Published
Original or 
Adapted/ 
Modified 
Version of 
Measure
If Adapted, 
How? 
Number of 
Test Items
Number of 
Dimensions 
on Test
Name of 
Each 
Dimension
Number of 
Task Types
List Name of 
All Task 
Types 
Reported
Provide Brief 
Description 
of Task 
Types 
Reported (1-
2 
Sentences)
INFORMATION PROCESSING MEASURES
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Do Items 
Include 
Language?
Level of 
Training 
(Instructions 
Only, 
Practice 
Round, 
Formal 
Training)
Timed or 
Not Timed
If Timed, 
What Was 
Time Limit?
Speeded or 
Not 
Speeded 
(i.e., 
Intentional 
Time 
Pressure 
with Timed 
Test)
If Speeded, 
is There a 
Practice 
Round?  
If Speeded, 
is Score 
Computed 
by Time 
Taken or 
Number of 
Correct 
Items? 
Administration 
Method (Paper-
Pencil, Computer 
Based, Computer 
Adaptive)
Proctored or 
Non-
Proctored
Type of 
Reliability 
Reported
Reliability 
Coefficent
INFORMATION PROCESSING MEASURES (CONTINUED)
Name or 
Description 
of 
Dependent 
Variable 
(Use 
Separate 
Row for 
Each 
Measure)
Citation for 
Measure
Supervisor/ 
Instructor 
Rating; Peer 
Rating; 
Objective 
Rating; Self-
Report
Type of DV 
(e.g., CWB, 
GPA, training 
outcome, 
simulation 
performance; 
work sample; 
job 
knowledge 
test; 
supervisor 
rating; peer 
rating; multi-
source rating)
Type of 
Performanc
e (Job,  
Academic, 
or  Job-
Oriented 
Training)
Is DV a 
Composite 
(e.g., 
Composite 
of Grades 
from Multiple 
Classes)?
If Yes, 
Provide Brief 
Description 
of 
Composite
Is DV a 
Single Item 
Rating?
Is DV Uni-
dimensional 
or Multi-
dimensional?
Type of 
Reliability 
Reported
Reliability 
Coefficent
Sample Size 
for DV 
Is DV used 
for Research 
(e.g., 
Supervisor 
Ratings for 
Study), 
Evaluative 
(e.g., Hiring 
Decision), or 
Development 
Purposes?
Concurrent 
vs. 
Predictive 
Validity Test
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
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Was There 
a Time Lag 
between 
Information 
Processing 
Measure 
and DV?
If Time Lag, 
How Long? 
Did Hypotheses 
Predict a 
Significant 
Relationship 
beween Information 
Processing and 
DV?
Type of 
Statistic 
between 
Information 
Processing 
Measure 
and DV 
(e.g., r, t, F )
Sample Size 
for Effect 
Size
If r, Provide 
Statistic
If Not r, 
Provide All 
Relevant 
Statistics
Group 
Differences 
Reported (e.g., 
Caucasian to 
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young to old). 
Use Separate 
Row for Each 
Group 
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Reported
What is the 
d if 
Reported?
What is the 
Sample Size 
for Each 
Group?
EFFECT SIZES GROUP SCORE DIFFERENCESDEPENDENT VARIABLES (CONTINUED)
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Did Hypotheses Predict 
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Table 1 
 
Representative Sample of Psychometric Information Processing Measures  
 
Psychometric Measures 
Measure Name Measure Citation Sample Citations Reporting on Measure 
Ability Processing of Information 
and Learning Battery – Concept 
Formation Test 
Taylor, 1997 Mashu, 2015; Pretorius, 2010 
Baddeley Reasoning Test Baddeley, 1968 
Chamorro-Premuzic & Furnham, 2008; Furnham, 2012; 
Furnham et al., 2006 
Berlin Test of Intelligence Structure – 
Fluid Subtest 
Jäger et al., 2006 
Kunina Wilhelm, Formazin, Jonkmann, & Schroeders, 
2007 
Cattell Culture Fair Intelligence Test Cattell, 1973 
Belhekar, 2017; Côté & Miners, 2006; Domino, 1964; 
Durso et al., 2016; Lowery et al., 2004; Naderi, 
Abdullah, Hamid, & Sharir, 2009  
D-48/D-70 Test Black, 1961  
Domino, 1964; Domino, 2000; McLaurin, Pendergraa, 
& Kennedy, 1973  
Differential Aptitude Test – Abstract 
Reasoning Subtest 
Bennet, Seashore, & Wesman, 
1991  
Alkhadher, Clarke, & Anderson, 1998; Chamorro-
Premuzic et al., 2009; Colonia-Willner, 1998; J. J. 
Kirkpatrick et al., 1968 
General Ability Measure for Adults Naglieri & Bardos, 1997 Harper, 2014; Ispas, Iliescu, Ilie, & Johson, 2010  
General Reasoning Tests – Abstract 
Reasoning Subscale 
PsyTech International, Ltd. PsyTech International, Ltd. 
Intelligenz-Struktur-Test  
Amthauer, Brocke, Liepmann, 
& Beauducel, 2001  
Bühner et al., 2006; König, Bühner, & Mürling, 2005; 
Krumm et al., 2012  
Intelligence Structure Battery S2 Arendasy et a., 2005  Sommer et al., 2006 
Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test Kaufman & Kaufman, 1997  Bradshaw, 2008 
Primary Mental Abilities Test – 
Inductive Reasoning Subtest 
Thurstone, 1938  
Burton & Dowling, 2010; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 
2009  
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Psychometric Measures 
Measure Name Measure Citation Sample Citations Reporting on Measure 
Raven’s Matrices Raven, Raven, & Court, 2000 
K. G. Brown & Day, 2006; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 
2009; Day, Hanson, Maltby, Proctor, & Wood, 2010; de 
Bruin et al. 2005; Di Fabio & Palazzeschi, 2009; Goh & 
Moore, 1978; Montgomery, 1962  
SRA Pictorial Reasoning Test 
Science Research Associates, 
1967  
Fox & Lefkowitz, 1974; Kirkpatrick et al., 1968; 
Lefkowtiz, 1972 
TRASI Rubio & Santacreu, 2003  Colom, Martínez-Molina, Shih, & Santacreu, 2010 
 
  
 
1
2
1
 
Table 2  
 
Representative Sample of Cognitive Science Information Processing Measures  
 
Cognitive Science Measures 
Measure Name Measure Citation Sample Citations Reporting on Measure 
Cognitive Assessment System Naglieri & Das, 1997 Fein & Day, 2004 
CogScreen - AE Working Memory 
Subtest 
Kay, 1995  
Taylor, O’Hara, Mumenthaler, Rosen, & Yesavage, 
2005  
Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cognitive 
Ability Battery 
Higgins et al., 2007 Higgins et al., 2007; Sabet et al., 2013 
Executive Attention Battery Bosco et al., 2015 Bosco et al., 2015 
Operation Span Task Turner & Engle, 1989 
Bergersen & Gustafsson, 2011; Durso, 2006; Hambrick 
et al., 2010; Periman, 2016; Rohde & Thompson, 2007  
Reading Span Task Daneman & Carpenter, 1980 
Bergersen & Gustafsson, 2011; Durso, 2016; König et 
al., 2005; Perlow et al., 1997 
Sentence Verification Task Nelson, 2003 Nelson, 2003 
Test Battery for Attentional 
Performance  
Zimmermann & Fimm, 1993  Bühner et al., 2006; König et al., 2005 
Tower of London/Hanoi Shallice, 1982  Culbertson et al., 2013 
Verbal Working Memory Task Salthouse, 1992  Perlow et al., 1997 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test Berg, 1948  Culbertson et al., 2013; Hidlebrand, 1996 
Working Memory Test Battery 
Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & 
Wittman, 2003 
Bühner et al., 2006; König et al., 2005; Krumm et al., 
2012 
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Table 3  
 
Reliability Coefficients Used for Correcting Measurement Error in the Criterion  
 
Criterion Type 
Reliability 
Coefficient 
Source 
Job Performance Rated by 
Supervisor 
.52 
Rothstein, 1990; Salgado et al., 2003; Salgado 
& Tauriz, 2014; Viswesvaran, Ones, & 
Schmidt, 1996   
Job Performance Rated by 
Peer 
.42 Viswesvaran et al., 1996 
Objective Task Performance 
(e.g., Work Samples; 
Simulations) 
.80 McKay & McDaniel, 2006; Roth et al., 2003  
Counterproductive 
Workplace Behaviors 
.82 Gonzalez-Mulé et al., 2014 
Organizational Citizenship 
Behaviors  
.89 Gonzalez-Mulé et al., 2014 
Training Course Assessment 
(e.g., Grade in Training 
Class) 
.90 Brown, Le, & Schmidt, 2006  
Training Evaluation (e.g., 
Instructor Rating) 
.56 Salgado et al., 2003 
Transfer of Skill Test .75 
Alliger, Tannenbaum, Bennett, Traver, & 
Shotland, 1997  
Retention of Skill Test .53 Alliger et al., 1997 
GPA .83 Kuncel et al., 2001  
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Table 4 
 
Information Processing Measures and Performance Outcomes 
 
 
ksources/samples/effects n rw ser 
95% CIr 
rc serc 
95% CIrc 
LL UL LL UL 
Overall performance 
outcomes 
100/121/234 36,658 .19 .02 .15 .24 .23 .03 .18 .28 
Job performance 
outcomes (overall) 
45/56/122 19,440 .19 .04 .12 .26 .25 .04 .16 .33 
Subjective job 
performance 
outcomes 
31/39/75 13,437 .14 .03 .07 .20 .19 .05 .10 .28 
Objective job 
performance 
outcomes 
18/21/47 6,003 .30 .07 .16 .43 .33 .08 .18 .49 
Job-oriented training 
performance 
outcomes 
16/18/48 8,629 .22 .06 .10 .34 .25 .07 .11 .38 
Academic 
performance 
outcomes  
43/49/64 8,589 .19 .02 .15 .22 .21 .02 .17 .24 
Note. k = number of sources of data/independent study samples/effect sizes; n = cumulative total sample size for effect sizes; rweighted = 
inverse sampling variance-weighted, uncorrected mean correlation; ser = standard error of weighted, uncorrected mean correlation; rc 
= mean correlation corrected for measurement error in the criterion; serc = standard error of correlation corrected for measurement 
error in the criterion; 95% CI = the lower limit (LL) and upper limit (UL) of the confidence interval around the correlation corrected 
for measurement error in the criterion.
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Table 5 
 
Group Score Differences  
 
 
ksources/samples/effects n dweighted sed 
95% CI 
LL UL 
Overall effect 20/23/32 26,092 .41 .12 .17 .65 
Note. k = number of sources of data/independent study samples/effect sizes; n = cumulative total sample size for effect sizes; dweighted 
= inverse sampling variance-weighted, uncorrected mean d value; sed = standard error of weighted, uncorrected mean d value; 95% CI 
= the lower limit (LL) and upper limit (UL) of the confidence interval around the weighted, uncorrected d value. 
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Table 6 
 
Theoretical Approach and Performance Outcomes  
 
 
ksources/samples/effects n rw ser 
95% CIr 
rc serc 
95% CIrc 
LL UL LL UL 
Overall performance outcomes 
    Psychometric 85/99/163 26,856 .18 .02 .14 .23 .22 .03 .16 .27 
    Cognitive science 20/27/71 9,802 .23 .04 .14 .31 .28 .05 .19 .38 
Job performance outcomes (overall) 
    Psychometric 35/41/66 11,044 .16 .04 .09 .23 .21 .04 .12 .30 
    Cognitive science 14/19/56 8,396 .22 .06 .10 .34 .29 .07 .15 .43 
Subjective job performance outcomes 
    Psychometric 27/31/51 8,984 .15 .03 .08 .21 .20 .05 .10 .29 
    Cognitive science 6/10/24 4,453 .12 .08 -.03 .27 .17 .10 -.03 .37 
Objective job performance outcomes 
    Psychometric 11/12/15 2,060 .23 .07 .08 .37 .25 .08 .09 .41 
    Cognitive science 9/11/32 3,943 .34 .09 .16 .51 .38 .10 .18 .57 
Job-oriented training performance outcomes 
    Psychometric 15/17/46 8,445 .22 .06 .09 .34 .24 .07 .10 .38 
    Cognitive science 1/1/2 184 .32 .17 -.02 .65 .39 .19 .01 .77 
Academic performance outcomes  
    Psychometric 38/43/51 7,367 .18 .02 .14 .22 .20 .02 .16 .24 
    Cognitive science 6/7/13 1,222 .23 .05 .14 .32 .25 .05 .15 .35 
Note. k = number of sources of data/independent study samples/effect sizes; n = cumulative total sample size for effect sizes; rweighted = 
inverse sampling variance-weighted, uncorrected mean correlation; ser = standard error of weighted, uncorrected mean correlation; rc 
= mean correlation corrected for measurement error in the criterion; serc = standard error of correlation corrected for measurement 
error in the criterion; 95% CI = the lower limit (LL) and upper limit (UL) of the confidence interval around the correlation corrected 
for measurement error in the criterion.
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Table 7 
 
Group Score Differences by Theoretical Approach  
 
 
ksources/samples/effects n dweighted sed 
95% CI 
LL UL 
Overall effect 
    Psychometric 14/14/15 3,844 .46 .09 .27 .64 
    Cognitive science 7/10/17 22,248 .40 .14 .11 .69 
Note. k = number of sources of data/independent study samples/effect sizes; n = cumulative total sample size for effect sizes; dweighted 
= inverse sampling variance-weighted, uncorrected mean d value; sed = standard error of weighted, uncorrected mean d value; 95% CI 
= the lower limit (LL) and upper limit (UL) of the confidence interval around the weighted, uncorrected d value. 
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Table 8 
 
Task Diversity Within the Psychometric Approach and Performance Outcomes 
 
 
ksources/samples/effects n rw ser 
95% CIr 
rc serc 
95% CIrc 
LL UL LL UL 
Overall performance outcomes 
    No task diversity 66/74/116 19,028 .21 .03 .15 .26 .24 .03 .17 .31 
    Task diversity 21/27/47 7,828 .13 .04 .06 .20 .16 .04 .08 .24 
Job performance outcomes (overall) 
    No task diversity 27/29/46 6,529 .16 .04 .08 .25 .21 .05 .11 .32 
    Task diversity 8/12/20 4,515 .16 .06 .04 .28 .21 .08 .05 .36 
Subjective job performance outcomes 
    No task diversity 20/20/32 4,598 .14 .04 .05 .23 .19 .06 .07 .31 
    Task diversity 7/11/19 4,386 .16 .05 .06 .26 .21 .07 .06 .35 
Objective job performance outcomes 
    No task diversity 10/11/14 1,931 .23 .09 .02 .43 .25 .10 .03 .48 
    Task diversity 1/1/1 129 .20 .27 -.39 .79 .22 .30 -.43 .88 
Job-oriented training performance outcomes 
    No task diversity 13/14/33 6,827 .25 .06 .13 .38 .27 .07 .13 .42 
    Task diversity 2/3/13 1,618 .06 .09 -.11 .24 .08 .10 -.12 .26 
Academic performance outcomes  
    No task diversity 28/33/37 5,672 .20 .02 .16 .24 .22 .02 .17 .27 
    Task diversity 12/12/14 1,695 .12 .04 .04 .19 .13 .04 .04 .21 
Note. k = number of sources of data/independent study samples/effect sizes; n = cumulative total sample size for effect sizes; rweighted = 
inverse sampling variance-weighted, uncorrected mean correlation; ser = standard error of weighted, uncorrected mean correlation; rc 
= mean correlation corrected for measurement error in the criterion; serc = standard error of correlation corrected for measurement 
error in the criterion; 95% CI = the lower limit (LL) and upper limit (UL) of the confidence interval around the correlation corrected 
for measurement error in the criterion.
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Table 9 
 
Task Diversity Within the Cognitive Sciences Approach and Performance Outcomes 
 
 
ksources/samples/effects n rw ser 
95% CIr 
rc serc 
95% CIrc 
LL UL LL UL 
Overall performance outcomes 
    No task diversity 14/15/44 6,471 .20 .07 .07 .33 .26 .07 .13 .40 
    Task diversity 8/14/27 3,331 .28 .06 .16 .39 .32 .07 .18 .46 
Job performance outcomes (overall) 
    No task diversity 10/11/35 5,872 .20 .09 .03 .37 .27 .09 .08 .45 
    Task diversity 5/9/21 2,524 .28 .09 .11 .45 .33 .10 .12 .53 
Subjective job performance outcomes 
    No task diversity 4/5/19 33,991 .11 .09 -.08 .30 .15 .13 -.12 .42 
    Task diversity 2/5/5 462 .23 .09 .05 .41 .32 .12 .07 .57 
Objective job performance outcomes 
    No task diversity 6/6/16 1,881 .38 .06 .26 .51 .43 .07 .29 .57 
    Task diversity 4/6/16 2,062 .29 .06 .16 .42 .33 .07 .18 .47 
Job-oriented training performance outcomes 
    No task diversity -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 
    Task diversity 1/1/2 184 .32 .07 -.59 1.00 a .39 .09 -.74 1.00a 
Academic performance outcomes  
    No task diversity 4/4/9 599 .22 .04 .12 .31 .24 .05 .13 .35 
    Task diversity 3/4/4 623 .24 .05 .14 .35 .27 .05 .15 .38 
Note. k = number of sources of data/independent study samples/effect sizes; n = cumulative total sample size for effect sizes; rweighted = 
inverse sampling variance-weighted, uncorrected mean correlation; ser = standard error of weighted, uncorrected mean correlation; rc 
= mean correlation corrected for measurement error in the criterion; serc = standard error of correlation corrected for measurement 
error in the criterion; 95% CI = the lower limit (LL) and upper limit (UL) of the confidence interval around the correlation corrected 
for measurement error in the criterion. 
a Upper limit of this confidence interval was above 1.00 but reported at the highest correlation value possible.
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Table 10 
 
Language Knowledge Requirements and Performance Outcomes  
 
 
ksources/samples/effects n rw ser 
95% CIr 
rc serc 
95% CIrc 
LL UL LL UL 
Overall performance outcomes 
No language 
knowledge requirement 
89/103/183 29,084 .19 .02 .14 .23 .22 .03 .17 .28 
Language knowledge 
requirement 
19/26/51 7,574 .23 .05 .13 .33 .28 .05 .18 .38 
Job performance outcomes (overall) 
No language 
knowledge requirement 
40/47/89 14,005 .17 .03 .10 .23 .22 .04 .14 .30 
Language knowledge 
requirement 
9/13/33 5,435 .24 .08 .08 .40 .31 .09 .13 .48 
Subjective job performance outcomes 
No language 
knowledge requirement 
29/34/64 10,707 .14 .03 .08 .20 .19 .04 .11 .28 
Language knowledge 
requirement 
3/6/11 2,730 .12 .11 -.10 .34 .17 .15 -.14 .47 
Objective job performance outcomes 
No language 
knowledge requirement 
14/15/25 3,298 .25 .07 .11 .38 .28 .07 .13 .43 
Language knowledge 
requirement 
7/9/22 22,705 .36 .10 .16 .55 .40 .11 .18 .62 
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Table 10 Continued 
 
 
ksources/samples/effects n rw ser 
95% Cir 
rc serc 
95% CIrc 
LL UL LL UL 
Job-oriented training performance outcomes 
No language 
knowledge 
requirement 
15/17/46 8,445 .22 .06 .09 .34 .24 .07 .10 .38 
Language knowledge 
requirement 
1/1/2 184 .32 .17 -.02 .65 .39 .19 .01 .77 
Academic performance outcomes 
No language 
knowledge 
requirement 
37/41/48 6,634 .18 .03 .14 .22 .20 .02 .16 .25 
Language knowledge 
requirement 
10/12/16 1,955 .20 .04 .13 .28 .22 .04 .14 .30 
Note. k = number of sources of data/independent study samples/effect sizes; n = cumulative total sample size for effect sizes; rweighted = 
inverse sampling variance-weighted, uncorrected mean correlation; ser = standard error of weighted, uncorrected mean correlation; rc 
= mean correlation corrected for measurement error in the criterion; serc = standard error of correlation corrected for measurement 
error in the criterion; 95% CI = the lower limit (LL) and upper limit (UL) of the confidence interval around the correlation corrected 
for measurement error in the criterion. 
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Table 11 
Summary of Findings by Hypothesis   
Hypothesis Theoretical Rationale Summary of Findings Key Takeaways 
Hypothesis 1: 
Information processing 
measures will be 
positively correlated 
with (a) job 
performance, (b) job-
oriented training 
performance, and (c) 
academic performance. 
Information processing entails 
the fundamental cognitive 
processes that lead to declarative 
and procedural knowledge, and 
therefore should predict 
performance across several 
domains. 
The mean uncorrected 
correlation between information 
processing and all performance 
outcomes is .19.  
 
The smallest mean uncorrected 
correlation is between 
information processing and 
subjective job performance at 
.14.  
 
The largest mean uncorrected 
correlation is between 
information processing and 
objective job performance at .30.  
Past meta-analyses have shown 
other intelligence measures to 
have uncorrected correlations 
between .22 (Bertua et al., 2005) 
and .43 (Bobko, Roth, & 
Potosky, 1999) with subjective 
job performance, .30 (Roth et al., 
2005) with objective job 
performance, between .23 
(Schmitt & Fandre, 2008) and 
.38 (Postlethwaite, 2011) with 
job-oriented training, and 
between .27 and .45 (Kuncel & 
Hezlett, 2007) with academic 
performance.  
 
While the mean uncorrected 
correlations for information 
processing measures are slightly 
below other measures of 
intelligence, they clearly have 
predictive validity. The 
hypothesis is supported.  
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Table 11 Continued 
    
Hypothesis Theoretical Rationale Summary of Findings Key Takeaways 
Hypothesis 2: 
Information processing 
measures will have 
smaller group scores 
differences between 
African American and 
Caucasian test takers 
than traditionally found 
on intelligence 
measures (i.e., d = 
1.00). 
Information processing measures 
reduce the reliance on prior 
knowledge, which can differ 
based on past education, cultural 
background, socio-economic 
status, and so forth. By 
minimizing knowledge on these 
measures, differences between 
groups should also be reduced.  
The uncorrected d value across 
all information processing 
measures is .41, with a 95% 
confidence interval of .17 to .65. 
Past studies have shown other 
intelligence measures to have 
uncorrected d values ranging 
from .60 for specific abilities 
(Hough et al., 2001) to 1.14 for 
the GATB (Berry et al., 2014). 
Generally, reviews point to a d 
value of 1.00 for intelligence 
measures.  
 
The current study shows that 
information processing measures 
have d values that are much 
smaller than common measures 
of intelligence. The hypothesis is 
supported.   
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Table 11 Continued 
    
Hypothesis Theoretical Rationale Summary of Findings Key Takeaways 
Hypothesis 3: 
Cognitive science 
measures of 
information processing 
will have a stronger 
relationship with (a) 
job performance, (b) 
job-oriented training 
performance, and (c) 
academic performance 
than psychometric 
measures of 
information processing. 
The two theoretical approaches 
differ in their theoretical 
foundation, coverage of the 
construct space, and item design. 
The psychometric approach 
relies more on statistical analyses 
for determining the structure of 
intelligence whereas the 
cognitive science approach uses 
biological and 
neurophysiological research. 
This also translates to the 
cognitive science approach 
capturing a broader set of 
cognitive functions as it relates 
directly to cognitive processes 
rather than relying on a 
statistically abstract approach. 
Finally, the cognitive science 
approach uses more dynamic 
stimuli compared to the 
psychometric approach.  
The cognitive science approach 
consistently has higher 
uncorrected validities except for 
subjective performance 
outcomes, which slightly favors 
the psychometric approach with 
a difference of .03.  
 
For the other outcomes, the 
smallest differences favoring the 
cognitive science approach are 
.05 for overall performance and 
academic performance.  
 
The largest difference favoring 
the cognitive science approach is 
.11 for objective job 
performance.  
 
However, the confidence 
intervals for all outcomes 
overlap.  
The trends generally support the 
notion that the cognitive science 
approach has stronger validities 
than the psychometric approach.  
 
More research is needed though 
since the confidence intervals 
overlap.  
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Table 11 Continued 
    
Hypothesis Theoretical Rationale Summary of Findings Key Takeaways 
Hypothesis 4: 
Cognitive science 
measures of 
information processing 
will have smaller group 
score differences 
between African 
American and 
Caucasian test takers 
than psychometric 
measures of 
information processing.   
The cognitive science approach 
is more deeply rooted in the 
physiological sciences than the 
psychometric approach. Research 
suggests that group score 
differences cannot be fully 
explained by biological factors, 
meaning measures assessing the 
physiological domain may 
reduce deficiencies and 
contamination that are associated 
with irrelevant error contributing 
to group score differences.  
The uncorrected d value for the 
cognitive science approach (.40) 
is lower than the uncorrected d 
value for the psychometric 
approach (.46).  
 
However, the confidence 
intervals overlap.  
Both approaches lead to smaller 
differences than seen with typical 
intelligence measures.  
 
There is a trend suggesting the 
cognitive science approach 
produces smaller group score 
differences than the 
psychometric approach, though 
the confidence intervals overlap.  
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Table 11 Continued 
    
Hypothesis Theoretical Rationale Summary of Findings Key Takeaways 
Hypothesis 5: 
Psychometric measures 
of information 
processing with a 
diverse set of item 
types will have a 
stronger relationship 
with (a) job 
performance, (b) job-
oriented training 
performance, and (c) 
academic performance 
than psychometric 
measures of 
information processing 
that do not have a 
diverse set of item 
types. 
Increasing the number of tasks 
assessed within a measure should 
reduce error associated with any 
one of those measures. 
Therefore, more tasks within a 
measure should lower the 
psychometric sampling error of 
the measure.  
For most outcomes, there is 
either little difference between 
the uncorrected effect sizes or the 
uncorrected effect size for 
measures with no task diversity 
is larger than for measures with 
task diversity.  
 
Job-oriented training has the 
largest difference favoring no 
task diversity with a difference of 
.19, though the sample size is 
very small. The next largest 
differences favoring no task 
diversity are .08 for all 
performance outcomes and 
academic performance.  
 
There is a small difference (.02) 
favoring measures with task 
diversity for subjective job 
performance.  
 
The confidence intervals overlap 
for all outcomes. 
Overall, the hypothesis is not 
supported as the trends mostly 
suggest larger validities for 
measures with no task diversity 
than measures with task 
diversity.  
 
The small sample sizes and large 
overlap in the confidence 
intervals means more research is 
needed to understand this pattern 
of findings.  
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Table 11 Continued 
    
Hypothesis Theoretical Rationale Summary of Findings Key Takeaways 
Hypothesis 6: 
Cognitive science 
measures of 
information processing 
with a diverse set of 
item types will have a 
stronger relationship 
with (a) job 
performance, (b) job-
oriented training 
performance, and (c) 
academic performance 
than cognitive science 
measures of 
information processing 
that do not have a 
diverse set of item 
types. 
Measures from the cognitive 
science approach are meant to 
assess specific cognitive 
functions. The more tasks 
included in a cognitive science 
measure should increase the 
number of specific functions 
being assessed, and therefore 
reduce deficiencies in assessing 
the focal variable.  
For most outcomes, measures 
with task diversity have a larger 
mean uncorrected correlation 
than measures with no task 
diversity.  
 
The largest differences favoring 
measures with task diversity are 
.12 for subjective job 
performance and academic 
performance, though the sample 
sizes are small.  
 
There is a difference favoring 
measures with no task diversity 
for objective job performance 
(.09). 
 
Overall, the confidence intervals 
overlap for all outcomes. 
The trends generally support the 
hypothesis. Measures with task 
diversity typically have larger 
validities than measures with no 
task diversity.  
 
However, there is a limited 
sample size and the confidence 
intervals overlap. Also, the 
validity for objective job 
performance contradicts the 
hypothesis. More research is 
needed to better understand the 
trends related to this hypothesis.  
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Table 11 Continued 
    
Hypothesis Theoretical Rationale Summary of Findings Key Takeaways 
Hypothesis 7: 
Information processing 
measures that require 
less language 
knowledge will have a 
stronger relationship 
with (a) job 
performance, (b) job-
oriented training 
performance, and (c) 
academic performance 
than information 
processing measures 
that require more 
language knowledge. 
Knowledge language 
requirements can introduce 
irrelevant test content when the 
performance outcome does not 
require the language assessed on 
the measure. Therefore, reducing 
the language knowledge 
requirement should reduce 
potential contamination from 
irrelevant knowledge.  
For most outcomes, measures 
with a language knowledge 
requirement have a larger mean 
uncorrected correlation than 
measures with no language 
knowledge requirement.  
 
The largest difference favoring 
measures with a language 
knowledge requirement is .11 for 
objective job performance.  
 
There is a small difference (.02) 
favoring measures with no 
language knowledge 
requirements.  
 
Overall, the confidence intervals 
overlap for all outcomes.  
The trends oppose the original 
hypothesis as most outcomes 
have a higher validity for 
measures that require language 
knowledge than measures that do 
not require language knowledge. 
 
The confidence intervals overlap 
across for all outcomes, meaning 
more research is needed to better 
understand these trends.   
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Figure 1. Decision tree for inclusion/exclusion criteria of meta-analysis. 
No Yes 
Yes 
Literature Search 
Does Study Include 
Measure of Information 
Processing? 
Does Study Examine 
Information Processing 
Measure and 1) Relationship 
with Performance Outcomes or 
2) Group Score Differences?  
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Clinical and Over 
18 Years Old? 
Do Not Include 
Does Study Include 
Correlations and/or 
Cohen’s d?  
Does Study 
Include 
Manipulations?  
Is There a 
Control Group? 
Does Study Include 
Statistics to 
Calculate 
Correlation and/or 
Cohen’s d?  
Yes No 
Yes No 
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Do Not Include 
No 
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